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Abstract
This paper is an overview of the social welfare systems of five East
Asian countries, namely Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Singapore. It analyses the overall costs of welfare as well as income
distribution aspects, based on both aggregate data and a programme-by-
programme review of their welfare states (presented in annex). Private
welfare is introduced in the analysis in two ways. First, it is argued that
sometimes welfare programmes are characterised by a mix of public and
private interventions, along the three dimensions of provision, finance
and decision. Second, this study explores the welfare roles played by
private actors alone, namely enterprises and families. The main
conclusions are that (i) Hong Kong and Singapore’s public welfare
expenditures will remain very low as long as they continue to rely
mainly upon privately financed welfare programmes, (ii) Korea and
Taiwan’s public welfare expenditures will grow significantly in the
coming years as their populations age, their old age pension
programmes mature and their various insurance schemes are extended
to marginal occupational groups, (iii) Japan’s ageing problem is
compounded by the weakening of the family as a provider of welfare,
which will put an extra burden on her welfare state, (iv) Japan and
Korea’s enterprises are challenged in their chief welfare role, namely
securing employment, which will also put an extra burden on their
welfare states and (v) the main income equalising factor in East Asia is
the very equal distribution of work across households, which is also
threatened by the weakening of enterprise and family welfare (i.e.,
respectively rising unemployment and decreasing income pooling inside
the family).
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Some East Asian countries have reached a level of industrialisation
comparable to that of Western countries. This is particularly true of
Japan and the four “New Industrialised Countries” (NICs): South Korea,
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. On the other hand, their social
welfare systems are widely considered to be underdeveloped. Indeed,
their very success is by some seen to lie in the low emphasis they give to
formal social welfare institutions. One fact supporting this view is their
low level of public expenditures on social welfare as a percentage of
GDP. Another element is the rhetoric of East Asian governments
themselves, championing “Asian values” as an alternative to the
Western “state-dependency” system. Until the recent Asian financial
crisis, many Western politicians have expressed interest in that
alternative, for different reasons depending upon their ideological
position.1
Several surveys of East Asian welfare states have already been
carried out.2 Many authors have taken a historical approach, seeking to
explain why those welfare systems have turned out to be what they are.
They have adopted either a political economy or a cultural perspective
or both.3 They also discussed whether there is such a thing as an “East
Asian model” of social security, as opposed to the often-quoted
European models.4 This study will not dwell any further on these
questions and perspectives.
My purpose is rather to examine the ways in which those five East
Asian countries are dealing with social risks and income inequality,
which affect any advanced economy. My overall research questions are
the following: Is it true that East Asian states are less involved in social
                                        
1 For a good discussion of “positive” and “negative orientalism” in welfare
policy, see Goodman, White and Kwon (1998a or 1998b).
2 Goodman, White and Kwon (1998a) offer a comprehensive and up-to-date
review of this large literature.
3 See among others Anderson (1993), Campbell (1992), Chow (1988), Dixon and
Kim (1985), Goodman and Peng (1996), Goodman, White and Kwon (1998a), Gould
(1993), Jones (1990a and 1993), Kwon (1995), Rose and Shiratori (1986) and Shinkawa
and Pembel (1996).
4 Such as the Bismarkian and Beveridgian models, or Esping-Anderson’s
liberal, conservative and social-democratic models.
8welfare than their Western counterparts? If yes, is the private sector
playing a role as an alternative provider of welfare? If it does, what are
the advantages and disadvantages of private versus public welfare
provision? And finally, are the current East Asian welfare systems
sustainable or will they have to adapt themselves to the current financial
crisis, as well as to changing economic, socio-cultural and demographic
conditions?
This paper aims at laying down the foundations for an economic
and quantitative analysis of those broad questions. The five East Asian
countries are compared to some major Western countries with two
yardsticks: cost and income distribution. The underlying idea is that it is
better for a country to have less income inequality with a cheaper
welfare system, everything else being equal. However, ratios of public
expenditures on social welfare to GDP and Gini coefficients are not
taken at face value. This paper’s objective is indeed to identify the main
factors that influence those two macro-measures and to compare them
across countries. This analysis must also reveal further elements to
assess the effectiveness of East Asian welfare systems, for aggregate
income inequality and cost alone are poor indicators indeed. Each
country’s welfare state is therefore studied in detail, and put into context
by looking at some important background variables, such as
demographic, economic and socio-cultural factors. At the outset, the
welfare state is considered as only one part of a country’s social welfare
system, because the private sector plays important welfare roles as well,
particularly in East Asia. 5
 Private welfare is given special attention in two ways. First, I will
examine Goodman, White and Kwon (1998a)’s proposition that East
Asian states do play an important role in welfare, albeit as regulators.6
Instead of providing services by themselves or using fiscal and spending
instruments, they rely on their regulatory power to enforce the private
sector to provide and finance certain types of welfare benefits. Burchardt
(1997) proposes a more operational definition of this regulatory role
(which she uses for Britain). In her typology of private versus public
welfare programmes, she distinguishes three dimensions that can be
independently controlled either by the state or by the private sector:
                                        
5 Several authors have stressed the importance of private actors in East Asian
welfare systems. See among others: Goodman, White and Kwon (1998a), Hall (1988),
Jones (1990a), Shinkawa and Pembel (1996).
 6 See also Kwon (1997).
9provision, finance and decision.7 Decision here refers to the ability of
consumers to choose whether they want to participate in a programme
at all, and if yes, what amount of services they want to buy. In other
words, there must be an affordable possibility of “exit” and no
intermediary or “agent” choosing for the consumer. This typology is
particularly interesting as it allows us to separate three goals of
privatisation: fostering competition among providers, lowering taxes
and enlarging consumers’ choice. Those three goals may be pursued
separately. For instance, contracting out services (private provision,
public finance, public decision) may increase competition; distributing
vouchers to consumers (public or private provision, public finance,
private decision) may foster both competition and choice; charging user
fees (public provision, private finance, public decision) allows for lower
taxes.8 I will use this typology in chapter II to discuss the importance of
hybrid welfare programmes in East Asian countries (programmes that
are public in at least one of the three dimensions but may be private in
one or both other dimensions).
The second way in which I will explore private welfare is by
discussing the welfare roles played by some private actors without any
input of the state (i.e., purely private programmes). Those actors are
enterprises and families. I will show how they take in charge some tasks
that are commonly under the responsibility of governments in Western
countries but that are relatively neglected by East Asian states. As little
data is available to measure family or enterprise welfare, I will limit
myself to highlight some societal characteristics of some East Asian
countries that have a direct impact on the need of the state to fulfil
specific social welfare functions. As shall be seen, this discussion is quite
complex, as it goes far beyond the field of social policy itself. Hence
conclusions in this part are more tentative.
                                        
 7 Provision refers to the legal status of the implementing agency. Government
departments and quasi-public social security authorities are considered as public,
while for-profit companies as well as charities and individuals are private actors.
Finance refers to the programme’s financing sources. Taxes and social security
contributions are public finance, while user charges and non-statutory contributions
constitute private finance. Decision is considered private if two conditions are met:
(i) there must be a range of alternative services available to consumers, which must
be close in terms of price and quality and (ii) consumers must be able to choose
services by themselves.
 8 Combinations are also possible. For example, ‘marketing of public services’
corresponds to public provision, private finance and private decision.
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This paper is organised as follows. The first chapter presents a
brief description of the five welfare states (see the end of this
introduction for a “user guide” of the descriptive framework).
The second chapter is a synthesis of the systematic programme-by-
programme review of East Asian welfare states. It identifies some
patterns shared by the five East Asian welfare states, as opposed to
Western ones. Yet differences between the East Asian countries
themselves are also highlighted, as well as their similarities with the
West. The focus is put on patterns that bear on the level of public
expenditures on social welfare and/or income distribution. For instance,
to what extent welfare programmes are publicly or privately financed
(which influences public expenditures)? How do different programmes
across countries compare in terms of generosity (which influences both
costs and income distribution)? And what are the mechanisms leading
to either vertical or horizontal redistribution (which influence income
distribution)?
To complement this programme-by-programme analysis, the third
and fourth chapters present macro evidence of respectively the costs of
social welfare and the structure of income distribution and discuss the
caveats of such broad measures.
 Chapters V and VI discuss the social welfare roles of enterprises
and families, respectively. Again, the main questions refer to cost and
income distribution aspects. Do East Asian enterprises and families take
in charge a bigger share of the economic costs of social welfare than in
the West? Are there any private mechanisms of income redistribution, as
opposed to taxes and transfers? Those chapters also contain background
information to put each country’s welfare system into context.
The conclusion summarises the main findings. A number of
hypotheses on the interactions between private and public welfare in
East Asia are suggested. I also emphasise the challenges that this
private/ public social welfare mix is currently facing, as a result of the
current financial crisis, as well as economic, socio-cultural and
demographic factors.
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 Reference Guide to the Welfare States of Five East Asian Countries
 The basic material for this study is a reference guide to the welfare states
of five East Asian countries, presented in annex 1.9 It consists of one
section for each country, divided into the same sector-based sub-
sections. “Welfare state”, “social security”, “social welfare” or “social
policy” are rather vague terms. The International Labour Organisation
defines “social security” as all public programmes that aim to protect
people against the following “social risks”: health care, maternity,
invalidity, occupational injury10, disability, old age, survivor, family11
and unemployment. My list of “social welfare” sectors includes two
additional social policy areas, although to a lesser extent: education and
housing.
 For each country and sector, a number of programmes of
programmes have been identified. Although the aim is to be as complete
as possible, the sheer number of policy instruments makes it almost
impossible to be exhaustive. Hence the choice of programmes is biased
in several ways according to the availability of information: (i) small
programmes tend to be neglected, (ii) cash programmes are better
represented than services, (iii) some local government programmes are
overlooked.
 This reference guide is summarised in chapter I, which includes
synthetic tables of the cash programmes of each country. Those tables
include the following descriptive categories:
· Instrument: Social security instruments are taken from the
taxonomy of Dixon and Chow (1992). Those concepts are meant to
express most characteristics of a programme in a nutshell (see
                                        
9 Readers must be aware that programme descriptions are quickly outdated.
The pace of change of East Asian social welfare systems has been particularly rapid
in the 1990s. Earlier systematic attempts to describe East Asian welfare systems can
be found in Dixon and Kim (1985) and Dixon and Chow (1992). There are also two
excellent reference guides on social security systems throughout the world available
on line, one produced by the US government (see US Government, 1997 or
http://www.ssa.gov/statistics/ssptw97.html) and the other by the International
Social Security Association (http://www.aiss.org).
 10 To simplify the presentation, I have regrouped maternity, invalidity (or sick
pay) and occupational injury into one group of “health-related temporary work
interruption”, as opposed to disability that implies a permanent work impairment.
 11 I will focus on family or child allowances and programmes for lone parents,
not on child support from separated parents.
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table 1).12 Insurance and assistance are well known. Allowance
differs from insurance because it is not contributory, and from
assistance because it is not means-tested but cover entire categories
of people (e.g., the disabled, the elderly).13 A provident fund is
nothing else than a mandatory saving scheme. It differs from
insurance because there is no risk pooling. Since accounts are
individualised, it does not involve any interpersonal
redistribution. Employers’ liability consists of labour laws
enforcing employers to pay minimum benefits to employees in
some circumstances (e.g., legal sick or severance pay). I have
included health care among the cash programmes, although it is
really a service, because it is primarily financed by insurance
schemes. When it is not, I use the term “state provision” to mean
government subsidies to (mainly public) health care facilities.
· Coverage: If the programme is an insurance or a provident fund, it
is the proportion of people eligible to benefits, either as a
percentage of the total population, in the case of health care, or as a
percentage of the labour force, in the case of income replacement
schemes. For allowance and assistance schemes, it is the
proportion of the population that actually receives benefits, either
as a percentage of the total population, or as a percentage of the
relevant category of people (e.g., the elderly for an old age
allowance).
· Expenditures: Each programme’s total expenditures are given as a
measure of their importance. They are presented in local currency
as well as a percentage of GDP. Data for employers’ liability
schemes are never available.
· Financing: It is the share of the budget financed by taxes and by
statutory contributions of employers and employees. An estimate
of user fees is also included for health care.
                                        
12 They are of course “ideal types”, with characteristics that do not always fit
particular programmes.
 13 Some allowances are means-tested. Nevertheless, they still aim to catch a
broad set of people, such that the test of means is normally designed to exclude the
rich, as opposed to assistance schemes that aim at targeting the poor.
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 Table 1: Social Security Instruments
  Assistance  Insurance  Allowance  Provident
Fund
 Employers’
Liability
 Purpose  poverty
alleviation
 poverty
prevention
 social
compensation
 poverty
prevention
 poverty
prevention
 Funding  taxes  contributions  taxes  contributions  employers
 Eligibility  means test  contributions  belonging to
some social or
demographic
category
 contributions  current
employment
 Benefits  flat-rate
cash & in-
kind
 earnings-
related cash
 flat-rate cash  contributions
refund
 earnings-
related cash
 Focus  persons in
need
 persons
suffering
interruption
of earnings
 persons with
additional
income need
 persons
suffering
interruption
of earnings
 persons
suffering
interruption
of earnings
Source: Adapted from Dixon and Chow (1992).
 I. Description of the Welfare States of Five East Asian
Countries
I.1 Japan
 Japan has a fully developed welfare state. Its pillar is social security,
composed of a large number of insurance schemes as well as various
miscellaneous programmes. Its main branches are health care and old
age pensions, both sectors in which Japan achieved universal coverage a
long time ago. Health insurance schemes usually also provide invalidity
and maternity benefits, while pension schemes generally include
disability and survivor benefits. The other social security programmes
are (i) several occupational injury insurance schemes, (ii) three means-
tested family allowances, (iii) an unemployment insurance scheme, (iv)
war victims pensions, (v) public health programmes, (vi) the public
assistance and (vii) personal social services.
 Social security in Japan is very complex because of its institutional
fragmentation, especially in the health care and old age pensions sectors,
which is the product of a long history of incremental development.
There is not one health or old age insurance scheme, but different
systems existing in parallel, the boundaries of which correspond to
broad occupational groups (e.g., civil servants, private sector employees,
the self-employed, seamen, teachers and so on). Moreover, there are
14
numerous insurance schemes within each system, managed by a large
number of quasi-public institutions that are all regulated by the Ministry
of Health and Welfare. The level of both contributions and benefits may
vary considerably across systems. Likewise, the government subsidises
all insurance schemes in quite different proportions. Some genuinely
national schemes have been added on top of this already complex
structure, in an attempt to limit social stratification. The main examples
are the National Pension, which provides uniform benefits for all, on top
of which the occupational pensions are added (two-tier system), and the
Health Services System for the Aged, covering the health care costs of all
people over 70 years old.
 Personal social services have received fresh attention since the
issue of population ageing has surfaced as the main welfare challenge in
Japan. The government has launched the Gold Plan (1989-99) and the
Angel Plan (started in 1994) to increase the supply of personal care
services for, respectively, the elderly and families with children. It has
also recently voted the introduction of a long-term care insurance to
cover the costs incurred by old people who need constant care.
However, the sector of personal social services still faces serious
challenges, as will be discussed in chapter VI.
 Besides social security, education is the other component of the Japanese
welfare state. It is either provided or subsidised by the government and
is mandatory and almost free at the primary and secondary levels. The
state’s intervention in housing is comparatively much less important,
and focuses on the provision of houses for sale for the middle-class, with
some cheap rental flats available for the poor.
15
 Table 2: Synopsis of the Main Cash Welfare State Programmes in
Japan (1994)a
 Programmes  Instruments  Expendituresb  Coveragec  Financingd
   Ybn  % GDP   S  Er  Ee  Tr
 Health Care         
 EHI (gov’t managed)  insurance  4,077  0.85  30%  12  42  41  
 EHI (society managed)  insurance  2,940  0.61  26%  1  50  39  
 National Health Insurance  insurance  5,132  1.07  34%  45  0  38  11
 MAAs  insurance  1,100  0.23  9%  4  45  23  13
 HSSA  insur./ state
prov.
 7,780  1.62  ..  32  0  0  68
 Public Health Progr.  state provision  637  0.13  ..  100  0  0  0
 Public Assistance  assistance  794  0.19  0.54%  100  0  0  0
 Total   22,46
1
 4.69   U: add ± 13.3%f
 Invalidity, maternity
 occupational injury
        
 EHI (gov’t managed)  insurance  342  0.07  30%  12  42  41  
 EHI (society managed)  insurance  237  0.05  23%  1  50  39  
 National Health Insurance  insurance  81  0.02  ..  45  0  38  11
 MAAs  insurance  81  0.02  8%  4  45  23  13
 Gov’t Empl. Acc. Comp.  insurance  34  0.01  7%g  0  92  0  
 Workmen Acc. Comp. Ins  insurance  685  0.15  70%g  0  75  0  
 Total   1,460  0.30      
 Old age, survivor &
disability
        
 National Pension  insurance  6,755  1.41  47%  12  0  14  61
 Employees Pension Ins.  insurance  14,73
1
 3.07  49%  8  26  23  26
 MAAs (public sector)  insurance  6,832  1.43  8%  2  46  23  13
 MAAs (private sector)  insurance  520  0.11  1%  20  17  41  8
 Public Assistance  assistance  494e  0.10e  4.5%h  100  0  0  0
 Total   29,33
2
 6.12      
 Family         
 Child Allowance  allowance/
employer liab.
 171  0.04  63%i  100  Er: add ±
233%
 0
 Child Support Allowance  allowance  260  0.05  106%j  100  0  0  0
 Spec. Child Dep. Allow.  allowance  177  0.04  ..  100  0  0  0
 Public Assistance  assistance  53e  0.01e  9.2%j  100  0  0  0
 Total   665  0.14      
 Unemployment         
 Employment Insurance  insurance  1,889  0.39  50%g  10  64  0  
 Public Assistance  assistance  42e  0.00 e  0.06%k  100  0  0  0
 Total   1,931  0.40      
 Total   55,84
9
 11.65      
Sources: Social Development Research Institute (1996), Health and Welfare Statistics
Association (1997) and Statistics Bureau (1997).
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Notes: a. Read introduction for definitions and annex 1 for more details. b. Excludes
administrative costs. c. 1995. d. S= state; Er= employers (including state for civil
servants); Ee= employees; Tr= transfer from another social security branch; U= users.
Financing sources don’t add to 100% because of capital income. e. Breakdown of
public assistance budget is an estimate (total correct). Public assistance benefits
include cash, housing, education and others, but not health care (counted
separately). f. Of which 11.7% of co-insurance fees and 1.6% of uncovered expenses,
excluding over-the-counter pharmaceuticals (total health care expenditures for 1994:
Y25,790.8 billion). g. 1993. h. % of elderly households. i. % of children under 3 years
old. j. % of lone-parents households. k. Recipient households other than elderly,
disabled and lone parents as % of labour force.
I.2 Korea
 The Korean social security system is dominated by a few public
insurance programmes, divided along occupational lines. In the health
care sector, civil servants and private school teachers have their own
schemes. Private sector employees must join a separate system, which is
administered by a large number of firm-based insurance carriers.
Universal health care coverage has been achieved recently thanks to the
introduction of a third system in 1989, the Regional Health Insurance, to
catch farmers, the urban self-employed and employees of small firms. It
is administered by local governments and is subsidised by the
government at a rate of 50%. User fees remain high because of high co-
insurance rates as well as the lack of reimbursement of some services.
The Medicaid programme pays for the health care of the poor, although
only indigent elderly and disabled people without family support may
expect completely free health care.
 In the old age, survivor and disability sectors, civil servants and
private school teachers are the only groups having a pension scheme of
their own. The rest of the working population is covered by the National
Pension Programme, introduced in 1988. It is a funded scheme with
defined benefits. 20 years of contributions are required to get full
benefits, which means that only survivor and disability benefits are
disbursed at the time being, as well as lump-sum refunds of
contributions. The government reviews ways to reform the system,
because it appears that the entitlements are too generous compared to
contributions, such that the fund will collapse in the middle of the next
century. The government does not subsidise the NPP at all.
 Other major programmes are the Industrial Accident
Compensation Insurance (IACI), the oldest Korean insurance scheme,
and the Employment Insurance Programme. There is also the Livelihood
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Protection Programme, the Korean public assistance, which offers a
minimum cash income as well as a range of subsidies for essential
goods. Middle-aged, able-bodied people generally do not receive cash
benefits but are rather enrolled in public works projects.
 The above brief presentation suggests that Korea has developed a
fairly comprehensive social security system. However, it is important to
keep in mind that a large proportion of the population remains
uncovered, except for health care insurance. Indeed, the other insurance
schemes are not mandatory for workers of firms with less than five
employees, nor for the self-employed and family helpers, with the
exception of the NPP.14 Private and public sector workers of firms with
at least five employees actually represent only about 45% of the labour
force.15 Yet workers of small firms that do not join the IACI are protected
by the Labour Standards Law, which enforces their employers to pay
them at least some benefits. Similarly, legal severance payments will
continue to play an important role as long as the NPP does not deliver
its full benefits.
 Education is another major part of Korea’s welfare state. It is
mandatory and almost free for nine years. The government is also
actively involved in the housing market but has focused on building
housing units for sale, thus targeting the middle class. The government
has more recently turned the attention on renting cheap housing to the
poor.
 
                                        
 14 The NPP has recently been extended to the self-employed but this is not fully
reflected yet in the coverage figure presented in table 3.
 15 See section IV.2. According to the 1995 census of establishments carried out
by the National Statistical Office, 30.6% of workers were employed in establishments
of less than five employees (including public sector workers). However, that survey
only catches a total of 13,634,273 workers, compared to a total labour force of
20,377,000. The surveyed population corresponds more or less to the total of people
“active in the formal urban sector” of annex 3, as it excludes agricultural
establishments owned by an individual, the military and “simple stores without
fixed facilities and business place”. Note that establishments mean physical
workplaces, not firms. In fact, 22% of employees were working in branch offices or
factories belonging to a larger company, which leads to an overestimation of
employees working in firms of less than five employees.
18
 Table 3: Synopsis of the Main Cash Welfare State Programmes in
Korea (1996)a
 Programmes  Instruments  Expenditures  Coverage  Financingb
   Wbn  % GDP   S  Er  Ee
 Health Care c        
 Civil Servants and Private
Sch. Teachers Health Ins.
 insurance  588  0.15  11%  0  50  50
 Industr. Empl. Health Ins.  insurance  1,803  0.46  37%  0  50  50
 Regional Health Ins.  insurance  2,430  0.62  50%  50  0  50
 Medicaid  assistance  173 d  0.08 d  4%  100  0  0
 Ministry of Healthe  state provision  ..  ..  ..  100  0  0
 Ministry of Defencef  state provision  ..  ..  1.4%  100  0  0
 Total   4,994  1.28   U: add ± 136%g
 Invalidity, maternity
 occupational injury
       
 Ind. Accident Comp. Ins.  insurance  777 d  0.36 d  40%  0  100  0
 Labour Standards Law  employers’
liab.
 ..  ..  20%  0  100  0
 Old age, survivor &
disability
       
 National Pension Progr.  insurance  1,118  0.29  35%  0  50  50
 Gov’t Off. Pension Progr.  insurance  ..  ..  5%h  0  50  50
 Pr. Sch. Teach. Pension Pr  insurance  ..  ..  1%h  0  50  50
 Labour Standards Law  employers’
liab.
 ..  ..  ..  0  100  0
 Livelihood Protection Pr.  assistance  144 d  0.07 d  4%i  100  0  0
 Total   1,262  0.32     
 Family        
 Livelihood Protection Pr.j  assistance  ..  ..  ..  100  0  0
 Unemployment        
 Employment Ins. Progr.  insurance  ..  ..  20%  100  0  0
 Total   7,033  1.80     
Sources: National Statistics Office (1997), National Pension Corporation (1996),
Soon-Won Kwon (1993) and Huck-Ju Kwon (1998b).
Notes: a. Read introduction for definitions and annex 1 for more details. b.
Estimates; S= state; Er= employers (including state for civil servants); Ee=
employees; U= users. c. Excluding cash benefits (maternity grant, funeral grant and
others). d. 1991. e. Subsidies to public hospitals and public health programme. f. Free
health care for the military. g. Estimate based on 1989 figures of Soon-Won Kwon
(1993). h. 1994. i. All recipients (including non-elderly) as % of total population. j. See
data in annex 1 (no breakdown available).
I.3 Taiwan
Just like Korea’s, Taiwan’s social security has been significantly
developed in the last decade. It is based on a social insurance system
that is now close to achieving comprehensive and universal coverage of
the population.
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The first component of this system is a number of occupation-
based insurance schemes. The main one is the Labour Insurance (created
in 1958), a scheme covering several risks: (i) invalidity, (ii) disability, (iii)
maternity, (iv) occupational injury, (v) retirement and (vi) death (plus
funeral costs). It is mandatory for private sector workers whose
enterprise employs at least five people.16 However, the actual coverage
figure is higher than the total number of private sector workers,
including family helpers.17 Government employees are covered by a
similar insurance of their own, which also covers their dependants.18
Farmers have their own insurance as well, albeit only for maternity,
disability and death. However, the government introduced an old age
allowance for them. There are some minor insurance schemes for other
occupational groups.19
 The second component is National Health Insurance (NHI). It is a
comprehensive health insurance that is very close to achieving universal
coverage. Launched in 1995, it is in fact the product of the merger of
several previous programmes, including the health care branch of the
Labour Insurance and of the government employees’ schemes. Thanks
to additional government subsidies, the NHI now covers about a third of
the population that was previously not covered by any insurance at all.
                                        
 16 Private sector workers include: workers of the industrial, commercial, mining,
forestry, transportation, communication and public utility sectors, journalists,
employees of non-profit organisations, fishermen, persons receiving vocational
training in institutes registered with the government and members of unions, as well
as some teachers and employees of government agencies who are not covered by the
Government Employees Insurance.
 17 This may be due to fraud, as employers used to register false employees such
as family members. Although they had to pay the premium, they attached a higher
value to the health care benefits of LI. LI coverage has indeed dropped significantly
since the introduction of the NHI, which took over the LI’s health care branch.
 18 Besides this Government Employees Insurance, there is also an Insurance for
Teaching and Administrative Staffs of Private Schools and a Retired Government
Employees Insurance. Military officers pay special low premiums.
 19 Professional groups are eligible for group life insurance sponsored by the
Central Trust of China. Each professional group forms an insurance unit that pays
two thirds of the premium, while those insured pay the rest. The government also
sponsors comprehensive accident insurance for students and pays the full cost of
premiums for aboriginal and offshore island students (see Government Information
Office, http://www.gio.gov.tw/ info/yearbook/content.htm). These minor schemes
will be ignored in this paper.
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The government considers to privatise the NHI’s administration, which
would considerably change Taiwan’s health care system.
 Table 4: Synopsis of the Main Cash Welfare State Programmes in
Taiwan (1996)a
 Programmes  Instruments  Expenditures  Coverage  Financingb
   NT$bn  % GDP   S  Er  Ee
 Health Care        
 National Health Insurance  insurance  221.1  2.96  93%  36c  38  26
 Ministry of Healthd  state provision  42.42  0.57  ..  100  0  0
 Ministry of Defencee  state provision  ..  ..  1.7%  100  0  0
 Total   263.52  3.53   U: add ± 56%
 Invalidity, maternity
 occupational injury
       
 Labour Insurance  insurance  6.46  0.09  80%  17  48  27 f
 Farmers Insuranceg  insurance  0.13  0.00  19%h  70  0  30
 Total   6.59  0.09     
 Old age & survivor        
 Labour Insurance  insurance  60.34  0.81  80%  17  48  27 f
 Government Employees
Insurancei
 insurance  14.06  0.19  7%   65  35
 Farmers Insurancej  insurance  5.38  0.07  19%h  70  0  30
 Old Age Allowance  allowance  ..  ..  20%k  100  0  0
 Farmers’ Old Age Allow.  allowance  12.43  0.17  22%k  100  0  0
 Public Assistance  assistance  2.29  0.03  0.54%l  100  0  0
 Total   94.5  1.26     
 Disability        
 Labour Insurance  insurance  3.65  0.05  80%  17  48  27 f
 Government Employees
Insurancei
 insurance  0.31  0.00  7%   65  35
 Farmers Insurancej  insurance  0.55  0.01  19%h  70  0  30
 Public Assistance  assistance  ..m  ..m  ..m  100  0  0
 Total   4.51  0.06     
 Family        
 -  -  -   -  -   
 Unemployment        
 Unempl. Assist. Progr.  allowance  ..  ..  ..  100  0  0
 Public Assistance  assistance  ..m  ..m  ..m  100  0  0
 Total   369.12  4.94     
Sources: National Health Insurance Bureau, http://www.nhi.gov.tw (December
1997). Bureau of Labour Insurance (1997), Central Trust of China (1997), Directorate
General for Budget, Accounting and Statistics (1997a) and information provided by
the courtesy of the Farmers Insurance Bureau.
Notes: a. Read introduction for definitions and annex 1 for more details. b. S= state;
Er= employers; Ee= employees; U= users. Italics are estimates. c. Includes direct
subsidy to NHI, plus contributions as employer of government employees, plus
contributions for special occupational groups. d. Subsidies to public hospitals and
public health programmes. e. Free health care for the military. f. Financing sources
don’t add up to 100% due to capital income. g. Maternity benefits only. h. 30% of the
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insured under the Farmers Insurance are over 65 years old and are probably not
reported in the labour force statistics, such that the coverage figure is overestimated.
i. Includes Retired Government Employee Insurance and Insurance for Teaching and
Administrative Staffs of Private Schools. j. Survivor benefits only. k. % of all people
65 years old and over. l. All recipients (including non-elderly) as % of total
population (no breakdown available). m. See Old age, survivor and disability section
in annex 1.
 A third component may soon be added to this system, the
National Pension Insurance (NPI). Although its introduction has not
been formally approved yet, the civil service has set up a concrete plan
that the government is likely to adopt before the next elections. The NPI
will be a funded insurance scheme with defined benefits. It will offer flat
benefits for a flat premium. In a transitory period, the LI will continue to
serve its insured population, but its old age benefits will be aligned on
those of the NPI.
 Besides insurance schemes, the Department for Social Welfare
provides a variety of welfare services, as well as a small assistance
programme. Last but not least, nine years of mandatory education is
provided almost free by the state. The housing policy is relatively much
less developed.
 
I.4 Hong Kong
 Social security is only one of the pillars of the welfare state in Hong
Kong, for the state plays a major role as direct provider of education,
health care and housing. Education is mandatory for nine years. It is
very cheap in private and subvented schools, but there is also a marginal
private sector. Public health care is also available to all and almost free.
Yet the poor quality of health care services and the long waiting lists
lead many people to opt out for the private sector, especially for
outpatient visits. The state is also the main provider of housing,
although rental fees cover the full costs of building. Still, some cross-
subsidies exist in favour of poor households and rents do not reflect the
full value of the land owned by the government. The state’s intervention
in personal social services is on the other hand relatively limited.
 As far as social security is concerned, the main instruments in
Hong Kong are assistance, allowance and employers’ liability. The
Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) is a programme
providing subsistence income to poor people irrespectively of age,
health or even employment status (beneficiaries may earn some
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income).20 Recipients must have both an income and savings below
prescribed levels and a “limited capacity to work”. The benefits include
a flat cash payment depending upon status21 plus occasional ad hoc aid.
A very low proportion of the population depends upon it and it is
highly stigmatised (MacPherson, 1992).
 Table 5: Categories of CSSA recipients (1995/96)
  Number of recipients
 Old age  84,243
 Blind, deaf, physically and mentally disabled  10,058
 Ill health  14,450
 Single parents  8,982
 Low earning  1,814
 Unemployed  10,131
 Others  6,523
 Total recipients  136,201
 Total budget (HK$m)  4,831.1
Source: Department of Census and Statistics (1996).
 
 The Social Security Allowance (SSA), on the other hand, provides
cash benefits at a flat rate to some broad categories of people (the elderly
and the disabled), without neither contribution nor test of means. The
take-up rates are therefore very high. However, these benefits are very
low and by no means enough to live on. They should rather be
considered as covering extra needs due to disability or age (MacPherson,
1992).
 Prior to the transfer of Hong Kong to China, the government had
agreed upon the introduction of a provident fund scheme to foster the
economic security of the fast ageing population. If implemented, this
will progressively change the nature of Hong Kong’s social security.
 Employers’ liability programmes cover the sectors of occupational
injury, invalidity, maternity, unemployment and old age pension.
                                        
 20 Information on the CSSA and the SSA is taken from MacPherson (1992) and
Social Security Administration (1997).
 21 From HK$1,615 to HK$4,135 per month for singles (£133 and £342) and from
HK$1,440 to HK$3,365 for family members, depending upon the category of the
recipient (in 1997).
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 Table 6: Synopsis of the Main Cash Welfare State Programmes in
Hong Kong (1995)a
 Programmes  Instruments  Expenditures  Coverage  Financingb
   HK$bn  % GDP   S  Er  Ee
        
 Health Care        
 Hospital Authority  state provision  16.025c  1.58  82%d  100  0  0
 Invalidity, maternity
 occupational injury
       
 Invalidity pay  empl. liability  ..  ..  84.3%e  0  100  0
 Maternity pay  empl. liability  ..  ..  84.3%e  0  100  0
 Occupational inj. pay  empl. liability  ..  ..  84.3%e  0  100  0
 CSSA (ill health)  assistance  0.5f  0.05f  0.48%g  100  0  0
 Old age & survivor        
 Long Service Pay  empl. liability  ..  ..  ..  0  100  0
 Old Age Allow. (SSA)  allowance  0.7h  0.06h  54%i  100  0  0
 Higher Old Age
Al.(SSA)
 allowance  2.068h  0.19h  82%j  100  0  0
 CSSA  assistance  2.990f  0.28f  14%k  100  0  0
 Total   5.758  0.53     
 Disability        
 Disability Allow. (SSA)  allowance  0.915  0.08  1.11%l  100  0  0
 CSSA  assistance  0.357f  0.03f  0.16%l  100  0  0
 Total   1.272  0.12     
 Family        
 CSSA (single parents)  assistance  0.319f  0.03f  0.15%l  100  0  0
 Unemployment        
 Severance Pay  empl. liability  ..  ..  84.3%e  0  100  0
 CSSA  assistance  0.655f  0.06f  0.62%l  100  0  0
 Total   24.529  2.35     
Sources: Department of Census and Statistics (1997a, 1997b and 1997c).
Notes: a. Read introduction for definitions and annex 1 for more details. b. S= state;
Er= employers; Ee= employees; U= users. c. 1994. d. 1988. The entire population is
entitled to benefits but a minority chooses to opt out of the public sector, paying high
user fees in the private sector. e. All civil servants and private sector employees. f.
Estimate based on table 5 (categories “low income” and “others” added in
unemployment). g. % of labour force. h. Own estimate for breakdown between the
two old age allowance (total is exact amount). i. % of 65 to 70 year-olds. j. % of the
over 70 year-olds. k. % of the over 65 year-olds. l. % of entire population (proportion
of relevant population not available).
I.5 Singapore
 The dominant welfare instrument in Singapore is the provident fund.
The Central Provident Fund (CPF) is a quasi-public institution
managing workers’ mandatory savings that are channelled to three
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individual accounts: the Ordinary Account, the Medisave Account and
the Special Account. The Ordinary Account may be used to finance
housing, education as well as CPF insurance schemes and approved
private investments22. The Medisave Account covers health care
expenditures. The Special Account is for old age income maintenance.
All employees must join the CPF, the self-employed being required to
contribute to Medisave only. An individual may use his CPF savings for
himself or his immediate family. Both employees and their employers
contribute 20% of the wages each to the fund (subject to a floor of S$50
per month for the employee and S$200 for the employer and to a ceiling
of S$6,000, resp. £23,£91 and £2,724). This rate decreases with age.23 CPF
contributions are exempted from tax and earn interest. The government
runs a number of grants for some CPF members and occasionally tops
up CPF accounts with gifts. Almost the whole fund (95.7%) is invested
in government bonds or deposited in the central bank for purchase of
future government bonds. Those bonds are issued especially for the
CPF, are not tradable and have a floating interest rate pegged to the CPF
interest rate, itself aligned on private banks rates. 24
 Table 7: Basic Data on Singapore’s Central Provident Fund (1996)
 Number of membersa  2,741,804
 Number of active membersb  1,395,015
  of whom self-employed membersc  201,163
 Total revenues (S$m)  17,076
  of which contributions  13,858
  of which government grants  699
  of which capital income  2,519
 Total withdrawals (S$m)  10,530
  of which for CPF insurance
schemesd
 470
  of which for CPF housing schemese  5,058
  of which for private investment  2,745
 Total balances (S$m)  72,567
                                        
 22 After setting aside S$50,000 (£22,706, called the Minimum Sum), CPF
members may invest up to 80% of the balance of their savings in a large variety of
approved financial instruments. They also have the option of buying non-residential
properties and special discounted shares. All those investments are registered by
approved banks, such as they cannot be realised for consumption expenditures.
 23 It becomes 20% after 55 years of age, 15% after 60 and 10% after 65.
 24 See Central Provident Fund, http://www.cpf.gov.sg, and Central Provident
Fund Board (1997). Figures of 1996.
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 Interest rate (%, annual rate Jul-Dec)  3.48 (Ordinary & Medisave)
 4.73 (Special & Retirement)
Source: Central Provident Fund Board (1997).
Notes: a. People who have an account. Add dependants to obtain number of
potential beneficiaries. b. Members currently paying contributions. c. 32% of whom
have voluntarily opened Ordinary and Special Accounts on top of the mandatory
Medisave account. d. MediShield, Dependants Protection Scheme and Home
Protection Scheme. e. Public Housing Scheme and Residential Properties Scheme.
 
 Table 8: Synopsis of the Main Cash Welfare State Programmes in
Singapore (1996)a
 Programmes  Instruments  Expenditures  Coverage  Financingb
   S$m  %
GDP
  S  Er  Ee
 Health Care        
 Ministry of Health  state provision  1,195  0.90  ..  100  0  0
 Medisave (CPF)  provident fund  316  0.24  80%cd  0  50  50 e
 MediShield (CPF)  provident fund
+ insurance
 31  0.02  50%c  0  0  100
 MediFund  assistance  13  0.01  3%f  100  0  0
 Total   1,555  1.17     
 Invalidity, maternity
 occupational injury
       
 Invalidity pay  empl. liability  ..  ..  83%g  0  100  0
 Maternity pay  empl. liability  ..  ..  83%g  0  100  0
 Occup. injury pay  empl. liability  ..  ..  83%g  0  100  0
 Total   ..  ..     
 Old age & survivor        
 Central Provident Fundh  provident fund  1,493  1.13  70%i  0  50  50
 Civil servants’ pension  empl. liability  ..  ..  ..  100  0  0
 Dependants Protection
Scheme (CPF)
 provident fund
+ insurance
 67j  0.05 j  70%i  0  0  100
 Public Assistance  assistance  4  0.00  0.8%k  100  0  0
 Total   1,564  1.18     
 Disability        
 Central Provident Fund  provident fund  10  0.01  70%i  0  50  50
 Dependants Protection
Scheme (CPF)
 provident fund
+ insurance
 ..j  .. j  70%i  0  0  100
 Public Assistance  assistance  0.5  0.00  ..  100  0  0
 Total   10.5  0.01     
 Family        
 -  -  -  -  -  -   
 Unemployment        
 -  -  -   -  -   
 Total   3,129  2.36     
Sources: Central Provident Fund Board (1997), data received by the courtesy of the
Ministry of Health.
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Notes: a. Read introduction for definitions and annex 1 for more details. b. S= state;
Er= employers; Ee= employees; U= users. c. 1995. d. Dependants must be added
(data not available). e. Small state subsidy ignored. f. Number of claims, not of
beneficiaries. g. All employees and civil servants. h. Minimum sum and final
withdrawal. i. Proportion of active CPF members in the labour force. j. No
breakdown available between death and disability sectors. k. % of elderly over 65
years old.
 The sectors in which the state is more directly involved are
education and housing. The government provides and finances 10 years
of mandatory education. The state is also the major provider of housing
and promotes house ownership through the CPF. Finally, the Ministry
of Community Development provides or finances a variety of social
services and a small, strictly means-tested income support allowance.
 II. Comparative Analysis of the Five East Asian Welfare
States
 The previous chapter summarised the welfare state programmes for
each country separately. This chapter identifies similarities and
differences between them. The first section discusses patterns in the
choice of social security instruments across countries (social security
consisting of cash programmes and health care). The second section
takes a first approach to private welfare by examining in more details
the shallow boundaries between the public and private sectors in social
security. The same exercise is undertaken for in-kind benefits in the
third section (i.e., education, housing and personal social services25). In
the fourth section, a number of generalisations that are often used to
describe East Asian welfare systems are reviewed and commented. The
central theme throughout that section is how redistributive East Asian
social welfare systems are, vertically, horizontally as well as in a life-
cycle perspective. The last section summarises the main findings.
 
II.1 Different Structures of Social Security
 Table 9 maps out the main instruments of social security used by the
different countries in each sector. Assistance is used in almost all
                                        
 25 Personal social services mean residential, day-care and outreach services for
the elderly, the disabled and the youth, such that this category cuts across the sectors
used in annex 1.
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countries and sectors as the main poverty alleviation instrument (see
table 1 in introduction). As to poverty prevention instruments, it is not
rare for a state to use several of them in the same sector. This may be
either to reach different groups of people (e.g., Taiwan’s old age
allowance for farmers, Korea’s employers’ liability scheme for
occupational injuries in very small firms), or simply to complement each
other (e.g., direct subsidies to hospitals on top of health insurance
schemes, Singapore’s MediShield insurance). In this case, I have ranked
instruments by size of expenditures.
 A clear pattern emerges for Japan, Korea and Taiwan. They rely on
insurance as their main “poverty prevention” tool for all branches of
social security (together with limited subsidies to public health care
facilities). They also all use a public assistance programme as a “poverty
alleviation” tool to catch the marginal population. This pattern is exactly
the same as in most European countries.
 An important nuance must be added for Korea and Taiwan,
however. Some of their insurance schemes are really universal and offer
comprehensive benefits, like their health care insurance. In the old age
sector on the other hand, coverage is still rather limited in Korea, where
the National Pension Programme (NPP) is progressively becoming
universal by being extended to all occupational categories. Moreover,
Kwon (1998a) stresses that the NPP does not offer full pensions yet,
because workers have not had the opportunity to contribute to the
scheme for enough years. As a result, all private sector employees are
still protected only by the minimum legal severance pay, while farmers,
the self-employed and the large proportion of day-labourers and
workers of very small companies are left to their own means of
subsistence in their old age. In fact, government employees are the only
ones entitled to a substantial legal pension.26 In Taiwan, the existing
occupational insurance schemes together achieve a fairly high coverage
rate, yet they offer quite low benefits for private sector employees, or
even no old age benefits at all for farmers. That’s why the government
recently introduced allowance programmes and is planning to set up the
National Pension Insurance, which will protect private sector workers
better. A similar remark may be made for the other sectors.
Occupational injury was historically the first risk covered by social
insurance, just like in most countries in the world. On the other hand,
                                        
 26 Employees of large firms also receive substantial pension but at the discretion
of their employers only (see section V.1).
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unemployment insurance has only appeared recently in Korea but does
not cover many employees. In Taiwan, there is only an unemployment
allowance for the moment, but an unemployment insurance scheme is
scheduled to be introduced soon. Both countries also lack any
comprehensive family or child benefits.
Hong Kong and Singapore both offer very different pictures. Hong
Kong relies on direct state provision for health care and on a mix of legal
severance pay and allowances for old age and disability. The Central
Provident Fund covers those two sectors in Singapore. Employers’
liability is the main instrument for invalidity, maternity, occupational
injury and unemployment in both countries.
 Table 9: Social Security Instruments by Country and Sector
  Japan  Korea  Taiwan  Hong
Kong
 Singapore
 Health care  insurance
 state
provision
 assistance
 insurance
 state
provision
 assistance
 insurance
 state
provision
 assistance
 state
provision
 state
provision
 prov. fund
 insurance
 assistance
 Invalidity,
maternity,
occupational
injury
 insurance  insurance
 employer
liab.
 insurance  employer
liab.
 employer
liab.
 Old age,
disability
 insurance
 assistance
 insurance
 employer
liab.
 assistance
 insurance
 allowance
 assistance
 employer
liab.
 allowance
 assistance
 prov. fund
 insurance
 assistance
 Family  allowance/
employer
liab.
 assistance
 assistance  assistance  assistance  assistance
 Unemployment  insurance
 assistance
 insurance
 assistance
 allowance
 assistance
 employer
liab.
 assistance
 employer
liab.
II.2 Public/ Private Mix of Social Security
 This section examines Goodman, White and Kwon (1998a)’s proposition
that East Asian states pursue social welfare aims mainly through
regulation instead of provision and finance. To this end, I apply
Burchardt’s operational definition of regulation as “decision” (see
introduction).
29
 
 Importance of Private Finance in Hong Kong and Singapore
 Goodman, White and Kwon (1998a)’s proposition applies very well to
Singapore, because her social security system relies entirely upon a
provident fund and the Labour Law. In terms of Burchardt (1997)’s
taxonomy, provident funds may be characterised by public provision,
private finance and public decision. Indeed, the Central Provident Fund
is managed by a quasi-public board and membership is mandatory for
employees, implying that both provision and decision are public. Since
contributions are held in individualised accounts, they may really be
considered as the contributors’ own money, hence finance is private. On
the other hand, employers’ liability schemes are characterised by private
provision, private finance and public decision. Indeed, they are
managed and financed by enterprises, but decision is public because
they are mandatory as well. Thus, social security in Singapore is entirely
financed by the private sector. Likewise, as shall be explained in the next
section, Singapore’s comprehensive housing policy is also financed
almost entirely by user charges. As a result, Singaporean public
expenditures on social welfare are basically limited to education, with
some subsidies to public hospitals and a small budget for personal social
services (the size of the public assistance programme is hardly worth
mentioning).
 The case of Hong Kong is subtler. Her allowance and assistance
schemes as well as her health care system are all fully public
programmes. However, the former are not very generous and the latter
is of poor quality, such that many patients opt out to the private sector.
More significantly, the importance of employers’ liability schemes in
Hong Kong’s social welfare system is often overlooked, probably
because there are no data to measure it. Yet, the legal severance pay
appears to be more generous than the various allowances (see table 13 in
section II.4 below). In other words, Hong Kong’s social security might
also be financed mostly by the private sector.
 As to Japan, Korea and Taiwan, Goodman, White and Kwon
(1998a)’s description of East Asian welfare states as regulatory states
needs important qualifications. As argued above, the basic structure of
their social security is no different than that of most European countries,
with insurance and assistance schemes that are fully public according to
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Burchardt (1997)’s taxonomy.27 Some exceptions must be kept in mind,
however. One of them is the importance of the employers’ liability
instrument in Korea’s old age pension sector, although it is being phased
out with the introduction of the NPP. The other significant exception is
the health care sectors of both Korea and Taiwan, where insurance
schemes include high co-payments or user charges, such that health care
finance is about half public and half private.
 
 Institutional Fragmentation and Lack of Competition and Choice in Japan,
Korea and Taiwan
 Another finding that supports Goodman, White and Kwon (1998a)’s
emphasis on regulation is that decision is the only dimension that is
almost always public. Singapore’s MediShield scheme is the only
exception that leaves some space for consumers’ choice. If the
government allows CPF members to purchase a wider range of private
health insurance schemes, genuine competition will also appear in the
Singaporean health care system.
 The decentralised or fragmented social security systems of Japan,
Korea and to a lesser extent Taiwan suggest that there is some scope for
choice and competition. They involve many institutions, some of which
are closely connected to individual companies (e.g., Japan and Korea’s
health insurance societies). The image of autonomous quasi-public
organisations competing under state regulation contributes to the idea
that those systems are run like the private sector. However, a
multiplicity of providers, either private or public, is a necessary but not
sufficient condition to create competition and give some choice to users.
The key element is to devolve decision to users. This is not the case in
Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Workers may not choose their insurance
carriers but are assigned to a particular institution according to their
occupational status, employer or region. That factor greatly inhibits
competition. In fact, such fragmented systems may turn out to be more a
liability than an advantage as they multiply administrative costs. They
also raise the issue of a lack of national solidarity. Different occupational
groups have different levels of risks and of earnings to pay their
contributions, such that some social security institutions are bound to be
                                        
 27 Although separated from central government, the boards managing the
mandatory insurance schemes are as closely connected to government as the quasi-
public organisations of continental Europe. In both cases, social security
expenditures are included in general government accounts.
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wealthier than others. This induces much rent seeking, i.e., wasteful
efforts to tap the others’ surpluses or to protect one’s own. Yet the
multiplicity of providers combined with public decision may have some
advantages compared to an integrated system: (i) it allows for some
experimentation, (ii) it may induce cost discipline so far as comparisons
can be made between organisations with different mix of consumers and
hence needs and (iii) it might be more effective to tackle moral hazard as
it reduces the distance between providers and consumers.
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 Table 10: Institutional Fragmentation of the Social Security Systems of
Japan, Korea and Taiwan
 number of institutions  Japan  Korea  Taiwan
 Health care (insurers)  many  Many  one
 Invalidity, maternity  many  -  few
 Occupational injury  few  one  few
 Old age, disability  few  few  few
 Family  one  -  -
 Unemployment  one  one  one
 
 Hong Kong and Singapore have genuine centralised social security
systems, managed directly by the government in the former and by the
Central Provident Fund in the latter. In both cases, we clearly have
public provision and decision.
 
II.3 Public/ Private Mix in Social Services
 I now turn to non-cash welfare benefits, with an emphasis on the
interaction between public and private actors according to Burchardt
(1997)’s taxonomy.
 As Jones (1993) points out, the importance of education in East
Asian social welfare systems can hardly be understated. It is the social
sector in which East Asian states commit themselves the most to protect
their citizens. Education is mandatory and mostly free for at least nine
years in the five selected countries. Although there is a mix of public and
private schools, elite schools are not necessarily the private ones. As a
matter of fact, governments finance both private and public schools and
strictly control their whole curriculum. Schools do charge user fees,
which are higher in private schools (to finance more extra-curricular
activities, for instance). In Hong Kong and Singapore, education is more
segmented, with some expensive elite schools attracting a significant
minority of students. Higher education is a sector on its own, with more
user fees, more private schools and above all private decision as
attendance is not mandatory and there is a wide variety of providers
with similar prices and quality. Overall, state intervention in the
education sector in the selected countries is therefore not fundamentally
different than in the West. The importance of afternoon schools and
tutorials, which represent a purely private sector, is perhaps the most
striking peculiarity of East Asian countries.
 At the other extreme, the social welfare sector for which East Asian
states are the least directly involved is probably personal social
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services.28 They all play a residual provision and financing role for
residential institutions for the elderly, children and the disabled, leaving
the bulk of the work to families or charities. This is changing fast in
Japan, however, where the government initiated ambitious plans to
increase the number of places in facilities for both the aged and children,
respectively the Gold Plan and the Angel Plan (see annex 1). It is also
planning the introduction of a long term care insurance to help people in
need to purchase those services. As to outreach social work, they also
heavily rely on the private sector (see section VI.2). In short, the
government’s role in personal social services is essentially to organise or
co-ordinate private initiative, with possibly adding some financial aid. In
this sense, states play a social welfare role as “regulators” to use the
term of Goodman, White and Kwon (1998a), although in Burchardt’s
taxonomy decision is mainly private as the purchase of personal services
is not mandatory and private providers are often directly competing
with public institutions that also charge user fees.
 Finally, housing policy is very developed in Hong Kong and
Singapore. The two city-states’ governments have been drawn into
direct involvement in the housing sector for obvious geographic and
historic reasons: immigrants flowed in after World War II, squatting and
crowding scarce land. The state has thus become the provider of housing
for a majority of citizens in both countries. Its role in finance is marginal,
however, since both countries’ housing boards charge rents to tenants
and sell flats at rates that cover all or most of their costs, although not
necessarily land costs. Decision is private too, because residents can
freely choose private housing, although private providers specialise up
market. The dominant form of government involvement in the housing
sector in Hong Kong and Singapore is thus “marketing of public
services” (i.e., a combination of public provision with private finance
and private decision), the public sector competing with the private
sector. Housing policy in Japan, Korea and Taiwan is more modest
though important as well. In those three countries, governments have
focused on encouraging people to purchase their own houses or flats by
providing them with subsidised loans. Therefore, housing policy has
targeted the middle class rather than the poor who are unable to save
enough money to purchase a flat. Yet they also build some public
housing for rent at cheap rate for the poor. More significantly, the
housing market in all five countries is relatively strictly regulated,
                                        
28 See Maruo (1986).
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especially in urban areas. In Korea for instance, the government
manages to keep private housing prices relatively low through a system
of lotteries and waiting lists (see annex 1). This is another case of state
intervention through regulation.
 
II.4 How Well Do East Asian Social Welfare Systems Protect Workers?
 This section discusses several patterns that are often used to describe
East Asian social security systems in light of the systematic review
presented in annex 1. Most of those patterns do indeed fit some
countries quite well. However, it will also be shown that they may also
be very misleading for others, as each country has a unique system.
 
 Few Entitlements?
 Is the Asian rhetoric against state dependency reflected in the five
selected countries’ social security systems? It has been argued that all
countries except Hong Kong rely upon contributory schemes, either
insurance or provident fund. The flip side of that statement is that there
are indeed few non-contributory entitlements, such as allowances, again
with the exception of Hong Kong (albeit they are quite low even there).
Similarly, public assistance benefits are usually not regarded as
entitlements in East Asia. In Western countries, a person fulfilling
objective criteria has a right to receive the full minimum income. In the
countries studied here, civil servants have more discretion on the
allocation of public assistance and it is not rare for them to give only
partial benefits. In the context of full-employment, the physical ability to
work is paramount to withhold at least part of them. Moreover, Peng
(1998) stresses the fact that the Japanese civil law requires people to
support their family members, which include spouses and children but
also parents and siblings. As a result, social workers check resources of
family members that do not necessarily live together before allocating
benefits. The other countries also apply the test of means to the extended
family.
 
 Actuarially Fair Social Security Schemes and Limited Vertical Redistribution?
 Is it true that, in the five selected countries, what you get from the
system is what you put in? Although most social security schemes are
contributory, it does not mean that they do not redistribute income. In
Singapore however, it does, because the CPF’s individualised accounts
do not allow any interpersonal redistribution. In Hong Kong, this
pattern does not hold at all, except for employers’ liability schemes. In
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Japan, Korea and Taiwan, some qualifications are required. It is true that
income replacement insurance schemes are generally not designed to
redistribute wealth from rich to poor. Both contributions and benefits
are proportional to earnings (although floors and ceilings to both
contributions and benefits do imply some redistribution). As a result,
insurance schemes are actuarially fair in some sectors (e.g., invalidity,
maternity and occupational injury).29 Among the main old age pension
schemes, only Korea’s National Pension Programme includes an explicit
vertical redistribution element, as benefits are based on a weighted
average of one’s own earnings and average earnings (see annex 1). On
the other hand, most old age insurance schemes are not actuarially fair
because they involve some intergenerational redistribution (see below).
Finally, the health care sector is a clear exception: there is scope for
vertical redistribution as contributions are proportional to income while
benefits are not.
 
 Preference for Lump-Sum Grants over Annuities and Low Horizontal
Redistribution in Old Age Pensions?
 Hill and Lee (1992) point to the preference for lump-sum grants over
annuities in East Asian countries, especially in the disability and old age
pension sectors. Again, this holds perfectly for Singapore’s Central
Provident Fund but not at all for Hong Kong. For Japan, Korea and
Taiwan, it used to be true but they are moving towards annuities.
Japan’s public pension schemes now offer mostly annuities, but many
companies still give lump-sum severance payments (see section V.1). In
Korea, the National Pension Programme will offer annuities from 2007
onwards. As of now, most retired employees receive lump-sum grants,
both under the NPP and under the Labour Standards Law (civil servants
may choose an annuity). Finally, Taiwanese retirement insurance
schemes all offer lump-sum grants only, as opposed to the allowance
schemes. However, this will change as well with the introduction of the
National Pension Insurance.
                                        
 29 An insurance scheme is actuarially fair if insured people’s contributions
correspond to their expected benefits. In other words, people who buy the insurance
may win or lose ex post but not ex ante. For instance, an actuarially fair pension
insurance policy is one that offers benefits that are proportional to lifetime
contributions and life expectancy at retirement age. Individuals who happen to live
longer than that age will benefit from the system and those who die earlier will lose,
although all were expected to receive an amount equal to their contributions.
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 The difference between lump-sum grants and annuities matters in
terms of social protection. In fact, an old age scheme offering lump-sum
grants only can hardly be called insurance but should rather be
considered as a mandatory saving plan, because it does not cover the
“risk” of prolonged life without sufficient resources. Although risk-
prone individuals may prefer lump-sum grants, annuities do offer more
social protection. The cases of Taiwan and Singapore show that
individuals tend to be risk-prone as few of them voluntarily buy
annuities with their lump-sum grants. Yet, this might simply reflect a
lack of consideration for the future, as retiring people prefer spending
their grant on a bigger house or on their children’s wedding. Or it may
just be the rational thing to do given that lump-sum grants are often
much too low to buy annuities sufficient to live on (see table 13 below).
This should certainly be a source of concern.
 Preference for Funded over Pay-as-you-go Systems and Low Intergenerational
Redistribution in Old Age Pensions?
 It is true that all countries except Hong Kong have built some kind of
fund to finance their old age pension, and even Hong Kong may move
in that direction. Singapore has a genuine funded retirement system
with defined contributions, which means that benefits are uncertain and
will depend upon the financial performance of the fund. The CPF’s
balance has consistently increased over the years to reach a staggering
54% of GDP (see table 11).30 Contributions indeed amount to 40% of
basic wages, while withdrawals have failed to match the pace despite
the ageing of the population. This huge reserve represents a bonanza for
public investments, as more than 95% of it is invested in government
bonds or deposited at the central bank.31 For Goodman, White and
Kwon (1998a), this characteristic is part of what they call
“developmental welfare”, or the subordination of welfare policy to the
priority of economic development through capital accumulation.
                                        
30 Private investments financed through the CPF should be added to that figure.
 31 Nevertheless, Singapore’s pension system must be considered as a genuinely
funded system because the government’s general account does not run a structural
deficit. This stands in contrast to the US social security, whose “fund” has been used
over the years to finance large federal deficits, such that the public sector as a whole
does not have a real reserve for the present generation’s old age pensions.
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 Table 11: Reserves of Social Security
  Surplus (%GDP)  Balance (%GDP)
 Japan  +3.2a  +29.2b
 Koreac  ..  +5.4
 Taiwand  +0.8  +2.8
 Hong Kong  -  -
 Singaporee  +4.4  +54.5
Sources: Social Development Research Institute (1996). Ministry of Health and
Welfare (1997). Kwon (1998). Bureau of Labour Insurance (1997). Central Provident
Fund Board (1997).
Notes: a. Balance of total social security (1994). b. Reserve of EPI and NP only (1995).
c. NPP only (1994). d. Labour Insurance reserve for old age benefits only (1996). e.
CPF members’ accounts (1995).
 By contrast, Japan’s pension plans are pay-as-you-go. Still, they are
managed conservatively and have progressively but steadily
accumulated large surpluses. As a result, capital income represented as
much as 8.9% of total social security revenues in 1994.32 As argued later,
such a policy makes perfect sense in light of the ageing of the Japanese
population. Yet, it would be misleading to conclude that it has
prevented large intergenerational transfers. Ogushi, Kimura and Hatta
(1996) use a number of methods to assess intergenerational transfers of
the two main Japanese pension plans. Their conclusion is that the first
generation of EPI members were largely net recipients of the system,
while members born between 1948 and 1965, depending upon the
methodology, were net contributors. This reflects an initial over-
commitment of the EPI scheme. This intergenerational transfer was
sustainable as long as the demographic structure of Japan was young.
The population has been growing very fast however, which has been
putting the system under stress. Had the Japanese government not
reacted early to that phenomenon, pay-as-you-go pension schemes
would have run large deficits instead of healthy surpluses and the full
cost would have been born only by later generations. A 1986 reform has
turned EPI into a more actuarially fair system but intergenerational
transfers still exist. By contrast, the National Pension would now be
almost actuarially fair, according to Ogushi et al. (1996).
 Taiwan and Korea stand in between Japan and Singapore. On the
one hand, Taiwan’s Labour Insurance (LI) and Korea’s National Pension
                                        
 32 See Miyajima (1997) and Social Development Research Institute (1996).
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Programme (NPP) are funded schemes. On the other hand, they have
defined benefits, which means that insured workers are entitled to a
pension calculated according to a specific formula taking into account
their lifetime contributions but independent of the actual interests
earned by the fund. Such a system may lead to intergenerational
transfers or not, depending upon its management. In the case of LI,
contributions have been adjusted such as the scheme is almost
actuarially fair, in the sense that the current funds almost correspond to
future expected benefits due. By contrast, NPP is expected to run large
deficits and its fund will eventually become negative if contributions are
not raised or if the entitlement is not changed (see annex 1). The
Government Employees’ Insurance of Taiwan was also intended to be
actuarially fair at its inception but is now running large deficits, covered
by the government. Anyway, table 11 shows that Korean and Taiwan’s
funds do not represent a large amount in terms of GDP, because NPP
has been introduced only recently, hence its fund is bound to increase a
lot before declining, while LI offers only quite low benefits.
 Again, Hong-Kong is an exception with a genuine pay-as-you go
system. Benefits are paid from the general government’s accounts such
that there is no special fund from which to take the balance for table 11.
Still, one important evolution in Hong Kong’s social security system
might be the introduction of a provident fund, which would be an
actuarially fair scheme.
 
 High Co-Payments and Low Horizontal Redistribution in Health Care?
 Korea and Taiwan have both introduced universal and comprehensive
health insurance plans recently. Yet, patients must still worry about high
health care bills as they are charged high co-insurance user fees and
some services remain uncovered at all. As a result, out-of-pocket
expenses amount respectively to about 58% and 36% of total health care
costs.33
 Singapore fits this pattern even better, because patients pay their
health care bill entirely by themselves, albeit through their mandatory
saving account (although the state helps them indirectly through
subsidies to public hospitals). In a pure provident fund system, there is
no place for either vertical or horizontal redistribution. While the first
                                        
 33 For Korea, figure of 1989 from Soon-Won Kwon (1993). For Taiwan, figure of
1996 from National Health Insurance Bureau, http://www.nhi.gov.tw (December
1997).
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aspect may be defended from some ideological point of view, the latter
appears groundless in the health care sector. For the experience all over
the world demonstrates that people are risk averse about their health. In
the United States where health insurance is not mandatory, most of
those who can afford one voluntarily buy one. This is discouraged in a
pure provident fund system. Since people must put some money aside
anyway, purchasing a private insurance is like paying a second time.
That’s why the Singaporean government has moved towards a system
combining provident fund and insurance, to allow redistribution
between the healthy and the sick but not between the rich and the poor.
First, the CPF has introduced an insurance scheme of its own,
MediShield, covering major health risks only. Second, the government
considers to extend the range of private insurance schemes that
members are allowed to purchase with their CPF savings. Those reforms
may progressively turn Singapore’s health care model into an American
system dominated by private insurance. Yet the Singaporean
government asserts that it will regulate private insurance firms much
more closely than the United States government does, to avoid the well-
known problems of that model.
 Hong Kong also has a peculiar health care system. On the one
hand, the direct provision of health care by the government should
guarantee the perfect pooling of health risks at the national level. On the
other hand, the low quality of services pushes a large proportion of
patients to the private sector, which creates a dual system.
 Japan is an exception here, as her health insurance schemes
include very reasonable co-payment rates by any international standard
(equal to about 12% of total health care costs in 1995), implying a
genuine solidarity between healthy and sick people.
 
 Low Generosity?
 Another often-quoted pattern of social security in East Asian countries is
their lack of generosity. Generosity of income replacement schemes may
be measured in two ways: their replacement rates and, for those that are
temporary, their duration. Table 12 compares the generosity of
occupational injury, invalidity and unemployment schemes across the
five countries plus a few Western countries. It appears that there is no
big gap between the two groups, although continental European
countries are slightly more generous across the three sectors. The only
pattern that emerges to support the low generosity claim is the low
duration of unemployment benefits and to a lesser extent invalidity
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benefits in East Asia, and perhaps the low level of lump-sum grants that
compensate permanent disability in case of occupational injury (see
annex 1).
 Old age pension schemes are important to consider as well
because they represent by far the bulk of cash transfers. Unfortunately,
they are much harder to compare due to their diversity, their
multiplicity (in some countries and industries, workers cumulate several
pensions) and the distinction between lump-sum grants and annuities.
Table 13 provides rough estimates, based on average benefits per person
divided by average insured earnings.34 Lump-sum grants are converted
into annuities at the rate of 7%. This is really a rule of thumb rather than
an accurate estimate.35 It turns out that Japan’s pensions are about as
generous as those of the United Kingdom and the United States for
instance. Korea’s NPP is also very generous, although the replacement
rate presented here is not based on actual expenditures, but on the
entitlement formula explained in annex 1. The other countries are
lagging far behind (except Taiwanese civil servants!36). Even Singapore’s
pensions look very low despite the staggering 40% contribution rate.
This can be explained by two factors. First, like the Korean NPP, the CPF
needs more time to deliver its full benefits because it started with much
lower contribution rates, such that workers retiring now did not put as
much money in their accounts as the present working population.
Second, withdrawals used to finance long term investments such as
housing are not recorded as old age benefits, although they serve the
same purpose.
                                        
 34 For some schemes, average earnings of the whole economy have been used
instead (read notes of table 13). Insured earnings are generally basic wages,
excluding bonuses and other benefits. Hence the replacement rates based on them
tend to be overestimated (see for instance the two estimates presented for Japanese
EPI). Note also that replacement rates of old age pension schemes are usually
calculated on the basis of the last salary prior to retirement, which is typically higher
than average insured earnings because wages rise with age and seniority.
 35 This rate corresponds to the current price of annuities in the British insurance
market and was used by the former British government in its “Basic Pension Plus”
plan. Roughly, it means that the lump-sum grant can be depleted in 14 years (100/7),
the interests earned covering the few additional years of expected life. Of course, life
expectancy at retirement age varies across countries, such that this rate should
ideally be adapted for each country. Since workers retire from their main job earlier
in East Asia than in Britain, this rate should be regarded as an overestimation.
36 Some senior officials receive very generous pensions.
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 Table 12: Basic Wage Replacement Rates and Duration of Selected
Income Security Schemes (1997)
Invalidity Unemployment Occupational
injury
rate months rate months rate months
Japan 60% 18 60% 3-10 60% open
Korea - - 50% 1-7 70% open
Taiwan 50% 12 flat:39%a 4 70% open
Hong Kong 80% 3 66% - b 80% open
Singapore 100% 0.5/year .. .. 66% open
United Kingdom flat:15% 7 flat:13% 6 flat:15% open
France 50% 12 57.4% 4-27 60-80% open
Germany 100-70%c 1.5-20c 67% 2-28 100-70% open
Sweden 75% open 75% 10 75% open
United States -d - d ca. 50% 6 66% open
Source: Social Security Administration (1997).
Notes: Basic rates only: benefits may vary according to a series of variables. “Open”
means that the benefits are due either for any required length or lead to a lump-sum
payment based on previous earnings in case of permanent disability to work. “Flat”
means that the benefit is not proportional to earnings (percentage in terms of
average wage in manufactures). a. 1997. b. Lump-sum (see annex 1). c. Second rate
applies for second period. d. Only six States have some invalidity benefit schemes.
 Although public assistance is much less important in budgetary
terms, it is very significant because it defines the bear minimum which
poor people must live with. Table 14 shows the level of the public
assistance cash benefit in each country as a percentage of GDP per
capita. Again, some caution is required to interpret those data, because
cash benefits are only one form of assistance, complemented by other
subsidies, which in some countries are quite significant (e.g., housing
benefits in Britain). Nevertheless, it is clear that the Japanese and
Taiwanese public assistance is no more generous than the least generous
European assistance schemes, and that the other East Asian countries are
even stricter.
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 Table 13: Replacement Rates for various Old Age Pension and
Disability Schemes (1996)
Retirement
Age
Average replacement rate
(% average wage)
Old Age Disability
Japan
  National Pensiona
  MAA (central gov’t)
  Employees Pension Insurance
  Employees Pension Insuranceb
65
60i
60i
60i
13
51
49
43
19
23
21
..
Korea
  National Pension Programme c
  Labour Standards Law df
60
60
61
20
..
-
Taiwan
  Labour Insurance d
  Government Employees Ins.d
  Farmers Old Age Allowancec
60
60
65
11
283
9
6
6
-
Singapore
  Central Provident Fund be 55 26 9
Hong Kong
  Long Service Pay df
  Social Security Allowanceag
  Social Security Allowanceah
open
70
65
13
7
6
-
24
12
Germany
  Workers’ Pens. + Empl.’Pens.b
65
31
..
Sweden
  National Pensionb
65 58 ..
United Kingdom
  National Pensionb
65 (male)
60 (female) 43
..
United States
  Old age, Surv. & Dis. Pensionb
65
48
..
Sources: Health and Welfare Statistics Association (1997), Bureau of Labour
Insurance (1997), Central Trust of China (1997), Central Provident Fund Board
(1997), Department of Census and Statistics (1996).
Notes: a. Based on average earnings of the whole economy rather than average
insured wage. b. Computed by Ministry of Health and Welfare of Japan; includes
additional pensions if applicable; rate of couples; based on average earnings of the
manufacturing sector (figures of 1993). c. Theoretical pension, based on entitlement
formula for an average wage (see annex 1). d. Lump sum grants programmes (see
text for methodology). e. Median balance at age 55. f. Theoretical pension, based on
35 years of seniority at the same company. g. Higher Old Age Allowance (over 70
years old) and higher rate of Disability Allowance. h. Old Age Allowance and
normal rate of Disability Allowance. i. 59 for women until 1999.
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Beyond those quantitative comparisons, East Asian welfare
systems can also be described as less generous in terms of the patterns
explained above, at least for some countries and sectors:
· Few entitlements: Access to most benefits is conditional to
contributions and even the notion of right to a minimal income
from public assistance is not as clear as in Western countries.
· Actuarially fair schemes: Social security programmes are usually
designed to avoid vertical redistribution.
· Preference for lump-sum grants over annuities: Retired people are
not fully protected against poverty in the event of a prolonged life.
· Preference for funded over pay-as-you-go systems: Either
intergenerational redistribution is avoided through funded
systems, or governments manage pay-as-you-go schemes
conservatively to avoid building debts for future generations.
· High co-payments in health care: Horizontal redistribution in the
health care sector is limited by high co-insurance fees.
 Table 14: Generosity of Public Assistance (Cash Benefit for a One-
Person Household)
Benefit (% GDP/cap.)
Japan (1996)a 26
Korea (1994) 14
Taiwan (1997)b 23
Singapore (1995) 6
Hong Kong (1995) 6 – 15
Denmark (1992) 40
France (1992) 29
Germany (1992) 22
United Kingdom (1992) 22
Source: Health and Welfare Statistics Association (1997), Kwon (1998b), Government
Information Office http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/yearbook/ content.htm (December
1997), European Commission (1996).
Notes: a. Elderly person in a region with middle costs of living. b. Taipei city only.
II.5 Summary
 The previous discussion has concentrated on the main differences
between the selected East Asian countries and some Western countries.
The East Asian specificity should not be overestimated, however. On the
one hand, Goodman, White and Kwon (1998a) remind us that all East
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Asian countries have imported fundamental institutional structures and
systems from the West. For instance, the Japanese system is very similar
to the Bismarkian model as it is dominated by insurance and is
institutionally fragmented along occupational lines.37 Korea and Taiwan
have in turn been very influenced by the Japanese colonisation. Hong
Kong has likewise imported institutions from her British colonial master.
On the other hand, there is also a large diversity among the five selected
East Asian countries. At the end of the day, each country, be it Western
or Asian, has its own unique social welfare system.
 This chapter has also emphasised the big difference between
Japan, Korea and Taiwan on the one hand and Hong Kong and
Singapore on the other. To sum up, the former group has adopted social
welfare systems similar to those of most European countries, and they
are progressively developing into full-fledged welfare states. In Japan,
this development has already been achieved. In Korea and Taiwan, a
strong welfare infrastructure already exists, although their welfare states
still appear to be small compared to the West. They are likely to grow as
(i) a recently introduced national old age pension programme in Korea is
progressively phased in, while Taiwan is contemplating to introduce
one as well and (ii) social security programmes are progressively
universalised, as they are extended to more occupational groups (e.g.,
employees of small firms, the self-employed). Those developments
surely require ambitious and hotly contested policy reforms. However,
my point is that they lie in the logic of the system itself. There is a
welfare state dynamic at work in Japan, Korea and Taiwan.
 Nevertheless, I have also identified a number of strategies by
which those three countries’ governments have limited the growth of the
welfare state. In other words, within a general social welfare structure
similar to most Western countries, they have adopted features limiting
the overall generosity of the system, such as striving to make their
insurance schemes as actuarially fair as possible. In the housing and
personal social services sectors, the state has also mainly relied upon
regulation of the private sector, with some financial incentives, although
the Japanese government has launched ambitious programmes to
increase the supply of personal social services in the last few years.
 The governments of Hong Kong and Singapore are opposing any
Western-like welfare state more strongly. Their rhetoric is backed by
                                        
 37 However, Jones (1990) notes that workers’ participation, an essential
characteristics of the Bismarkian model, is absent of the Japanese system.
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social welfare structures that have already reached their full
development, with minimal state intervention as far as expenditures are
concerned. Indeed, in contrast to Korea and Taiwan, increasing the size
of their welfare states would require major institutional changes, rather
than the development of existing structures. That is why few social
welfare advances have been achieved in recent years. It does not mean
that no change will happen at all, however. In Singapore, an institutional
reform under way is to combine the provident fund system with
insurance schemes in the health care sector. But that would increase the
role of the private sector, not the state. Hong Kong is a more peculiar
case. In theory, she could become a full-fledged welfare state within its
existing institutional framework: the state could just increase the
Hospital Authority’s budget and multiply the various allowance and
assistance benefits several folds. Yet the sheer cost of such reforms,
which would be financed by taxes only, prevents them from happening.
Ironically, Hong Kong’s allowances cannot be made more generous
because they are potentially too generous (i.e., non-means-tested, flat
rate, non-contributory). That’s why Hong Kong now contemplates
partial institutional shifts. For example, the government considers to
create a provident fund for old age pensions to meet the challenge of the
ageing population. Again, this alternative reveals the government’s
intention to keep a minimalist welfare state in terms of tax and
spending. Nevertheless, I have stressed that public spending is not the
only relevant measure of the size of welfare states, because governments
can also enforce the private sector to provide welfare benefits. This is
particularly the case in Hong Kong and Singapore that rely upon
provident fund and employers’ liability as their main social security
instruments.
 
 III. Cost Analysis
 This chapter examines the overall cost of social welfare in East Asian
and Western countries. In the first section, various sources of aggregate
data are used to complement the programme by programme approach
of chapter I. The second section presents aggregate private welfare
expenditures. The third section takes into account differences in age
structure that significantly affect the objective needs for social welfare.
The last section is a summary.
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III.1 Aggregate Public Expenditures on Social Welfare
 International comparisons of public expenditures are not an easy
exercise, let alone of private expenditures. Most governments publish
synoptic budgets with functional breakdowns, including the following
typical social welfare categories: education, health, “housing and
community development” and “social security and welfare”.38 Those
categories are rather broad, and more detailed information on the latter
would be particularly welcome. This is the point of the systematic
overview of annex 1 summarised in the previous chapters. On the other
hand, looking at the government’s aggregate data is a better way to have
a grasp of the overall spending, for simply adding up the budget of
individual programmes can be misleading (i.e., risk of omission and
double counting). Thus, the bottom-up and top-down approaches are
complementary.
 Nevertheless, much caution is required in assessing aggregate
figures too. The way public expenditures are allocated across sectors
varies from country to country. For instance, Hay (1992) assesses that
public health care expenditures in Hong Kong are at least twice as big as
they appear in the government’s accounts, because many relevant
expenditures appear in the accounts of other departments: (i) medical
staff’s pensions and fringe benefits (sometimes bigger than their basic
salary), (ii) implicit rental value of the land and facilities owned by the
state, (iii) goods and services provided free by other departments such
as laundry done by prisoners, maintenance work, stationery,
telecommunications, transportation and so on (the list is long). If these
hidden expenditures were taken into account, Hong Kong’s health care
expenditures as a percentage of GDP might well be about average
compared to OECD countries, instead of being very low. A similar
remark must be made about education. Countries treat differently
expenditures on research, pre-school centres, vocational training, school
buses and lunches, scholarships and administrative costs. Likewise, the
cost of housing policies is probably the hardest to compare, for tax
relieves and subsidies in the form of pricing under market value are
often unaccounted for. Moreover, expenditures under “community
development” may mean many things, some of which not belonging to
                                        
 38 Health would typically include public health programmes and subsidies to
hospitals, but expenditures of health insurance are included in “social security and
welfare”. This is of course one source of bias for sector comparisons, since countries
use both kinds of instruments in various degrees.
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social welfare at all.39 Finally, the tax system of each country may bias
comparisons in three ways: (i) tax exemptions are really equivalent to
expenditures although they are not counted, (ii) the tax regime to which
social security benefits are subject vary widely across countries and (iii)
various indirect tax regimes also influence their purchasing power. 40
 Some international institutions make an effort at standardising the
statistics to avoid these caveats. This is the case of the International
Monetary Fund’s “Government Finance Statistics”, the OECD’s national
accounts and SOXC, the OECD’s social expenditures data base.41 Even
then, aggregate welfare expenditures for the same country can vary by
up to 25%! Moreover, Taiwan and Hong Kong are members of neither of
those organisations. National sources are therefore used in this section
for those two countries. For Taiwan, the national accounts include a
functional breakdown of general government expenditures without the
category “health”, which is included in the sector “social security and
welfare”. For Hong Kong, the Department of Census and Statistics has
computed the total public expenditures on health, education and social
security and welfare. Expenditures of the Housing Authority are also
added, although it should really be considered as private spending, as
argued in chapter II. For Singapore, only central government
expenditures are available and I use the IMF data. They include some
but not all quasi-government agencies (the Housing Development Board
and the Central Provident Fund are excluded). Expenditures made
under the CPF are also added, which may be considered as private
expenditures. Although Korea is a member of OECD, it is not included
in SOXC yet. Hence data presented here are from OECD national
accounts instead. Finally, SOXC is used for Japan and the selected
Western countries. The data for those countries should therefore be
more comparable than the other ones. Compared to other sources, SOXC
tends to underestimate aggregate expenditures by between 15% to 25%,
                                        
 39 See International Monetary Fund (1986) or OECD (1996c) for a discussion of
methodological problems of international government expenditure comparisons.
 40 Even if the building and maintenance costs of public housing are entirely
covered by rents paid by tenants, hidden subsidies may subsist if rents don’t include
the market price of the land owned by the government, which can be very
substantial in cities like Hong Kong and Singapore.
 41 The International Labour Organisation has also published a series titled “The
Cost of Social Security”. Unfortunately, the last available issue is for the years 1987-
89 and it excludes Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong.
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notably by ignoring administrative costs. On the other hand, it is one of
the most processed sources and it provides detailed sector data.
 Those caveats kept in mind, tables 15 and 16 present the
magnitude of social welfare expenditures for several East Asian and
Western countries. The difference in spending between East and West is
striking. The governments in Hong Kong and Singapore barely spend
more than 5% of GDP on any kind of social welfare. Those of Korea and
Taiwan spend about twice as much, around 10% of GDP (if national
sources were used for Korea instead of the OECD national accounts,
Korea would hit the 10% line). This is still way below Western countries.
However, Korea and Taiwan do not spend significantly less in
education. Most of the difference comes from health care and social
security and welfare. In fact, health care expenditures covered by public
insurance must constitute the bulk of the “social security and welfare”
line for Korea and Taiwan (see chapter I). So the main gap between them
and Western countries stems from pensions and other cash programmes
and services.
 Table 15: Aggregate Social Welfare Expenditures in the Four NICsa
(%GDP)
  Korea
 (1995)
 Taiwan
 (1996)
 Hong Kong
 (1995)
 Singapore
 (1995)
 Education  3.73  5.00  2.63  1.78
 Health care  0.24  -  1.67  1.21
 Social security & welfare  3.12  5.71  1.22  0.79
 (2.20)c
 (6.00)d
 Housing & community
dvlpt
 1.56  0.38  (1.40)b  1.29
 Total  8.7  11.10  5.52
 (6.92)b
 5.08
 (6.49)c
 (10.29)d
Sources: OECD (1997a), Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics
(1997a), Department of Census and Statistics (1997c), International Monetary Fund
(1996) and Central Provident Fund Board (1996).
Notes: a. Consolidated, general government expenditures, current plus capital
accounts (except Singapore: central government expenditures, with some extra-
budgetary funds). b. Including the Housing Authority. c. Including social security-
related CPF withdrawals. d. Including housing and social security-related CPF
withdrawals.
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 Table 16: Aggregate Social Welfare Expenditures in some OECD
Countriesa (%GDP, 1993)
  Japanb  France  Germany  Sweden  United
Kingdom
 United
States
 Education  3.70  5.60  4.70c  6.70  5.20  5.20
 Health care  5.27  7.28  6.43  6.22  5.75  5.85
 Old age, surv.
pensions
 5.70  11.69  11.24  10.30  7.15d  6.19
 Unemploymente  0.36  3.33  4.34  5.84  1.78  0.79
 Family benefits  0.20  2.12  1.37  2.78  1.81  0.35
 Other social securityf  0.57  2.05  3.03  4.44  2.34  1.60
 Personal soc.
services
 0.42  1.11  1.01  6.39  1.05  0.35
 Housing benefits  ..  0.92  0.24  1.17  1.84  ..
 Others  0.12  0.22  0.59  0.91  1.7  0.55
 Total  16.14  34.33  32.97  44.73  28.62  20.84
Sources: OECD (1996c) and OECD (1996a) for education.
Notes: a. Consolidated, general government expenditures, current plus capital
accounts. b. 1992 (except education: 1993). c. 1994. d. This figure significantly
overstates national data. e. Includes benefits plus active labour market policies. f.
Includes disability, occupational illness and injury and sickness.
 Japan is also trailing behind Western countries in terms of
aggregate social security expenditures. The gap is much narrower,
however, especially compared to the United States. Unlike the other East
Asian countries, the Japanese government spends about as much on
health care as its Western counterparts. The gap is not so big for old age
pensions either, at least compared to the United Kingdom and the
United States. The bulk of the difference is situated in the other sectors,
from unemployment to housing benefits. In fact, the three big spending
sectors of education, health care and old age pensions represent together
91% of all social welfare expenditures in Japan, compared to 83% in the
United States, 72% in France, 68% in Germany and only 63% in the
United Kingdom and 52% in Sweden.
 
III.2 Social Security Expenditures and Ageing Population
When comparing aggregate social welfare expenditures, it is critically
important to take into account demographic variables such as age and
sex. Both health care and old age pension expenditures are a direct
function of the age structure of the population. Table 17 illustrates the
wide difference in age structure between East Asian and Western
countries. While Japan has already a higher proportion of over 65 year-
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olds than the United States, and about the same proportion as in France,
the other East Asian countries have much younger populations.
However, the population is ageing faster in all East Asian countries and
is expected to catch up with the old age structure of Europe. In fact,
Japan is still in the midst of one of the fastest ageing process in the
world, and is expected to become one of the oldest people by the middle
of the next century.
 Table 17: Ageing Societies - Population Forecasts as of 1994 (Medium
Variant)
% population 65 and over 1995 2020 2040 Fertility rate
(1990-95)
Japan 14.1 25.2 29.1 1.50
Korea 5.9 13.2 19.3a 1.73
Taiwan 7.6 14.1b 21.5c 1.80
Hong Kong 10.2 19.3 32.6 1.21
Singapore 6.7 16.0 24.4 1.73
United Kingdom 15.5 18.0 23.1 1.81
United States 12.6 16.1 20.6 2.08
France 14.9 19.7 24.3 1.74
Sources: Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis
(1995), National Statistical Office (1997) and Directorate General of Budget,
Accounting and Statistics (1997a).
a. 2030. b. 2021. c. 2036.
 The Japanese government, and indeed the Japanese people
themselves, are very well aware of the implications of rapid ageing on
the cost of their social security system. Numerous projections and policy
reform proposals have been generated in the last few years. Chart 1
presents projections from the Council on Welfare Vision for an Ageing
Society, a committee of the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Four
scenarios are presented: (i) the current system is unchanged, (ii) current
system plus improved measures for child and elderly care (Case I), (iii)
reform of the pension system and improvement of the health care sector
efficiency, plus the additional measures for child and elderly care (Case
II) and (iv) reform of the pension system and improvement in health
care sector efficiency without additional measures for child and elderly
care. The scenarios include the effect of ageing on economic growth as
well as on higher demand for social welfare services and benefits.
 Even if cost curbing measures are introduced, expenditures are
expected to rise to a level of about 30% of GDP in 30 years time
(excluding education and housing). Japan would then reach a level of
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public expenditures on social security comparable with the one of
France today. Nevertheless, Japan’s population is already as old as the
French one is today, such that the Japanese system can still be described
as cheaper than the French one.42
 Ageing will also affect social security systems of the other East
Asian countries. On top of automatic cost increase due to higher
demand put on existing welfare schemes, systemic reforms are likely to
take place to cope with the changing demography. It is therefore much
more difficult to predict the level of social security expenditures that
those countries will incur in 30 years, when the share of 65 year-olds and
over will reach the current Western levels.
 
Source: Council on Welfare Vision for an Ageing Society (1994).
III.3 Aggregate Private Expenditures on Social Welfare
 Now that it has been confirmed that East Asian governments currently
spend less on social welfare, it is interesting to know to what extent this
is compensated by the private sector. In other words, do East Asian
                                        
 42 Although part of the difference can be explained by a cohort effect because
Japanese old age pension schemes are not completely mature yet: the current
working population may expect higher benefits per capita than the current retired
population (although not higher net benefits because contributions have been raised
a lot as well).
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countries spend less on social welfare altogether or do they simply have
a different financing mix? This question will remain unanswered for
many sectors, for much of the private provision of welfare is either
extremely hard to measure or not monetised at all. In other sectors,
however, it is possible to add up private expenditures. This is the case
with health care and education. OECD has made some effort at
standardising data. Education expenditures include really everything:
direct public consumption, subsidies to private schools, as well as
subsidies to individuals (e.g., scholarships).
 Table 18 shows that private expenditures on education are
especially high in Korea, Japan and the United States. As a percentage of
GDP, private expenditures do compensate for lower public
expenditures, bringing total expenditures of Japan and Korea just below
those of France and the United Kingdom. Spending per child is about
the same in Japan, France and the United Kingdom. It is significantly
lower in Korea and in higher in the United States, which reflects the big
differences of GDP.
 Table 18: Private and Public Expenditures on Education (% GDP, 1993)
Public
expenditures
Private
expenditures
Total per student
(US$ PPP)
Japana 3.7 1.2 4.9 4,727
Koreab 3.8 1.9 5.7 2,132
France 5.6 0.5 6.1 4,548
United Kingdomc 5.2 0.9 6.1 4.339
United Statesd 5.2 1.6 6.8 7,341
Source: OECD (1996a).
Notes: United Kingdom: 1994. a. Excluding expenditures for students' living, family
allowances contingent to student status and transport reductions. b. Excluding
private purchases of books etc. c. 1994. d. Excluding tax rebate.
 A similar exercise can be done for health care (data for Korea are
unfortunately not available). Japanese private expenditures do not really
compensate for the low public expenditures, except if compared with
the Untied Kingdom. Nevertheless, total per capita expenditures in
Japan are in the same range as those in Europe, on a purchasing power
parity basis.
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 Table 19: Private and Public Expenditures on Health Care (% GDP,
1991)
Public
expenditures
Private
expenditures
Total per
inhabitant
(US$ PPP)
Japan 4.7 1.8 6.5 1,175
France 6.7 2.4 9.1 1,528
United Kingdom 5.5 1.1 6.6 985
United States 5.6 7.1 12.7 2,600
Source: OECD (1993).
 As to income replacement schemes, the private alternatives to
social security are private savings and insurance. Table 20 shows that
Japan and especially Korea have indeed a slightly higher household
saving rate than the three Western countries.43 The same holds for life
insurance, albeit to a lesser extent.
 Table 20: Households Savings and Private Insurance
Households’ net savings
rate
Life insurance (%GDP)
Japan 13.3 6.4
Korea 17.9 8.8
France 9.5 5.2
United Kingdom 5.6 6.6
United States 5.7 3.8
Source: OECD (1996b and 1997b).
III.4 Summary
 This chapter has presented data confirming the existence of a hierarchy
in terms of aggregate public expenditures on social welfare: Hong Kong
and Singapore are the lowest spenders, followed by Korea and Taiwan,
then Japan and finally Western countries.
                                        
 43 Tachibanaki (1996b) suggests several hypothesis to explain the high saving
rate in Japan (compared to Western countries): (i) the low level of social security
benefits requiring more precautionary savings, (ii) the demographic structure and
life-cycle theory, (iii) the large share of bonuses in take-home pay, that are more
easily saved than wages, (iv) the high proportion of self-employed who tend to save
more, (v) the high prices of real estate which require high savings, (vi) generous tax
incentives for savings and (vii) the rationing of personal borrowing due to imperfect
capital markets.
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 A hierarchy across sectors has also been identified, corresponding
to the historical development of social welfare policies. The five East
Asian countries put an early priority on education, for which their
public expenditures are not much lower than in the West. Moreover,
private expenditures on education are relatively high, such that total
spending on education is really in the same range as that of Western
countries. This readiness of East Asian people to spend public funds as
well as their own money on education is probably the best example of
the influence of “Confucian values” in welfare. The next priority social
sector was health care, a sector in which Korea and Taiwan have only
recently achieved universal insurance coverage and for which the gap in
terms of public spending is wider than for education. The priority has
more recently shifted towards old age pensions in those two countries, a
sector in which current public expenditures are even lower compared to
Western countries. Although Japan’s social security was developed
much earlier, the emphasis was also put on health care prior to pensions.
All other sectors represent very low amounts of public money, which
reflects a lack of interest for things like unemployment benefits or
personal social services for the elderly and families... at least until
recently! Korea is now struggling with her new unemployment problem
and Japan with the prospect of an ageing society. Those areas will be
examined in more details in chapters V and VI, with an emphasis on the
input of the private sector.
 Comparing expenditures alone does not make a lot of sense if they
are not measured against some yardstick of “quality”. In the case of
education and health care, measures of quality abound and converge to
demonstrate that East Asian students are quite good in mathematics and
science, and that people are expected to live long and healthy lives. The
link between the level of expenditures and those indicators is however
very uncertain and the East Asian good records in those fields must be
traced to a series of factors that go far beyond the scope of this paper,
such that I will not dwell on that topic. As to old age pensions and the
other income replacement or complement schemes, a relevant aggregate
measure of “quality” could be the extent to which they reduce income
inequality and poverty. That is the subject of the next chapter.
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 IV. Income Distribution Analysis
 Kwon (1998) notes that income redistribution has hardly been an issue
in East Asia, for the fast economic growth has been Pareto improving.
Inequality matters less, the argument goes, when incomes are rising.44
After all, whether social security systems should have a redistributive
function at all remains an ideological debate in Western countries too.
Without entering into this debate, this chapter analyses the extent of
income inequality in East Asian countries and the redistributive impact
of their welfare states. The first section takes the conventional approach
of comparing distributions of household income, before and after taxes
and transfers. In the second section, another aspect of income
distribution is examined, namely transfers across occupational groups,
because it is particularly salient in East Asia. The third section is a
summary.
 
IV.1 Interpersonal Redistributive Effects of State Welfare
 Table 21 presents Gini coefficients of income distribution for the five
selected East Asian countries, compared to a number of Western
countries. Two different data sources are used. The World Bank
publishes results from national sources, with no guarantee of uniform
methodology. They are all based on Family Income and Expenditures
surveys at the national level, and the unit of analysis is always income at
household level. There is no equivalence scale to account for different
household sizes. By contrast, Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) use data
from the Luxembourg Income Survey, which are more standardised,
and a common methodology to compute Gini coefficients. They also use
an equivalence scale to take into account the effect of household size on
income distribution: household income is divided by the square root of
household size. Unfortunately, their study does not include Korea, Hong
Kong and Singapore.
 Among the 24 countries studied by Gottschalk and Smeeding
(1997) (only seven are shown here) Japan and Taiwan are ranked among
countries with relatively unequal income distribution, although they are
not at the extreme. If the World Bank’s data are of any reliability, Korea
would be ranked at about the same place, while Hong Kong and
Singapore would be at the extreme side of inequality, perhaps even
                                        
 44 The legitimacy of wealth accumulation (i.e., corruption) is much more salient
a political issue in East Asia than wealth inequality itself.
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beyond the United Kingdom and the United States. A puzzling result of
table 21 is the very different ranking of Japan in the two studies. The
main reason to account for that discrepancy is probably the different
surveys used. The World Bank results are based on the Family Income
and Expenditures Survey, which excludes farmers, owners of family
businesses and one-person households. Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997)
use the Income Redistribution Survey that includes all households and is
therefore more reliable.45
 Table 21: Income Inequality, East and West
World Bank Gottschalk and Smeeding
Year Gini coef. year Gini coef. D9/D1a
Japan 1979 0.28 1992 0.315b 4.17
Taiwan 1991 0.308c 1991 0.300 3.90
Korea 1988 0.33 .. .. ..
Hong Kong 1980 0.39 .. .. ..
Singapore 1982-83 0.42 .. .. ..
Sweden 1981 0.28 1992 0.229 2.78
Germany 1988 0.32 1989 0.261 3.21
France 1989 0.35 1984 0.294 3.48
United States 1985 0.36 1991 0.343 5.78
United Kingdom 1988 0.39 1991 0.335 4.67
Sources: World Bank (1997) and Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997).
Notes: a. Income ratio of the ninth to the first deciles (upper boundaries). b.
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) have used unpublished national data for Japan
instead of LIS, using the same methodology. c. Source: Directorate General for
Budget, Accounting and Statistics (1996).
 Kwon (1997) has analysed the redistributional effects of the welfare
states of Japan and Korea compared to the United Kingdom (see table
22, note that inequality measures for Japan are underestimated because
data include working households only). He used income data before and
after taxes and social security transfers, from national surveys on family
income and expenditures. His conclusions are the following:
· The distribution of market income is much more equal in Japan
and Korea than in the United Kingdom.
· The redistributional effects of taxes and social security transfers
(i.e., benefits net of contributions) are much smaller in Korea,
where they are almost negligeable, and Japan than in the United
Kingdom.
                                        
 45 See Tachibanaki and Yagi (1997).
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· In Korea, the lowest and highest quintile get a higher share of
benefits than the middle quintiles. For the highest quintile, it is
due to the fact that most social security transfers take the form of
actuarially fair insurance (i.e., both benefits and contributions are
proportional to income). For the lowest quintile, the higher
proportion of benefits can be explained by the strictly means-
tested assistance programmes. In Japan, this phenomenon is even
more pronounced, with the share of social benefits increasing
steadily with income, except in the third quintile (but again, this
could change if workless households were added). This finding
stands in sharp contrast with the United Kingdom, where the two
poorest quintiles get much more benefits than the three upper
ones.
· Despite the lack of redistribution in Japan and Korea, their
distribution of disposable income is still much more equal than in
the United Kingdom.
The comparison with the United Kingdom might be misleading
because it has a particularly unequal income distribution at the time
being. If Japan and Korea were compared to many other Western
countries, the last conclusion would not hold: disposable income would
be less equally distributed in the two East Asian countries (see table 21),
especially if we question the reliability of the Japanese family income
and expenditures survey. Nevertheless, this study makes an important
point: in the case of Japan and Korea, the state intervention does not
influence income distribution much, such that whatever equality there
is, is caused entirely by market forces.
This compelling empirical evidence illustrates the inadequacy of
limiting the analysis of welfare to the state. Shinkawa and Pembel (1996)
underscore three important elements affecting the distribution of market
income in Japan:
1. Full employment.
2. State subsidies to farms and small and medium enterprises (the
traditional clients of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan).
3. Transfers within families: Shinkawa and Pembel (1996) assert that
income inequality in Japan is more pronounced across age and sex
compared to Western countries. Since in Japan there is a middle-
aged man in almost every family, these inequalities disappear as
soon as income comparisons are made on a household rather than
individual basis.
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The last two chapters will therefore analyse the social welfare roles
played by non-state actors. In particular, the first and third points above
will be addressed in the enterprise and family welfare chapters
respectively.
Table 22: Income Distribution Before and After Taxes and Transfers in
Japan, Korea and the United Kingdom
Average income of quintile groups (% of
general average)
%
gross
income I II III IV V
Japan (1990, monthly income,
workers’ households only)
Market income 99.62 58 78 96 115 154
Public transfers 1.38 92 100 90 101 117
Gross income 100.00 59 78 96 114 153
Direct taxes 4.90 26 48 78 118 230
Social security contributions 3.86 57 79 98 118 148
Disposable income 91.24 61 80 97 114 149
Korea (1991, monthly income,
all households)
Earnings 95.38 31 69 92 119 189
Private transfers 4.28 173 76 51 67 132
Market income 99.66 37 69 90 117 187
Public transfers 0.34 158 79 32 74 147
Gross income 100.00 38 69 90 117 187
Direct taxes 1.61 22 33 73 89 282
Social security contributions 2.07 40 77 94 117 172
Disposable income 96.32 38 69 90 117 185
United Kingdom (1990, yearly
income, all households)
Market income 87.52 6 30 80 128 255
Direct transfers 12.48 148 161 87 61 43
Gross income 100.00 24 46 81 120 229
Direct taxes & social security
contr.
20.27 20 37 76 121 246
Disposable income 79.73 25 49 82 120 225
Source: Kwon (1997).
IV.2 Redistributive Effects of State Welfare across Occupational Groups
Many authors studying social welfare in Confucian societies stress the
importance of status differences among workers. As Gould (1993) puts
it, Japanese regard themselves as a classless society in the Marxist sense
of the word, but they are very well aware of rank differences. Ranks are
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defined in terms of age and sex, but also education or size of one’s
enterprise.
This social stratification translates itself into a segregation of the
labour force along three dimensions:
· Labour force status: Private sector employers, employees and civil
servants versus self-employed, farmers, day-labourers, family
helpers and the unemployed.
· Employees’ status: Regular versus temporary and/or part-time.
· Size of enterprise: Large versus medium or small.
 Those three dimensions define so-called “core workers” (e.g., regular
employees of large firms) versus “contingent workers” (e.g., day
labourers). This distinction should of course be understood as a
continuum rather than a clear-cut division into two groups (e.g., a
temporary employee of a large firm may enjoy more benefits than a
regular employee of a small firm or vice-versa).
 Table 23: Breakdown of the Labour Force by Status (1996)
% labour force Japana Korea Taiwan Hong
Kong
Singapore
Civil Servants 8.1 3.0 11.0 5.7 3.5
Employeesb 68.6 50.1 56.5 78.6 79.3
Self-employed 11.8 27.4 21.7 10.4 13.1
Day labourers 1.8 8.5 .. d .. d .. d
Family helpers 6.0 9.1 8.1 0.9 1.2
Unemployed 3.2 2.0 2.6 4.4 3.0
Farmersc 5.1 11.4 9.9 0.0 0.2
Employees by
firm size (%
employees)
Japan Koreae Taiwanef Hong
Kong
Singapore
Over 1,000
employees
20.2 9.1 4.2 14.76 ..
30 to 1,000
employees
42.9 27.2 20.0 26.49 ..
Below 30
employees
36.9 63.7 75.8 58.75 ..
Sources: See annex 3 and Statistics Bureau (1996), Directorate General of Budget,
Accounting and Statistics (1997b).
Notes: a. 1995. b. Private sector employees. c. Farmers are double counted in
employment status categories (hence sum is over 100%). d. Included in employees. e.
Unit of measurement is establishments instead of firms (i.e., branch offices and
factories counted separately from headquarters). f. 1997.
60
 Tables 23 and 24 show that contingent workers represent a large
proportion of the labour force. Farmers, the self-employed and family
helpers are particularly large groups in Korea and Taiwan. Korea has
also an impressive 8.5% of day-labourers. As a result, public and private
employees represent barely half of the labour force in Korea and only
two thirds in Taiwan. The proportion is much higher in the city-states of
Hong Kong and Singapore. As to the breakdown of employees, regular
employees of large firms represent only 22% of all employees of firms
with more than five employees, compared to 20% for all temporary and
part-time workers (see table 24). In Korea, 35% of employees work in
establishments of less than 5 employees.46 Most of them may be
considered as contingent workers, as they are not even covered by
statutory social security.
 Table 24: Distribution of Private Sector Employees by Size of Firm
and Status in Japan (1995)
% employeesa Over 1,000
employees
30 to 999
employees
5 to 29 employees
Regular 22 39 21
Temporary 3 8 5
Part-time 1 2 1
Sources: Statistics Bureau (1996).
Note: a. 8.4% of all private sector employees work in firms with less than 5
employees and are excluded here
 A person’s status in the labour force will affect his or her access to
virtually all state welfare benefits:
· People who do not participate in the labour force have literally no
access to social security in their own right (except for some
allowances in some countries). The unemployed, family helpers
and some categories of temporary and part-time workers are
likewise excluded from almost all social security programmes. For
example, Furugori (1993) examines the holes in Japan’s social
security net for contingent workers in the unemployment and old
age insurance sectors.
· Almost all statutory insurance schemes in Japan, Taiwan and
Korea are organised along occupational lines. The programmes for
civil servants and private employees are systematically more
                                        
46 See footnote 15.
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generous than those for the self-employed and farmers (see for
instance table 13 in chapter II).
· On the other hand, the state often subsidises the premiums of the
latter groups. In fact, this mechanism of solidarity across
occupational groups is sometimes the only explicit source of
vertical redistribution in the social security systems. In Taiwan’s
National Health Insurance, the share of contributions taken in
charge by the government varies from zero to 100% across 11
occupational groups, which implies huge cross-subsidies.
Moreover, those occupational groups who are more subsidised
also tend to be the ones that consume more health care services
(see table 25). In Korea and Japan, the government has also
decided to subsidise 50% of the health insurance costs of several
occupational groups in order to make universal coverage possible.
Those groups include farmers, the self-employed and family
helpers, retired workers and employees of firms with less than five
employees (plus their dependants). Similar subsidies also exist in
the old age pension sector in Japan and Taiwan, although they are
proportionately lower. Again, state subsidies benefit mainly to
farmers and the self-employed, but also to civil servants and the
military (see tables 2, 3 and 4 in chapter I). Ku (1995) has calculated
that as much as 75% of the Taiwanese central government’s total
welfare expenditures benefited to civil servants and the military in
1991, reflecting their key importance to support the state’s goals.
Old age pensions and housing benefits are especially favouring
those two occupational groups.
 Table 25: Subsidies across Occupational Groups of Taiwan’s National
Health Insurance (1996)
Premium shares (%) Premium Expenses
Gov’t Employer Insured per capita
(US$)
per capita
(US$)
Government employeesa 60 0 40
Private school employeesa 30 30 40 497 366
Private sector employeesa 10 60 30
Farmers, fishermena 70 0 30 409 517
Military’s dependants 60 0 40 527 455
Employers, self-employeda 0 0 100 367 421
Low-income familiesa 100 0 0 400 869
Contingent workersab 40 0 60
Veterans 100 0 0 400 601
Veterans’ dependants 70 0 30
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Remaindera 40 0 60
Source: Bureau of National Health Insurance, http://www.nhi.gov.tw (December
1997).
Notes: a. Plus dependants. b. “Workers without a regular employer”.
IV.3 Summary
 Japan, Korea and Taiwan’s income distributions are relatively unequal
compared to OECD countries, although not as much as those of the
United Kingdom and the United States. Hong Kong and Singapore are
even more unequal. On the other hand, market income inequality in
Japan and Korea is relatively less pronounced, while taxes and public
transfers do not have much redistributive power at all, especially when
compared to the United Kingdom. In other words, the key to the
performance of Japan and Korea in terms of income equality is to be
searched outside of the realm of the welfare state. Labour market
mechanisms and income pooling inside families seem to be essential
factors to explain this phenomenon.
 When studying income redistribution in East Asian countries,
focusing on transfers between income groups may prove to be
insufficient. In chapter II, it has been emphasised that few social security
programmes had built-in vertical redistribution mechanisms, with the
exception of health care. However, they involve important redistribution
mechanisms between occupational groups. To the extent that those
groups have different average earnings, it implies some vertical
redistribution. However, it is not always in favour of the poor. The
primary beneficiaries of state subsidies are indeed (i) farmers and
employees of firms with less than five employees whose average
incomes are relatively low, (ii) the self-employed, which is a category
encompassing both low-income and wealthy households and (iii) civil
servants and the military whose average earnings are high compared to
other occupational groups but are privileged to secure loyalty to their
government.47
 
                                        
 47 For instance in Taiwan, the average insured wage of the Government
Employees Insurance was 23% higher than that of the Labour Insurance in 1996
(Bureau of Labour Insurance, 1997 and Central Trust of China, 1997).
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 V. Enterprise Welfare
 This chapter examines to what extent East Asian enterprises play a social
welfare role in East Asian welfare systems. Three potential sources of
“enterprise welfare” are identified:
· The provision of welfare benefits on top of legal requirements (i.e.,
voluntary non-wage labour costs).
· The commitment to security of employment (i.e., lifetime
employment).
· The levelling of the income distribution “at source” (i.e., before
redistribution through tax and social security), thanks notably to
the seniority system for wage determination.
 Enterprise welfare is particularly important in Japan and Korea,
for their industrial basis consists of large enterprises famous for
nurturing their employees. In Japan, firm loyalty is a key concept to
understand labour relations as it implies responsibilities for both
employees and employers. It is at the source of the lifetime employment
commitment and the seniority system. Taiwan and Hong Kong’s
economic structures are very different. They are based on small, family-
oriented companies. Hence the labour market is much more flexible and
competitive in the neo-classical sense of the term, especially in Hong
Kong, with however a strong element of family loyalty (as opposed to
firm loyalty).48 In Singapore, some enterprises are applying the seniority
system while others are more competitive. This chapter focuses on
enterprise welfare in the Japanese way, with some comments on Korea
as well.
 Even in Japan and Korea however, enterprise welfare is not
distributed evenly across the population. What people get depends of
course upon whether they are employees at all, but also upon whom
their employers are. Besides large enterprises, there is indeed a big
fringe of smaller companies that have a more flexible labour
management system (see the discussion on contingent and core workers
in the previous chapter). In a nutshell:
· Core workers benefit more from firms’ voluntary non-wage labour
costs.
· They enjoy maximum employment security.
                                        
 48 By this, I mean for instance that many Taiwanese factory owners recruit their
relatives or people from their own village rather than looking for the cheapest
workers (see for instance Hsiung, 1996).
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· They receive significantly higher wages.
 
V.1 Non-Wage Labour Costs
 Enterprises play a significant role as providers of social welfare benefits.
This can be analysed with evidence from non-wage labour costs studies.
Non-wage labour costs are generally reported as statutory or voluntary.
I will not dwell on the former, as they were the topic of the first chapter.
Still, it must be emphasised that the state in East Asia relies more on
enterprises even for statutory welfare benefits. First, social security
through the instrument of employers’ liability is proportionately more
prevalent than in Western countries, especially in Hong Kong and
Singapore. For instance, minimum legal severance payments disbursed
directly by firms would not appear in the statistics presented in chapter
III, since they do not involve any financial flow through public
institutions. Yet those expenses should count as “legal welfare”. Second,
the state sometimes allows enterprises to manage their own insurance
schemes (e.g., firm-managed health insurance schemes in Japan and
Korea).
 As to voluntary non-wage labour costs, they must be considered as
a part of the worker’s total incentive. Although they also exist in
Western countries, especially in the United States, they are known to be
particularly important in East Asia. This section will therefore examine
the real importance of this kind of enterprise welfare.
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Chart 2: Structure of Japanese Firms' Labour Cost
(Service Industry, 1985)
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Source: Commission of the European Communities (1988).
 Aggregate data on non-wage labour costs are not easily available
for all countries. Hence this section will focus on Japan, using a
comparative study carried out by the European Commission (see chart 2
and table 26).49 Non-wage labour costs consist of (i) cash payments other
than wages such as bonuses and premiums, overtime or holiday pay; (ii)
statutory social security costs; (iii) voluntary social security benefits
(extra pension, family allowance and the like); (iv) in-kind benefits
(housing allowance or housing provision, meals and others); (v) training
and hiring costs and (vi) others (including commuting allowance).
 Table 26: Non-Wage Labour Costs (Manufacturing Industry, 1981)
Holidays Statutory
welfare
Voluntary
welfare
Total
Japan 2.2 7.2 6.7 16.1
France 8.3 18.9 6.8 34.0
United Kingdom 10.9 9.4 8.9 29.2
United States 8.7 7.8 8.9 25.4
Source: Commission of the European Communities (1988).
Note: United States: all industries.
                                        
 49 Commission of the European Communities (1988). See also Hall (1988),
Tachibanaki (1987) and Hart (1994).
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 Compared to some Western countries, it turns out that enterprises’
non-wage labour costs are in fact quite low in Japan. Yet this can entirely
be explained by the low level of statutory social security schemes in
Japan (see chapter III). Nevertheless, even if one compares voluntary
welfare costs only, Japanese firms were spending about the same
amount as their French and British competitors but less than the
Americans50. In other words, compared to other countries, enterprise
welfare is more important in Japan relative to statutory welfare, but not
in absolute terms.
 What table 26 does not show is the importance of in-kind benefits,
which are definitely larger in Japan.51 They include a wide variety of
incentives, like cheap housing, cheap credit, organised vacation and
recreation activities, sports facilities, nurseries, company cars, medical
check-ups and even discount supermarkets at the work place. As shown
in chart 2, they represent only a small fraction of total labour costs. Yet
they contribute to the common perception of paternalistic Japanese firms
taking care of their employees from cradle to grave. Housing benefits in
particular are reckoned to be instruments promoting firm loyalty (see
Hall, 1988). They allow socialisation of employees outside of work hours
(single employees living in dormitories, families in the firm’s apartment
flats). They also enable easier relocation of workers in the event of a
firm’s restructuring. Finally, employees who accept cheap loans from
their employers to buy their own house find themselves tied to their
company. Yet the extent of this phenomenon is limited and particularly
important in big companies.
 As table 27 shows, large companies actually rely more on non-
wage labour costs across the board. The largest enterprises (more than
5,000 employees) devote 19% of labour costs to non-cash benefits,
compared to 15.2% for firms of 30 to 100 employees. Similarly, the share
of statutory benefits decreases and the proportion of voluntary benefits
over statutory ones increases with firm size. Note that table 27
underestimates the gap between large and small firms because it
excludes companies of less than 30 employees.
                                        
 50 The absence of mandatory universal health insurance in the USA influences
the respective share of voluntary and statutory social security costs compared to the
other countries.
 51 Tachibanaki (1987) presents Eurostat figures of 1981 for all European
countries, with benefits in-kind ranging from 0.1% (Germany) to 0.8% (France) of
total labour costs, compared to the 2.4% of Japan (see chart 2).
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 Table 27: Non-Wage Labour Costs by Firm Size in Japan (1995)
Number of
employees
(Yen per
employee per
month and %)
30-99 100-299 300-999 1,000-
4,999
5,000 + All
Firms
over 30
Total labour costs 379,209 413,607 464,120 529,748 615,838 483,009
Total cash
earnings
84.78% 84.37% 83.46% 82.53% 81.01% 82.95%
Statutory benefits 9.84% 9.30% 8.99% 8.41% 8.36% 8.87%
Retirement allow. 2.84% 3.51% 3.86% 4.54% 5.58% 4.26%
In-kind benefits 0.25% 0.34% 0.54% 0.44% 0.62% 0.46%
Training costs 0.18% 0.22% 0.27% 0.33% 0.30% 0.27%
Hiring costs 0.13% 0.17% 0.23% 0.17% 0.09% 0.15%
Housing 0.35% 0.66% 1.26% 1.78% 1.90% 1.31%
Food 0.27% 0.25% 0.25% 0.31% 0.38% 0.30%
Culture & sports 0.26% 0.19% 0.19% 0.23% 0.31% 0.24%
Private insurance 0.41% 0.28% 0.23% 0.22% 0.12% 0.24%
Medical care 0.06% 0.09% 0.09% 0.15% 0.30% 0.16%
Lifetime events 0.09% 0.08% 0.08% 0.12% 0.10% 0.10%
Accident comp. 0.11% 0.08% 0.05% 0.02% 0.02% 0.05%
Asset formation 0.02% 0.05% 0.07% 0.11% 0.23% 0.11%
Others 0.40% 0.27% 0.42% 0.63% 0.72% 0.53%
Source: Statistics Bureau (1996).
Notes: The classification differs from Chart 2 and table 26. In-kind benefits include
commuting allowance, goods manufactured by the company and others. Excludes
firms with less than five employees. Exchange rate: 1 US$ = 94 Yen.
 The literature on non-wage labour costs has produced several
hypotheses to explain to what extent employers and/or employees
prefer them over wages.52 Few of them have been successfully tested.
One factor that definitely plays a role is the tax exemption of most non-
wage labour costs in most countries. Besides that, the human capital
theory has focused on hiring and training costs, although they are
almost insignificant compared to other non-wage labour costs. The idea
is that firms are willing to pay to increase their workers productivity.
Yet they must focus on firm-specific skills in order to retain their
workers who might otherwise increase their market values and quit.
Ohta (1996) and the European Commission (1988) argue that training is
particularly firm specific in Japan, where teamwork is very important.
                                        
 52 See Tachibanaki (1987), European Commission (1988), Hall (1988), and Hart
(1994).
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Along the same idea, deferred payments may be interpreted as attempts
to retain workers, in order to save fixed training and hiring costs and to
avoid shirking by well-paid senior employees. Training costs may here
be understood as all the skills and experience acquired on the job,
beyond formal training sessions of which the costs appear in table 27.
This would explain why a large share of voluntary welfare benefits
consists of retirement pensions, in Japan like elsewhere.53 Shinkawa and
Pembel (1996) also argue that non-wage labour costs are particularly
important for large companies to attract the best workers in the tight
Japanese labour market, as it is harder for smaller firms to offer similar
fringe benefits packages (for instance, due to the lack of economies of
scale). They also note that non-wage labour costs tend to rise faster than
wages in the promotion scale. Yet another rationale of non-wage labour
costs is that many of them take the form of an insurance, for which
group purchase (e.g., firm purchase) is more efficient than individual
purchase, because of the larger pool of risks, lower administrative costs
and possibly lower control costs. Finally, there is some evidence that
unionised firms tend to have a higher proportion of non-wage labour
costs in total labour costs. This could reflect the fact that unionised
workers tend to be permanent employees, thus valuing deferred pay
more than mobile employees.
 Whether enterprise welfare is more efficient than state welfare is
an area that begs for further research. Several authors have tackled the
question of the effects of non-wage labour costs on unemployment, and
especially on cyclical unemployment taking into account the rigidity of
non-wage labour costs compared to wages.54 Yet unemployment is only
part of the issue. To my knowledge there have been no thorough
comparison of the efficiency of enterprise versus state welfare, in terms
of (i) administrative costs, likely to be lower in a public system, (ii) costs
flexibility, greater in an enterprise-centred system and (iii) the actual
                                        
 53 In Japan, enterprises usually offer lump-sum grants for their employees when
their contract is terminated, usually between age 55 and 60. Many employees are re-
hired by the same company or an affiliated company with a lower salary and they
continue to work until 60 years old when they become entitled to the public pension,
or even beyond that age. This is supposed to reflect the decline of employees’
productivity after 55 years old. Another traditional justification for lump-sum grants
at age 55 has been that they are particularly useful to finance children’s wedding.
Nevertheless, more and more companies now offer annuities rather than lump-sum
grants.
 54 See Tachibanaki (1987), Hall (1988) and Hart (1994).
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ability of firms to tackle the moral hazard problem better than the state,
thanks to the proximity between the insurer and insured.
 To sum up this discussion of non-wage labour costs, Japanese
firms do not spend more on them (relative to total labour costs) than
their foreign competitors. Enterprise welfare only looks more important
in Japan because (i) statutory welfare expenditures are lower (see
chapter III), (ii) enterprise welfare is a sign of status for Japanese
employees in a highly hierarchical labour market and (iii) Japanese firms
are perhaps using enterprise welfare more consciously than their foreign
competitors as a means to secure loyalty from their workers.
 
V.2 Full Employment
 The importance of full employment in East Asian economies can hardly
be overstated in an overview of their social welfare systems. Full
employment is first important in its own right, for unemployment is
precisely one of those risks from which social security must protect
workers. It is also important because of the numerous linkages with
other social security sectors. On the resources side, full-employment
means more social security contributions to finance all other sectors. On
the expenditures side, the long-term unemployed are a group at risk for
health care and are likely to fall onto either permanent disability
schemes or public assistance, creating a long term financial liability.
Finally, full employment is crucial because East Asian welfare states are
built around it. As argued in the first part of this paper, people have
access to the bulk of social security through their employment. The
unemployed is eligible only to public assistance (if that) and a few other
marginal schemes.
 This section first briefly analyses the supply side of employment in
the selected East Asian and Western countries. The purpose is to
compare their dependency ratios in order to assess the proportion of
people who have got no earnings and are therefore entirely dependent
upon the social security system, or alternatively upon family solidarity.
The lower those ratios are, the lighter the social security system may be.
Second, it explores to what extent enterprises are fulfilling a social
welfare function by keeping workers who are not necessarily profitable.
This second section again focuses on Japan, for it has a unique labour
management system.
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 Labour Force Participation and Low Dependency Ratios
 Tables 28 and 29 compare the activity, participation and unemployment
rates of the selected East Asian and Western countries.55 Those three
ratios influence the dependency ratio, which is here defined as the
proportion of people not working in the total population. The activity
rate is the pure demographic effect. It has already been discussed in
section III.3: all East Asian countries have a higher proportion of people
in working age and this proportion is going to increase further before
declining. The participation rate may be called the “socio-cultural”
effect. While middle-aged men are expected to work in all countries,
cultural expectations as well as social and economic opportunities and
constraints differ for women, youths (aged 15 to 25) and the elderly
(aged over 65). A very clear pattern of East Asian countries is the high
labour participation rate of the elderly (see table 29).56 Women
participate less in the labour force in East Asia than in Western countries
on average, but it is not true for every country-to-country comparisons
(e.g., female participation rate of all East Asian countries are higher than
that of France). The same holds for youth participation. Finally,
unemployment may be called the “economic effect” of the dependency
ratio. Here again a clear pattern emerges: unemployment rates in East
Asian countries are definitely lower than in any Western country (or
were, in the case of Korea). This is the topic of the next section.
 To sum up, the dependency ratios are generally lower in East
Asian countries, particularly in Japan and Singapore. This is due to the
combined effects of their favourable aged structures, the high propensity
of elderly to work and the low unemployment level. The higher labour
force participation rates of women and youths in some Western
countries partially compensate those effects, particularly in the United
Kingdom and the United States.
                                        
 55 The active population is here defined as the population aged between 15 and
65 years old, plus the employed over 65 years old. The labour force equals total
employment plus unemployment. The unemployed are the people not working but
looking for work and immediately available to work (ILO definition). The activity
rate is the active population over total population. The participation rate is the
labour force over the active population. The unemployment rate is the unemployed
over the labour force.
 56 The elderly participation rate of Korea is biased upward for the elderly are
those over 60 years old instead of 65.
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 Table 28: Activity, Labour Force Participation, Unemployment and
Dependency Rates (1995)
% relevant
population
Activity rate Labour force
part. rate
Unemployme
nt rate
Dependency
rate
Japan 72.8 72.9 3.2 48.6
Koreaa 75.1 62.0 2.0 54.4
Taiwana 69.5 62.4 1.6 57.8
Hong Konga 72.3 70.7 3.2 51.0
Singaporea 71.2 83.2 2.7 42.6
France 65.8 68.3 11.6 60.2
Germany 67.8 72.5 12.9 55.8
United Kingdomb 63.8 77.4 10.3 55.7
United Statesb 65.2 76.5 6.9 53.5
Sources: See annex 3 and International Labour Organisation (1997).
Notes: a. 1996. b. 1993.
 Table 29: Labour Force Participation by Age and Gender (1995)
% active
population of
relevant category
Women
(15-65 years old)
Elderly
(over 64 years old)
Youth
(15-25 years old)
Japan 60.2 23.9 48.2
Korea 53.9b 42.2ab 36.5
Taiwanb 50.4 8.8 33.9
Hong Kongb 56.8 9.8 51.7
Singaporeb 69.9 12.4 49.9
France 47.9 1.4 30.95
Germany 63.0 2.5 50.9
United Kingdomc 67.8 5.0 71.0
United Statesc 68.7 10.7 56.6
Sources: See annex 3 and International Labour Organisation (1997).
Notes: a. Elderly = people 60 years old and over, instead of 65. b. 1996. c. 1993.
 Lifetime Employment
 East Asian countries are characterised by very low and flat
unemployment rates, at least until the recent economic crisis (see chart
3). For the four NICs, it can of course be explained by the rapid growth
leading to labour shortages. However, even in the more mature Japanese
economy, the unemployment curve does not follow a business cycle like
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in the flexible American and British labour markets. It is hard to spot the
major recession that has struck Japan since the early 1990s on chart 3.57
 
Source: International Labour Organisation (1997).
 The Japanese-style of labour management is certainly a key to
understand this low level of unemployment, although macroeconomic
policies and other factors are also crucially important. Firm loyalty has
been at the heart of traditional post-war Japanese corporate culture and
its corollary of lifetime employment has been a pillar of the human
                                        
 57 Some authors criticise the Japanese statistics for underestimating the true
level of unemployment. Nevertheless, those statistics are based on surveys, not
administrative reports. The way they are constructed has never been substantially
altered, such that the time series are very consistent. They also respect the ILO
definition of unemployment (having no job, willing to accept one and actively
looking for one). There are however some sources of bias (see Hamada and
Kurosaka, 1984). The main one is that the period covered by the survey is only one
week, compared to one month in many other industrialised countries. In other
words, if a person has not been actively looking for work during that week, he or she
will not be considered as unemployed (this would be the case of a person waiting for
results of previous initiatives, or of students and women seeking temporary jobs
irregularly).
 
Chart 3: Unemployment Rates of Selected East Asian and Western 
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resources management, at least for core employees. 58 Dore et al. (1989)
quote one of the managers they have interviewed: “A factory owner
who shows his employees the door because he can’t find them work is
as deserving of blame as an officer who loses his men in a battle”. This
statement stands in sharp contrast with the American corporate culture,
where announcements of massive layoffs immediately trigger a jump in
the company’s shares value and improve the career prospects of its
CEO.
 Dore et al. (1989) describe how large Japanese firms have managed
to hold to their lifetime employment commitment, at least until recently.
The main strategy is diversification. Japanese companies pro-actively
anticipate the growth and decline of their industry and plan
restructuring with a long-term horizon. They may choose to diversify
towards businesses that match the skill endowment of their current
work force, or towards completely unrelated industries. If they have not
planned restructuring enough in advance and face a temporary or
permanent demand crunch, they will fire workers as a last resort, after
having exhausted the following steps:
· Decreasing overtime: Overtime is the main lead indicator of
business cycle of the Economic Planning Agency. Legal overtime
premiums are indeed quite low (25% and 50% at night), such that
firms can afford to build a buffer of hours worked during recovery
and deplete it during recession. Tachibanaki (1996a) shows that
Japan has a low variability in employment but a high variability in
hours worked, compared to other major industrial countries.
· Stop hiring additional temporary or part time workers.
· Manpower redeployment within the firm: Both geographical and
occupational redeployments are common in Japan.59 Employees
usually comply with their managers’ offers. They face both
positive and negative incentives, depending upon the situation
(e.g., pro-active diversification compared to sudden cost-saving
restructuring).
· Manpower redeployment within the firm’s group: Many large
Japanese firms belong to a group of “preferred trading partners”
(usual customers, suppliers or enterprises financed by the same
                                        
 58 Lifetime employment should not be understood too literally however. Taira
and Levine (1996) estimate that only about a third of regular employees never
change employer in Japan.
59 See some evidence of geographic labour mobility in Tachibanaki (1996b).
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bank) and rely on a vast network of small subsidiary firms. In
periods of need, a firm may dispatch some workers to another one,
keeping them on its own payroll and charging a flat fee to the firm
employing them.
· Creation of subsidiaries to exploit the profitable segments of
closing plants.
· Bearing the cost of idle workers and waiting for a recovery of
demand.
· Stopping hiring regular employees and letting the manpower
decrease naturally (with the negative effect of an ageing employee
structure).
· Laying-off temporary and part time workers: Dore et al. (1989)
assert that those workers are not as contingent as often claimed.
Not renewing them comes only after other options have been
exhausted.
· Cutting bonuses: As chart 2 in section V.1 indicates, the two
annual bonuses represent a large part of employees’ take-home
pay. They can be more easily cut back than regular wages,
although Dore et al. (1989) as well as Tachibanaki (1996a) write
that they are in fact pretty rigid.
· Laying-off regular employees: Finally, the last-resort decision par
excellence is to fire regular employees. Usually, older employees are
encouraged to take an early retirement, compensated by generous
pension benefits. When there are not enough volunteers, some
employees are discretely asked to “volunteer” to save face.
· Public subsidies: Moreover, the government’s budget for active
labour market policies is focused on retaining employees who are
about to be dismissed rather than on the unemployed.
This sequence of measures reflects very well the labour force
hierarchy. Large firms are more likely to find alternative positions for
their redundant workers, either within their diversified branches or in
their vast network of subsidiaries and preferred partners.  Regular
employees are explicitly preferred over temporary ones. As to the self-
employed, family helpers and some categories of part time and
temporary employees, not only their jobs are the most vulnerable, but
their access to unemployment benefits is not always guaranteed.
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Lifetime employment represents a costly rigidity for Japanese
firms. It means that they retain a certain percentage of idle workers60 and
do not substitute their least productive workers for better ones when
they can. Yet it is compensated by a very flexible manpower
management within the firm, as demonstrated by the above
restructuring strategies.61 Hence the positive aspect of lifetime
employment for employers is that they get a high level of effort from
their workers in return, as well as their full co-operation with the
enterprise’s aims (e.g., even for tough decisions like relocation, increased
overtime and the like). Whether or not this system is profitable is a
difficult question to answer. Anyway, market share growth and firm
loyalty are perceived as more important than profits (boards of directors
of Japanese firms typically consist of people who spent their whole life
in the company, plus a few co-opted bankers).62
Some authors question the sustainability of the Japanese labour
management system.63 They argue that several factors are putting it
under pressure. First, technological progress will steadily increase the
pace at which firms will have to adapt themselves to market conditions.
This will make it ever harder for firms to restructure swiftly without
major layoffs. Second, the international liberalisation of the economy
will force firms to pay more attention to their profits, as opposed to their
market share. Third, increased wealth will lead the Japanese to value
leisure and quality of life. Alternatively, the new generation would
prefer more competition as opposed to the egalitarianism of the
seniority system.
                                        
60 Taira and Levine (1996) estimate the number of redundant workers at about 3
to 5 millions in the early 1990s, twice the unemployment rate.
61 In addition, Tachibanaki (1996a) presents some evidence of wage flexibility
compared to Western countries. Yet it appears that it does not explain well the low
level of unemployment. Dore et al. (1989) also discusses “functional flexibility” (i.e.,
the capacity of workers to take in charge each other’s tasks from week to week or
even hour to hour).
62 Some authors have tried to explain the phenomenon of firm loyalty with
economic arguments, such as the existence of “firm-specific human investment” due
to “intensive horizontal co-operation” between workers (see European Commission,
1988 and Ohta, 1996). Others see it either as a sign of Confucian ethos. Still others
prefer political economy explanations, such as a necessary political concession to
pre-empt the rise of unions (Shinkawa and Pembel, 1996).
63 See for instance Taira and Levine (1996) and Whittaker (1990).
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Nevertheless, any conclusion as to the future of the Japanese
labour management system would be highly speculative. A safe
approach is simply to monitor recent trends. Since the beginning of the
1990s, Japan has gone through her severest and especially longest
recession since World War II, such that predictions of dramatic change
have appeared again. Yet enterprises have continued to rely on the same
tricks to retain their work force and unemployment has remained low
by international standards (4.1% at the time of writing), although it has
been rising steadily. Several insights help to assess the situation:
· Yahata (1997) and Kaneko (1997) point out that the crisis is
compounded by a demographic aspect: post-war baby-boomers
reach 45-55 years old and climb in the seniority ladder, but the
proportion of management positions does not necessarily increase.
Employees of this cohort are the hardest hit by layoffs.
· Dore (1988) notes that the proportion of regular jobs versus part-
time and/or temporary ones was still increasing in the age groups
other than the 20s at the end of the 1980s. Young workers are the
second group suffering from a decrease in job security, but it is
certainly partly due to personal choices.
· Kaneko (1997) asserts that what Japan corporate culture really
needs is a third category of workers. Besides regular workers (i.e.,
generalists paid by seniority) and temporary and/or part-time
workers, a real external market should be developed for
specialists, who should be paid according to performance and
change jobs according to needs.
Although the Korean corporate culture differs from the Japanese
in many ways64, job security is also firmly entrenched in Korea,
particularly in large firms. A strict labour law made it very difficult to
fire workers short of bankruptcy (if that) until the government
railroaded a bill through the National Assembly at Christmas 1996,
sparking massive strikes and demonstrations in the following month.
The former law was sustainable in a period of high growth and
authoritarian government keeping labour demands in check. It was also
part of Korea’s general strategy of industrial development based on the
chaebol (conglomerates). Since firing workers was hardly an option, firms
were bound to grow and diversify their activities in order to cross-
subsidise unprofitable industries and progressively move their labour
force to more profitable markets. With the financial crisis of 1997, this
                                        
64 See Chang and Chang (1994).
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period is now over. Further legislation is expected to let more flexibility
in the labour market. Unemployment is rising fast as a result of serial
bankruptcies. Large firms are preparing restructuring plans that will
produce some massive layoffs. Still, although the Korean industry goes
through a period of hard restructuring due to the financial crisis as well
as overcapacity in key sectors (e.g., car manufacturing and
semiconductors), the corporate culture is still strongly emphasising
retaining workers.
V.3 Wage Determination
Besides avoiding shedding unproductive workers, another way in which
Japanese and Korean firms may play a welfare role compared to their
Western competitors is by levelling the wage structure. Chapter IV has
shown that Korean and Japanese tax and benefit systems do not play a
very significant redistributive role, unlike those of Western countries.
This suggests that their distributions of market income must be more
equal than those of countries with similar Gini coefficients of disposable
income. Since earnings are the major component of market income, this
section will focus on the extent of wage inequality and on mechanisms
of wage determination that tend to reduce it.
Focusing on the case of Japan again, Tachibanaki (1996b)
emphasises the fact that there is high wage equality among workers
sharing the same status, but a high inequality between workers of
different status. The seniority system is a typical example. In many
firms, employees are promoted by age cohorts until their mid-30s when
a differentiation begins to take place. On the other hand, many
employees are expected to retire at 55 and are sometimes re-hired by the
same company at a lower wage, reflecting decreased productivity. Note
that this system of automatic promotions is not necessarily a
disincentive to work. Indeed, the system of lifetime employment means
that the firm has a monopsony power once a worker is hired. Hence
workers will compete for a limited number of executive positions within
their company to gain higher status and in-kind advantages rather than
higher wages.
Besides tenure, Tachibanaki (1996a) has analysed six other
variables of “status” explaining wage differentials: sex, age, firm size,
education and industry. Unfortunately, he has not studied the variable
regular/ temporary/ part-time worker. His conclusions are the
following. First, sex is the most important wage determinant. Since other
variables are controlled for, this represents a pure discrimination.
Second, job tenure is more important than in other countries, reflecting
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the seniority system. Third, age has a significant independent effect,
albeit not very important. Fourth, the factors “industry” and “white-
collar/ blue-collar” are not important when controlled for firm size.
Fifth, firm size is robust as an independent effect. The author explains
that result and concludes that it is due to a greater ability to pay, as
measured by profits, productivity and capital-labour ratio. Finally,
education is an important factor only for the sub-category of white-collar
males. Education plays a role as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition
to access higher positions, which in turn yield higher wages.
Table 30: Wage Inequality and its Incidence and Concentration across
Age and Gender
Japan France Germany Sweden United
Kingdom
United
States
D9/D1a 3.02 3.28 2.32 2.13 3.38 4.39
Low earnings
incidence b
  All employees 15.7 15.9 13.3 5.2 19.6 25
  Men 5.9 10.6 7.6 3.0 12.8 19.6
  Women 37.2 17.4 25.4 8.4 31.2 32.5
  < 25 years old 36.4 49.5 50.4 18.7 45.8 63.0
  25-54 years old 9.6 10.6 6.7 4.3 15.0 21.2
  > 55 years old 19.8 10.5 5.4 2.9 22.9 23.7
Low earnings
concentration c
  Men 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8
  Women 2.4 1.3 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.3
  < 25 years old 2.3 3.7 3.8 3.6 2.3 2.5
  25-54 years old 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8
  > 55 years old 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.6 1.2 0.9
Source: OECD (1996d).
Notes: a. Earnings of the upper boundary of the ninth decile divided by wage of the
upper boundary of the first decile (full time employees only). b. Proportion of full-
time employees with earnings inferior to 2/3 of the median earnings, among all
employees of the specified categories. c. Incidence of low earnings of each category
divided by incidence of low earnings of all employees.
Those conclusions are supported by OECD data presented in table
30. They show that wages in Japan are relatively unequally distributed.
The decile ratio ranking of Japan is the same as the one for disposable
income presented in table 21 except for France. This case of France
confirms the fact that Japanese income inequality appears less severe if
measured on the basis of market income or earnings rather than on the
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basis of disposable income, due to the weak redistributive power of the
tax and benefit system. However, comparisons with the other countries
are inconclusive on this respect.  Table 30 also confirms the fact that
wage inequality is more concentrated against women and aged workers
than in any other country. Japan’s high proportion of youths among low
paid workers is by contrast not unusual by international standards.
Those findings support a hypothesis proposed by Shinkawa and
Pembel (1996). In Japan, there is an interaction between “enterprise
welfare” and “family welfare” that makes state welfare less necessary as
far as income distribution is concerned. Enterprises strongly
discriminate female, young and aged workers in favour of middle-aged
men who benefit from secure and high earnings. By pooling resources,
families compensate for that discrimination. Since almost any household
includes one middle-aged man, this income inequality at the individual
level vanishes at the household level.
IV.4 Summary
The most apparent form of enterprise welfare are the benefits that firms
voluntarily pay to their employees on top of legal requirements, as a
part of their total pay package. Those voluntary non-wage labour costs
represent a lot of money in Japan, particularly in large enterprises.
However, it is wrong to believe that enterprise welfare is a substitute to
state welfare in Japan, because firms of other major industrialised
countries spend as much on voluntary fringe benefits on top of higher
statutory ones.
A more subtle way in which enterprises do play an important
welfare role is by retaining workers who are not necessarily profitable.
Japanese enterprises rely upon a variety of long term and short-term
strategies to redeploy their work force in response to business cycle and
structural shocks. This contributes to maintaining a low level of
unemployment, which is essential to the equilibrium of the welfare state.
The third welfare role of enterprises that has been explored is the
levelling of income at “source”, i.e., before taxes and transfers. It turns
out that earnings inequality in Japan is relatively high, but more
concentrated among women, youths and the aged. In other words,
enterprises here play a welfare role in a “conservative” way, by ensuring
that middle-aged men, the “breadwinners”, go home with decent pay,
while discriminating against other workers.
Besides low unemployment, I have also shown that high labour
force participation rates of the elderly contribute to low overall
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dependency rates. More than earnings dispersion, the key to understand
the structure of income distribution in East Asian countries is probably
the distribution of work itself, with fewer workless people, and
especially the distribution of work between households, which is
explored in the next chapter.
VI. Family and Community Welfare
The family is a crucial vector of intergenerational solidarity. In Western
countries as elsewhere in the world, the family is central in welfare
provision for children and young people. In East Asia like in many other
regions of the world, it is also central for the welfare of the aged. The
family plays a social welfare role in two ways. First, by pooling
resources of individuals within households, it provides income security
for people temporarily or permanently unable to earn a wage because of
their young or old age, disability or any other reason. Second, family
members provide a large range of services to each other. This is
particularly important for child care, provided by grandparents, and
care of the elderly, provided by their adult children. In East Asia,
families are thus still doing a lot of the work that is done by professional
social workers and public and private care institutions in the West. This
will be discussed in the first section. The second section briefly discusses
“community welfare”, i.e. the role of the non-profit sector and
volunteers. The third section is a summary.
VI.1 Family Welfare
It is difficult to measure the importance of family welfare systematically.
Tables 31 and 32 offer partial evidence on intergenerational family
solidarity. The former table is about financial support for the elderly in
Korea and Taiwan. The latter is about the provision of services for the
elderly in Japan.
Table 31: Major Income Sources of Elderly Koreans (1991)
% over 59 years old (Korea) Primary Income Source
% over 64 years old (Taiwan) Korea (1991) Taiwan (1986) Taiwan (1993)
Earnings from work 32.0 29.8 42.8
Savings 1.9
Public pension 2.5 1.2 1.6
Public or private assistance 2.2
Private pension 0.3 .. ..
81
Property 4.6 - 1.9
Children’s support 54.0 67.8a 53.2a
Others 1.6 1.2 0.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Sung-Jae Choi (1996) and Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and
Statistics (1997b).
Note: a. Includes friends’ and relatives’ support.
According to table 31, children’s support was the main source of
income for just over half of Korean and Taiwanese aged people in the
beginning of the 1990s. The second main source of income was earnings
from employment. It is indeed not unusual at all for people to continue
working beyond retirement age in Korea and Taiwan, as well as in the
other East Asian countries (see table 29 in section V.2). By contrast,
public pensions, public assistance as well as private insurance were the
main source of income for a negligible proportion of the elderly.65 This
reflects the weak pension systems in Korea and Taiwan. In Korea, the
National Pension Programme (NPP) does not offer sufficient benefits for
retired workers to live on, as they have not had the opportunity to
contribute for enough years (see annex 1). Only a small proportion of the
total population receives substantial lump-sum retirement grants,
namely civil servants and, on a voluntary basis, employees of large
companies. In Taiwan too, the old age benefits of the various
occupational schemes cannot secure financial independence, except for
civil servants. The situation is completely different in Japan, where
pensions are substantial. As the NPP matures, the data of table 31 will
change dramatically. The same would hold for Taiwan if she
strengthened her old age pension system as planned. Meanwhile, the
data of table 31 put the discussion over the welfare states in perspective:
as of today, old age pension programmes in Korea and Taiwan are
insignificant, which explains much of the gap in public spending on
welfare between them and Western countries.
                                        
65 The table does not say that public pensions represented only 2.5% of total
income of Korean elderly households, but that only 2.5% of respondents to a survey
identified public pension as their main source of income, among others. Moreover,
since most Koreans and Taiwanese people receive lump-sum pensions instead of
annuities, they may either consume them fast or use them to purchase a house or
other financial assets, in which case they may appear in the savings or property
lines.
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Table 32: Main Carer of the Bed-Ridden Elderly Living at Home in
Japan (1992)
% Main Care-Taker
Female Male
Care-taker living with the aged 73.9 12.6
   Spouse 22.2 5.7
   Child 14.5 6.1
   Child’s spouse 33.0 0.3
   Other relative or non-relative 3.6 0.4
Care-taker living apart from the aged 12.5 1.5
   Relative 5.3 0.4
   Non-relative 7.3 1.0
Total 85.9 14.1
Source: Sumitaka (1996).
As to services, Sumitaka (1996) quotes figures from a 1990-92
survey carried out by the Ministry of Health and Welfare in Japan.
Almost two-third of the elderly in need of care lived at home, the
remaining third living in various kinds of welfare institutions.66 Table 33
shows that the primary carer for the bed-ridden elderly living at home
are daughters in-law, followed by wives and own daughters. Family
welfare is thus clearly the business of women. Also, about 85% of carers
were living in the same house as the aged person they were taking care
of.
A more comprehensive way to account for family welfare is thus
to look at the structure of households. The pooling of resources and the
mutual provision of services are automatic within households. Family
welfare must therefore be more prevalent in countries where the
extended family remains a dominant form of living arrangement. The
reverse is not necessarily true, however. Strong family solidarity might
be preserved even when family members no longer live under the same
roof, through private cash transfers as well as with services if they live
close to each other.
The composition of households is given for the five selected East
Asian countries in annex 3. Three-generation households now represent
                                        
66 According to the survey, there were 840,000 aged people in need of care living
at home and about 480,000 living in welfare institutions. The latter number is broken
down into: 300,000 in hospitals for more than 6 months, 20,000 in health care
institutions for the aged and 160,000 in special nursing homes for the aged. A further
390,000 people over 65 years old who were hospitalised for less than 6 months and
80,000 people living in residential homes other than special nursing homes were not
included in the category of aged people in need of care.
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only about 10% of households in Japan and Hong Kong and 12.5% in
Korea. Quoting Goode, Kumagai (1986) notes that industrialisation and
family nuclearisation go hand in hand, because the former entails many
social changes that are detrimental to the traditional extended family,
such as geographic mobility, upward social mobility, emergence of a
welfare state, achievement orientation and the increased cost of raising
children. Kumagai (1986) argues that the extended family has ceased to
be the norm of living arrangement in contemporary Japan. However, she
argues that very strong intergenerational ties remain, especially between
mothers and children. She also proposes the concept of “modified stem
family”. The idea is that a typical Japanese person experiences the
modern nuclear and the traditional stem family alternatively throughout
his or her life, according to the working and marital status of each
generation. Let’s take the example of a girl born in a nuclear family.
When her grandparents retire (she is very young), they come to live with
their first son (her father) and the household becomes an extended
family until their death. When she marries, a new nuclear family is
formed. She has her own children. When her parents-in-law retire, they
come to live with her and her husband, forming a new extended family.
Her family will become nuclear again between the death of her parents-
in-law and the retirement of her husband, at which point she will move
with him to their married eldest son. She will remain in that new
extended family until her death. This type of life history, together with
the low proportion of elderly in the total population, explains the fact
that most elderly people do still live with their children even though the
proportion of three-generation households is low.
Table 33 confirms this point. In East Asian countries, 60 to 80% of
the elderly are living in households with at least one adult of lower
generation, compared to 8 to 15% in the selected Western countries. On
the other hand, only 10 to 18% are living alone in East Asia, compared to
30 to 40% in the West. There is also a quite low proportion of old people
living in nursing homes or in residences in the five selected East Asian
countries.
Family responsibility for welfare provision raises several
important questions. The first one is whether it is desired by the people
themselves. As Gould (1993) and Goodman, White and Kwon (1998) put
it, do people in East Asia work until old age and live with their children
because they like it or because they don’t have any alternative? Kojima
(1992) tries to identify the factors explaining co-residence of Japanese
married couples with one of their mothers, from the point of view of the
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couple. His conclusion is that “kin availability” variables (e.g., eldest son
or daughter status, number of siblings and migrant status) and “need”
variables (e.g., mothers’ widowhood or poor health) are particularly
important, although economic variables (e.g., income and home
ownership) and cultural variables (e.g., rural/ urban, farmer, other self-
employed and education) also play a role. Education turns out to be
insignificant. Income of the married couple has a negative effect on co-
residence with the husband’s mother, while full-employment of the wife
has a positive effect on co-residence with her own mother. In a similar
study, Hirosima (1993) finds that income does play a role from the
elderly’s point of view: wealthier aged people tend to co-reside less with
their children, especially lone men who have more financial
independence than lone women. This last result as well as the strength
of the needs variables seem to indicate that the “lack of alternatives”
explanation prevails in Japan. The relative weakness of the cultural
variables may also support that conclusion, in that one would expect
people with different values to have different attitudes towards co-
residence. Yet, finer proxies for cultural differences would be welcome.
Table 33: Living Arrangements of the Elderly (over 65)
Living in
institutions
Lone elderly Elderly
couple
With
children,
relatives or
others
 % of all elderly % of elderly people living in domestic households
1996 1980 1995 1980 1995 1980 1995
Japan 1.68 8.5 11.7 a 19.6 27.6 a 72.0 60.8 a
Korea 0.29 .. 9.6b .. 13.3b .. 77.1b
Taiwan 0.55 11.7 c 10.6 d 14.2 c 18.6 d 74.1 c 70.5 d
Hong Kong e 2.13 f 12.7 c 11.7 g 5.2 c 7.4 g 82.2 c 80.8 g
Singapore 2.28 .. .. .. .. .. ..
France 5 l 30.3 h 32.2 i 47.8 h 54.3 i 16.1 h j 13.4 i j
United
Kingdom
6 l .. 41.7 g .. 49.3 g .. 8.4 g
United States 5 l .. 31.1 b .. 54.0 b .. 14.8 bk
Sources: Statistics Bureau (1997), National Statistical Office (1997), Directorate
General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (1997a and 1997b), Department of
Census and Statistics (1997a and 1997c), Department of Statistics (1997), Sumitaka
(1996), Sung-Jae Choi (1996), INSEE, Central Statistical Office, Schick and Schick
(1994), Hayman (1994) and Rivlin and Wiener (1988).
Notes: a. 1992. b. 1989. c. 1986. d. 1993. e. Elderly = people over 60; excludes elderly
living exclusively with other elderly (except elderly couples). f. 1995. g. 1996. h. 1982.
85
i. 1990. j. 87% of which live with non-relatives only. k. 16% of which live with non-
relative only. l. Late 1980s.
Kojima (1989) and Hirosima (1993) also explore co-residence
patterns of the youth with their parents. As much as 75% of never-
married youth of both sexes continue to live with their parents in
adulthood, with little differences by age cohorts up to the age of 40. Here
also, kin availability variables are the most important. As to newly wed
couples, about 30% of them reside with one of their parents upon
marriage. Hirosima (1993) finds that this percentage is the same
regardless of sibling size. His tentative interpretation is that the main
motivation of co-residence has become convenience rather than the
tradition according to which at least one child, normally the eldest, must
reside with the parents. Indeed, young couples co-residing with their
working parents benefit from free housing and child care.
The second issue is whether the family is strong enough to carry
the welfare burden that is taken in charge by the state in other
industrialised countries. Many voices express a negative answer. For
instance, Sung-jae Choi (1996) stresses that in Korea, about a third of
households headed by a person aged over 60 have an income below the
minimum necessary expenditures (they represent almost half of all poor
households). In other words, although the family is the main source of
income for about half of the elderly, old people without family often face
hardship.
As far as Japan is concerned, Sumitaka (1996) reports anecdotal
evidence on overburdened Japanese housewives neglecting their
parents-in-law. The Japanese government has long recognised the
challenge of family welfare. Since it is a burden mainly for women, three
intertwined trends must be addressed: the sharp decline in fertility, the
increase in women’s employment and the nuclearisation of the family.
Morgan and Hirosima (1983) found that women living in extended
families were (i) having slightly more children and (ii) working
significantly more. Expensive housing and high child care costs are
indeed more easily borne by extended families. The trend of
nuclearisation therefore exacerbates the decline in fertility and the
hardships of working women with children. The government has thus
launched a series of policies to strengthen the family, aiming at making
the Japanese society friendlier for those women. This initiative includes
the “Angel Plan” to increase the quantity and flexibility of public and
private child care centres. However, Sumitaka (1996) emphasises that
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government blueprints on social welfare still put the family at the
forefront, while child care facilities remain too few and too expensive.
Moreover, she stresses that a comprehensive family policy should
encompass wider societal reforms than just the provision of more child
care centres and higher family allowances, in particular in the areas of
education, housing and employment.
The third issue, directly resulting from the two first ones, is
whether family welfare will be sustainable in the future. If measured by
intergenerational co-residence, the current trend is downward (see table
33). Hirosima (1995) has carried out a series of simulations for Japan that
suggest that this trend is likely to continue at about the same pace in the
coming 20 years. In other words, the percentage of people over 65 years
old co-residing with their children will probably continue to drop slowly
by one percentage point a year, from 58.3% in 1990 to about 48.8% in
2000 and 39.9% in 2010.
Similar trends may be expected for the other countries. In Korea
for instance, a 1992 national survey on non-elderly persons insured with
the National Pension Programme highlighted a progressive change in
values. Only 4% of respondents thought of their children as a source of
income, while just 44% thought of their children as the first persons to
ask for economic help if needed in old age. Moreover, 13.8% preferred to
employ paid carers and 32.3% preferred to enter nursing homes if they
were widowed.67
VI.2 Community Welfare
It is often claimed that “communities” also play a crucial social welfare
role in East Asian countries, as an alternative to the welfare state. It is
difficult to assess the relative importance of this phenomenon. After all,
there are numerous NGOs and many of grass-roots volunteer social
workers in the West as well. The main difference is that, in Western
countries, those private initiatives come on top of tax-financed social
workers and welfare institutions. In East Asian countries, the state itself
provides very few personal services.68 However, it plays an active role in
organising, co-ordinating and regulating private organisations and
individual volunteers.
The most salient example of this state-led community welfare is
the Japanese minseiiin system. Minseiiin are an institutionalised pool of
                                        
67 See Sung-jae Choi (1996).
68 See Maruo (1986).
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volunteers providing personal services to weak households in their
neighbourhood. They are appointed by the Ministry of Health and
Welfare but they are not paid and receive no social training. They are
mostly aged men or middle-aged women who have spent a long time in
their neighbourhood. This comes to no surprise since the task requires
about 90 full days of work a year, such that full-time employees would
not be able to participate. They complement the work of local
government officials in charge of welfare. The latter sometimes don’t
have a proper training as social workers either, but get the job as part of
the rotation in the civil service. Minseiiin take in charge the bulk of
fieldwork, because civil servants are overloaded. Indeed, there are
around 190,000 minseiiin against only 15,000 civil servants. The role of
minseiiin is mainly to advise people at risk (the elderly, the poor, the
disabled, lone parents and children). They may recommend some of
them for welfare benefits but only civil servants may actually grant
them. The function of minseiiin is well respected by the community and
local governments and is a source of status, which explains the ability to
find enough volunteers.69
The advantage of such a community welfare is that minseiiin know
the neighbourhood of the people they must care for very well. There is a
real proximity between social workers and the population at risk and
they can easily have informal meetings and foster deep relationships. On
the negative side, Goodman (1998) reports suspicion that minseiiin can
be “enforcers of nationalistic moral codes of conduct rather than
advocates for the weakest members of society”. Quoting Peng, he also
points to the awkward relationships that could develop between lone
mothers in search for independence and those untrained, conservative,
aged men. In this perspective, low take-up rates of welfare benefits may
be a sign of weakness of the minseiiin system, instead of a positive
achievement. However, as Goodman (1998) puts it, “contrary to what
‘traditional’ practice might lead one to expect, many individuals do not
like to discuss their problems with their neighbours and would rather
suffer in silence.”
There is also a network of volunteers providing services to people
at risk in Taiwan. In 1995, about 37,000 volunteers were working an
average of 1.9 hours per week.70
                                        
69 See Goodman (1998).
70 See Government Information Office, http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/
yearbook/content.htm.
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The governments of Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore also foster
community welfare initiatives, such as befriender clubs. It is interesting,
by the way, that Singapore has no "Ministry of Social Affairs" but a
"Ministry of Community Development".
VI.4 Summary
In East Asia, the family is the key welfare provider for the elderly. This
is true both for care services as for income security, with the exception of
Japan for the latter. As Korea and probably Taiwan embark upon
ambitious old age pension schemes, the elderly will progressively gain
financial independence. This will certainly reinforce the trend of family
nuclearisation that is already taking place. On the other hand, the
elderly will need more care as their life expectancy and the incidence of
chronic diseases increase. Although family welfare is not completely
incompatible with nuclearisation, it certainly represents a source of
concern. The challenge to family welfare also comes from the younger
generations, and especially women who are the main providers of care.
Young people also increasingly prefer to live on their own, once they
have themselves achieved financial independence. Women increasingly
want to be and stay employed. Meanwhile, fertility is declining, notably
as a result of nuclearisation and women employment combined with the
lack of child care. The Japanese government has recognised those
challenges and is addressing them by increasing the provision of both
child care services and care for the elderly.
Free personal care is also provided by people unrelated by blood
or marriage. In all five East Asian countries, governments foster
community networks of volunteers who often substitute for the work
done by social workers in Western countries.
Conclusion
Japan, Korea and Taiwan have very different social welfare systems
from Singapore and Hong Kong. The former three countries share some
Bismarkian characteristics: their social welfare system is based on
insurance and is organised along occupational groups, implying an
institutional segmentation that “reinforces differentials in power and
status in society”71. Singapore’s system is much more integrated with the
                                        
71 Goodman, White and Kwon (1998a).
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Central Provident Fund centralising social security. Hong Kong also has
an integrated welfare state, albeit very different. It is the only country
relying on non-means-tested and non-contributory benefits, as well as
on public provision and financing of health care. As city-states
confronted with important immigration inflows in the 1950s and 1960s,
Singapore and Hong Kong have also both developed comprehensive
and ambitious housing policies.
Several official documents of Singapore and Hong Kong make it
plain that their governments do not intend to build anything like a
Western-style welfare state. Those statements are backed by the lack of
major reforms in the last ten years despite the modernisation of their
economies. Indeed, Hong Kong and Singapore’s existing institutional
frameworks are mature, in the sense that a further growth of their
welfare states would require major institutional shifts which they have
failed to initiate thus far.72 Nevertheless, Hong Kong and Singapore do
not share anything else to constitute a “model” (except their housing
policy). Singapore sticks to the provident fund system, barring any
interpersonal redistribution. Hong Kong, on the other hand, continues to
rely on income support schemes, albeit at very low levels.
By contrast, Japan has already developed comprehensive universal
insurance schemes comparable to those existing in the West. Korea and
Taiwan also have strong “welfare infrastructures”, although they are not
fully developed yet. Korea passed ambitious welfare laws a long time
ago, contrasting with the minimalist statements in Hong Kong and
Singapore. Yet they were not implemented immediately. A lot of
progress has been achieved in the last ten years however, with universal
health care coverage and a progressively phased-in universal old age
pension scheme. Taiwan has also virtually achieved universal health
care coverage but is lagging in terms of retirement benefits. Current
political debates indicate that the universalisation of old age insurance is
a very hot issue in Taiwan and might be introduced in the coming years.
In the remainder of this conclusion, I synthesise my findings by
proposing hypotheses to answer three questions: What are the sources of
low public spending on social welfare in East Asia and what is their
relative importance? How can we explain the relatively low level of
income inequality given the low public expenditures on social welfare?
And what challenges do East Asian welfare systems face?
                                        
72 With the exception of private health insurance in Singapore and a old age
provident fund in Hong Kong, both under study.
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Low Public Spending on Social Welfare in East Asia ...
The key factors explaining the low public spending on social welfare in
East Asia compared to Western countries are the following:
1. Choice of social security instruments: Singapore and Hong Kong’s
different attitude towards welfare is reflected in their choice of
those social security instruments that are privately financed. In
Singapore, the entire social security system is privately financed,
either through the Central Provident Fund or through employers’
liability schemes. Hong Kong’s public spending is more important
for health care and social security, but it also heavily relies on
employers’ liability schemes. This low public spending is
compensated by mandatory private spending (only partially
however, for the reasons explained in the next paragraphs). By
contrast, social security contributions and taxes represent the main
funding sources of social security in Japan, Korea and Taiwan.
2. Young demographic structures: A young population means low
spending on old age pensions and health care. The four NICs have
younger populations than Japan and Western countries, but they
are ageing fast. Without any policy change, the gap in total public
welfare spending will therefore narrow. Japan’s proportion of
elderly is already higher than that of the United States and about
the same as that of France, so that its current low spending on
welfare cannot be explained by demography. Yet demography
represents a serious challenge for Japan as well, since her
population is still ageing fast and is expected to become the
world’s oldest in a few decades.
3. Lack of maturity of old age pension programmes: Without any policy
change and even without considering the population ageing, some
old age pensions programme will incur rapidly growing
expenditures because benefits received by current retired
populations reflect past contributions, which were lower than
those paid by current working populations. This is particularly the
case of Korea but also of Singapore. It will also be the case of
Taiwan and Hong Kong if they launch the National Pension
Insurance (NPI) and provident funds, respectively.
4. Lack of universal coverage: Several occupational groups representing
large proportions of the population have no access yet to any
social insurance scheme for some social risks. This is particularly
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the case of Korea and to a lesser extent Taiwan.73 Any change in
this respect would require ambitious policy reforms, which are
nevertheless to be expected as they lie in the logic of those two
countries’ welfare systems. This also hold for the self-employed in
Singapore and Hong Kong. By contrast, Japan has achieved
universal coverage in all branches of social security.
5. Low generosity: Within an overall welfare structure similar to that
of Western countries, Japan, Korea and Taiwan have adopted
features that limit the generosity of the welfare state, and hence
check public spending. First, they have avoided non-contributory
and non-means-tested benefits, which is important in a dynamic or
political economy perspective because those benefits are more
vulnerable to upwards pressure by popular demand.74 Even
means-tested non-contributory benefits are relatively limited
because the test of means rests upon the extended family. The
equivalence between benefits and contributions is further
reinforced by an effort to make contributory schemes actuarially
fair, although a number of important exceptions have been
pointed out. Second, some schemes offer fairly low benefits, in
terms of duration and/or replacement rate (e.g., low replacement
rates of old age pensions in Taiwan). Third, although social
security schemes are mostly publicly funded in Japan, Korea and
Taiwan, high user fees are charged for health care in the latter two
countries. Similarly, the cost of primary and secondary education
born by households is not trivial even in Japan, as opposed to
many Western countries. The two latter points also hold for Hong
Kong and Singapore. The first one is even truer for Singapore, but
not for Hong Kong.
                                        
73 Although most Taiwanese workers (except the urban self-employed who do
not voluntarily join the Labour Insurance) are entitled to some old age benefits
under the various occupational insurance and allowance schemes, they represent
only a small amount of money. NPI is supposed to lead to a truly universal
coverage.
74 This is exactly the situation of Taiwan’s old age allowances, which have
become the object of competition between political parties to “buy” votes. Their
replacement by NPI should ease that competition because it will be contributory.
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6. Low spending on “marginal” social welfare sectors: All countries have
put the priority on education first, health care and health-related
income replacement schemes next, and finally old age pensions.
Public expenditures on the other sectors are marginal, even in
Japan. Those sectors include: unemployment and family benefits,
personal social services and housing. The state does play an
important role in the latter two sectors, but through regulation
rather than spending (or through public provision financed mainly
by user fees in the case of housing in Hong Kong and Singapore).
As suggested, all those factors do not play to the same extent in
every country. In figure 1 presents a stylised hierarchy among countries
in terms of public spending on social welfare. I define four groups of
countries. In the first group, Hong Kong and Singapore’s governments
both spend just above 5% of their respective GDP on social welfare. In
the second group, Korea and Taiwan spend about 10%. Japan is alone in
the third group, with spending of about 16%. The last group includes
Western countries, with spending ranging from roughly 20% to 45% of
GDP.
It is possible to identify the main factor(s) explaining the gap
between each group. Beginning from the bottom, Hong Kong and
Singapore differ from Korea and Taiwan mainly by the choice of social
security instruments. Indeed, they are roughly in the same situation
along the other dimensions, except perhaps for the overall generosity of
benefits.75 Many factors explain the gap between the second and third
groups: the younger populations, the lack of universal coverage, the lack
of maturity of pension schemes and an overall less generous welfare
system as defined in point 5 above. The high user fees for health care,
the low replacement rates of Taiwan’s pension schemes and the lack of
maturity of Korea’s National Pension Programme are three key factors
because they are important spending items. Finally, the main difference
between Japan and Western countries is low spending on social welfare
sectors other than education, health care and old age pensions. Low
generosity should also be mentioned but is more difficult to assess. It
                                        
75 For instance, if withdrawals from the Central Provident Fund were added to
Singapore’s public spending, it would still lag behind Korea. Arguably, withdrawals
are low because of the lack of maturity of CPF deposits, but so is the case of Korea’s
NPP. Also note that spending under employers’ liability schemes should also be
added, but they probably marginal because they cover low spending sectors (i.e.,
invalidity, maternity and occupational injury, as well as unemployment).
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can partly explain Japan’s low level of public spending on education. On
the other hand, there is no strong evidence of a less generous coverage
in the health care and pensions sectors, except if compared with really
high spending countries such as France and Sweden, which do offer
more generous replacement rates at retirement for instance.
Thinking in this way allows for some speculation about the future.
Unless Hong Kong and Singapore embark upon drastic institutional
reforms, their public expenditures on social welfare are bound to remain
low, especially compared to the other groups but even in absolute terms.
For example, the increase of spending expected from the ageing
population will be mainly borne by the private sector. This is not the
case for Korea and Taiwan. As argued above, those two countries have
adopted a full-fledged social security structure, although it has not
reached its maturity yet. As their populations grow older, their old age
programmes mature, and their various insurance schemes are
progressively extended to marginal occupational groups, it is probably
only a matter of time for them to reach public spending levels
comparable to those of Japan today. Hence the shallow line between
them in figure 1. Most interesting is the case of Japan. Two of the social
welfare sectors that have been left relatively neglected in Japan merit
special attention: personal social services and unemployment benefits.
For the way they are currently dealt with by enterprises and families
respectively is under challenge, as will be discuss in the last part of this
conclusion.
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Sweden ± 45%
France ± 34%
Germany ± 33%
United Kingdom ± 29%
United States ± 21%
Low spending in “marginal” sectors
(Low generosity)
Japan: 
±16%
Taiwan ± 11%
Korea ± 9%
Hong Kong ± 6%
Singapore ± 5%
Young demographic structure
Lack of universal coverage
Lack of maturity of old age pensions
Low generosity
Choice of social security instruments
(Low generosity)
Total public expenditures
on social welfare, %GDP
(OECD definitions)
Figure 1: Main Sources of Differentials
in Public Spending on Welfare
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... Without Excessive Income Inequality ...
Besides the analysis of the costs of welfare, this paper has also focused
on income distribution. Despite low spending on social welfare, there is
no wide income inequality in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. In particular, it
has been shown that:
1. On a scale of distribution of equivalised disposable household
income, Japan, Korea and Taiwan rank among the relatively
unequal industrialised countries, although not at the extremes. By
contrast, Hong Kong and Singapore’s income distributions are
even more unequal than those of the United States and the United
Kingdom.
2. Taxes and transfers are quite ineffective at redistributing income
towards low-income households in Japan and Korea, especially
when compared with the United Kingdom. In other words the
distribution of household disposable income is very similar to that
of market income in Japan and Korea. As argued above, this is not
surprising because their social security systems rely heavily upon
actuarially fair insurance schemes that do not involve any vertical
redistribution mechanisms (with some important exceptions).76
Moreover, the unit of risk pooling of many insurance schemes is
the occupational group or the region, not the nation. Hence social
security does not correct for the wide dispersion of income across
occupational groups and between “core” and “contingent”
workers, except for some government subsidies and some explicit
financial transfers between schemes.
3. Japan’s distribution of individual earnings has about the same
international ranking as her distribution of household disposable
income (i.e., it is relatively unequal). In other words, the notion
that the labour market is levelling the income distribution at
source seems not to be supported by the facts. However, low
earnings are more concentrated among women and aged workers
in Japan than in Western countries. Hence inequality among
middle-aged men is relatively lower, which must have some
                                        
76 For instance, Korea’s NPP includes an explicit mechanism of vertical
redistribution. All health insurance schemes are also redistributive because they
offer uniform benefits against earnings-related contributions. However, none of
those vertical transfers would appear in the current income distribution statistics,
because NPP does not offer full benefits yet and health care is a service, not a cash
benefit.
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influence on household income inequality because most
households include one middle-aged man (more so in Japan than
in Western countries).
4. The key to understand Japan’s performance in terms of income
distribution must therefore be the very equal distribution of work
between households, especially compared to the United Kingdom.
Several factors suggest that there are very few workless
households in Japan, as well as few households with two core
workers: (i) the low unemployment rate, (ii) the high labour force
participation rate of the elderly, (iii) the average participation rates
of women and the youth, who tend to take part-time or temporary
jobs and (iv) the co-residence patterns of both the elderly and
youths, who tend to stay with their children after retirement or
with their parents until they get a job and marry.
Confirming this story and examining whether it also holds for
Korea and Taiwan would require some more research with better data.
Anyway, it seems clear that limiting the analysis to the redistributive
role of the welfare state is insufficient to explain the different patterns of
income distribution between East Asian and Western countries.
... But Is It Sustainable?
The importance of non-state actors has appeared in the discussion of
both public spending and income distribution. Figure 2 summarises the
roles played by private actors, the enterprise and the family, along those
two dimensions. It has been argued that welfare benefits voluntarily
paid by Japanese enterprises do not in fact compensate low public
spending, because voluntary non-wage labour costs are as high in other
countries. However further research would be welcome on that topic,
especially because the data used here are quite old. On the other hand,
female labour in the family does contribute to limiting spending on
personal social services and health care compared to other countries. On
the income distribution side, enterprises do contribute to keeping low
levels of unemployment by retaining workers even if they are not
profitable, especially large firms in Japan and Korea, which reduces
income inequality. The importance of work distribution across
households has also just been explained in the previous paragraph, as
well as the effect of income pooling in the family compensating for wage
discrimination against women, youths and the aged. There is of course a
relationship between the two dimensions: by limiting income inequality,
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enterprises and families allow the state to spend less money on income
replacement schemes.
The challenge of East Asian social welfare systems is that the
burden carried by families and enterprises may be too heavy. The labour
management styles of Japan and Korea are currently put under stress by
the financial crisis. As the profitability constraint becomes binding, it
will be more difficult even for large firms to resort to the various tricks
thanks to which they could avoid firing workers. Whether workers and
employers will be able to preserve or adapt the solidarity mechanisms
that exist between and among them will determine the viability of the
Japanese way of tackling unemployment. At the time of writing, the
Japanese unemployment rate was widely expected to increase
substantially. In Korea, where unemployment has already reached a
level comparable to that of many Western countries, the population is
expressing a strong intention of thrift and solidarity to go through the
“IMF era”, although the National Assembly and some labour unions are
impeding reforms. Exploring how the Korean welfare state will tackle
the unemployment crisis and the role played by enterprises is certainly a
field that begs for more research.
Figure 2: The Welfare Roles of Non-State Actors
Costs Income distribution
Enterprise (voluntary non-wage labour
costs)
low unemployment
(low earnings dispersion)
Family personal social services pooling of core & contingent
workers with workless people
Besides unemployment, the hot issue for East Asian welfare
systems is the ageing of their populations. Beyond the unavoidable
growth of the social security’s financial burden, it raises the more
qualitative issue of personal care. As a society in which personal care for
the elderly as well as for children rests entirely on women’s shoulders in
the family nest, Japan is now facing the vicious cycle of three
intertwined trends: the nuclearisation of the family, the increased
employment of women and decreased fertility. The two former imply a
lower readiness for women to care for dependant family members, the
latter means that the pace of ageing does not decline and exacerbates the
need for more carers. Coping with this vicious cycle will not only
require more public services, but also the rethinking of women’s place in
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society and reforms in sectors like housing, labour relations and
education.
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Annex 1: Reference Guide to the Welfare States of Five East
Asian Countries
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Japan
Health care77
The private sector dominates the provision of health care in Japan (81%
of hospitals and 94% of outpatient clinics). Although the free
establishment rule still prevails, regional planning of facilities and heavy
equipment and control of medical schools’ admissions have been
introduced in the mid-1980s in order to curb costs.
Since 1961, all Japanese are covered by a health insurance scheme.
There are a large number of public and quasi-public insurance carriers.
They are usually divided into two groups. The Employee Health
Insurance (EHI) system consists of 1,900 insurers. It includes
government-managed institutions, such as the Social Insurance Agency
(the biggest health insurer), that mainly covers employees of small and
middle-size enterprises (of at least five employees, otherwise
participation is voluntary). Large companies have their own society-
managed plans. Also part of the EHI system are the Seamen Insurance
and the Mutual Aid Associations covering government officers and
private school teachers.
The second group is the National Health Insurance (NHI) system.
It consists of 3,400 institutions covering the self-employed, retired
employees and other groups. It can be divided into municipality-
managed and association-managed schemes (the latter including the
liberal professions). All health insurance plans cover the insured as well
as their dependants.
The NHI’s premiums are function of the individual or household’s
income and may vary across insurers. The government subsidises 50%
of health care expenditures and takes in charge the administrative
costs.78 Local authorities participate in the financing too. In the EHI
system, employees and employers contribute 4.3% of basic wage each,
                                        
77 This section is based on Watanabe (1993), who draws a good overview of the
challenges faced by the Japanese health care system in the 1980s and the policies that
the government set up to meet them.
78 For association-managed schemes, the state’s subsidy varies from 32 to 52% of
health care costs.
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with some government subsidies. 79 The National Federation of Health
Insurance Societies (EHI system) also plays a financial regulatory role,
by managing cross-subsidies among its member institutions.
All insurance schemes provide a wide coverage of health care
services and drugs. Patients must pay for a higher standard of service by
themselves (single-bed rooms, improved meals), as well as some
uncovered care. In the NHI system, co-payments amount to a maximum
of Y63,600 a month for the same illness and Y760 per hospital day (resp.
£334 and £4).80 The same applies for the EHI system, except that the
basic co-payment rate is only 10%.81
Private insurance schemes are marginal, as a result of the
mandatory participation in a public or quasi-public plan. They are also
closely regulated by the government in order not to hinder the co-
payment system.
Medical facilities are paid according to a fee-for-service system,
with a schedule of prices set up by the Ministry of Health and Welfare.
This price list is designed such as to cover the whole operation costs of
an “ordinary” medical facility. The government has been continuously
working on this schedule to limit costs (by discouraging excessively long
hospitalisation, encouraging a division of labour between hospitals and
clinics, promoting home care and so on).
Last but not least, the elderly have benefited from free health care
since 1972. The current system was established in 1983 and is called
Health Services System for the Aged (HSSA). The elderly are defined
here as people either over 70 years old or between 65 and 70 years old
and bed-ridden. All public and quasi-public insurers must contribute to
the HSSA. This fund reimburses municipalities that must pay the whole
                                        
79 See Social Security Administration (1997), figures of the beginning of 1997.
This includes the sick and maternity pay: see next section. For plans managed by
large companies having their own insurance society, the average premiums was
3.631% for employees and 4.7% for employers. Bonuses are also subject to
contributions of 0.3% for government-managed plans and 0.5% for society-managed
plans. Basic wages for the calculation of premiums are subject to a floor of Y92,000
and a ceiling of Y980,000 (resp. £541 and 5,669).
80 See Social Security Administration (1997), figures of the beginning of 1997.
Poor families may pay less: maximum Y35,400 for outpatient (£208) and Y650 per
hospital day up to 90 days and Y500 thereafter (resp. £4 and 3). In the Retiree Health
Insurance and associations-managed plans, the co-payment is only 20% for the
insured and 20 % (inpatient) and 30% (outpatient) for the dependants.
81 For the dependants, it is 20% for inpatient and 30% for outpatient care.
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cost of health care services for the elderly. The government also
participates through direct subsidies to the municipalities corresponding
to 50% of the total costs.82 The insurers’ contributions to this fund are
computed on the assumption that they have an average share of elderly
people among their insured population. In other words, there is a
transfer mechanism from insurers with low numbers of elderly
(typically EMI schemes) to insurers with a high proportion of elderly
(generally NHI schemes). The HSSA includes a very small cost-sharing
component: the elderly had to pay a fixed and statutory amount of Y900
per month for outpatient visits and Y600 per day for inpatient care up to
a maximum of two months in 1991 (resp. £5 and £4). Finally, the HSSA
also covers preventive health services for all people over 40 years old
who are not followed closely by a doctor in their company (check-up
books, health education and so on).
In 1986, another programme was introduced for the elderly: the
Health Services Facilities for the Aged (HSFA). Those facilities provide
residential and in-home care for the aged chronically ill who do not need
to remain in a hospital. They are financed through HSSA by user fees on
the basis of a fixed price per inpatient per month instead of the fee-for-
service system.
Invalidity, Maternity and Occupational Injuries83
The Employee Health Insurance system described in the previous
section also provides sickness and maternity pay. It is not mandatory in
the National Health Insurance system, but some insurers do provide it
as well. The EPI sickness benefit is equal to 60% of basic wage and is
paid for up to 18 months or determination of a disability. The maternity
benefit is also 60% of basic earnings for up to 42 days before and 56 days
after birth. EPI-covered mothers also receive a lump sum of Y300,000
upon birth (£1,766).
The Workmen’s Accident Compensation Insurance is mandatory
for all employers except agricultural, forestry and fishery establishments
of less than five employees. Seamen and public employees are covered
by their own schemes (Mutual Aid Association or special occupational
injury funds). The premium varies from 0.6% to 14.4% according to the
                                        
82 The central government takes in charge two thirds of the subsidy, the
prefectures one sixth and the municipality itself one sixth as well.
83 This section is based on Social Security Administration (1997), figures of the
beginning of 1997.
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proportion of accidents in the past three years. It is borne entirely by the
employer. The benefit is equal to 60% of basic wage (minimum Y4,240 a
day, £25). After 19 months, it is raised to 100%, based on a year of 245 to
313 days according to the degree of disability. Permanently disabled
workers receive a lump sum of between Y1,590,000 to 3,420,000 plus
special supplements based on the employee’s annual bonus (resp. £9,359
and £20,131). There is also a constant attendance allowance of Y105,080,
or Y57,050 if the care is provided by the family (resp. £619 and £336).
The less severely disabled receive a lump sum of 56 to 503 days of salary
plus Y80,000 to Y650,000 according to the degree of disability (resp. £471
and £3,826). If a person dies at work, his survivor is entitled to the
average daily wage multiplied by 153 to 245 days annually, according to
the number of dependants, plus a lump-sum of Y3,000,000 (£17,659),
plus another supplement based on the employee’s bonus. They also
receive a funeral grant of two months salary.
Old Age and Survivor84
Just like health insurance, old age insurance is fragmented into several
occupational-based systems. The Employees Pension Insurance (EPI)
covers private sector employees and the Mutual Aid Associations
(MAA) cover government officers85. The National Pension (NP) offers an
Old Age Basic Pension Benefit to everyone. This pension is not related to
income but only to the length of contribution. By contrast, EPI and MAA
pensions are proportional to lifetime earnings.
People who are not member of either an EPI or a MAA plan must
contribute a fixed amount to the National Pension from age 20 to 60 and
begin to receive benefits from the age of 65 (they may voluntarily
contribute between 60 and 65 years old). This category of people
includes self-employed, farmers, students and so on. Their wives must
contribute to NP as well, whether they are working or not. Poor
households are exempt of NP contributions but receive lower benefits.
Employees who are covered by either an EPI or a MAA plan receive the
Old Age Basic Pension Benefit on top of it, without paying any
additional contribution (but the National Pension scheme receives some
                                        
84 This section is based on Oguchi, Kimura and Hatta (1996) and Social Security
Administration (1997), figures of the beginning of 1997.
85 There are separate Mutual Aid Associations and/or pension funds for private
school teachers and members of agricultural, forestry and fishing associations.
Seamen are covered by the normal Employees’ Pension Insurance.
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transfers from EPI and MAA insurers). Their wives are entitled to it too,
without any contribution provided that they are not working (or earning
less than Y1.3m per year).86 (EPI and MAA contributions rate do not
vary according to marital status.)
The National Pension amounts to Y785,000 (£4,620) a year for a
fully insured person (i.e., 480 months of contribution), plus Y200 (£2) a
month for each voluntary contribution month. EPI benefits are equal to
0.75% of monthly earnings times the number of contribution years, plus
a supplement for dependants.87 The NP has also an original feature:
although benefits are meant to be taken at the retirement age of 65, they
may be taken earlier (from 60) or later, in which case their amount is
adjusted respectively down or up on an actuarial basis. EPI may be
taken from 60 year old, with possible adjustments as well.88
The contribution rate for EPI is 17.35% of basic wage (e.g., before
bonuses), half paid by the employer, half by the employee, and has been
scheduled to increase by 2.5 points every five years since 1990. EPI
contributions are computed on monthly earnings higher than Y92,000
and lower than Y590,000 (resp. £542 and £3,473). The NP contribution
was Y12,800 (£75) per month in 1997 and has been raising by Y400 every
year. The government pays a third of NP contributions, plus the
administrative costs of all three systems. People must contribute for at
least 20 years to be eligible for NP and 25 years for EPI.
All those public pension schemes are pay-as-you-go. However, the
Japanese social security system as a whole is running a positive balance
every year, amounting to about 3% of GDP in 1994. It has been
increasing steadily though slowly in the last 15 years. The system has
thus accumulated a large reserve. As a result, capital income represented
as much as 8.9% of total social security revenues in 1994. This
conservative policy is designed to cope with the rapid ageing of the
Japanese population.89
The market of private pensions is more developed than that of
private health insurance, just as in most Western countries. Employers
                                        
86 Thus, an unemployed woman will cease to contribute to NP once she marries
a man covered by either EPI or MAA, although she will still be entitled to the same
NP benefit!
87 The supplements are Y226,000 a year for the wife and first two children and
Y75,300 for the next children under 18, or 20 if disabled (resp. £1,330 and £443).
88 56 years old for miners and seamen.
89 See Miyajima (1997) and Social Development Research Institute (1996).
115
may choose to contract out of the EPI, provided that their private
insurance provides equal or higher benefits.
As to survivor benefits, spouses keep the Old Age Basic Pension
Benefit which they already received in their own name, even if they
have not contributed (in this case, their husband’s length of contribution
applies). They may cumulate this pension with the EPI survivor benefits
if their husband was covered, which is equal to 75% of the old-age
pension he received. Orphans receive the dependants supplement (see
footnote 75), plus their mother’s survivor benefit, divided equally
between them, if she dies too. Survivors also receive a funeral grant
equal to a month salary (minimum Y100,000, £589).
Besides income security, the elderly benefit from a wide range of
services. First, they are entitled to almost free medical care (see section
on health care). Second, the government set up an ambitious ten-year
plan in 1989 to develop alternatives to hospitalisation for chronic
diseases. This Gold Plan was revised upwards in 1994 and its budget is
set at about nine trillion Yen for the 1995-1999 period (£53bn). Third, to
finance those expanded services, the government has recently
introduced a Chronic Care Insurance, which will be implemented from
2000 onwards. It will be mandatory for all people over 40 years old.
Eligible beneficiaries will be people in need of long term care who are
over 65 years old or between 40 and 64 and disabled. The premium will
be added to that of the insured persons’ health insurance or deducted
from their pension. It will cover 90% of the costs of home-help,
residential welfare institutions or special home renovation or
equipment. Claimants will be screened individually and ranked
according to their degree of disability.90
Welfare Services for the Aged in Japan (Gold Plan)
1990
(actual)
1999
(revised goal)
In-Home Services
Home-helpers (persons) 35,905 170,000
Home-helper stations (stations) .. 10,000
Short stay services (beds) 7,674 60,000
Day service/ day care (centres) 1,780 17,000
In-home care support centres (centres) 300 10,000
Home-visit nursing care stations (stations) .. 5,000
                                        
90 Information about the Chronic Care Insurance is from Peng (1998).
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Institutional services
Special Nursing Homes for the Elderly (beds) 172,019 290,000
Multi-purpose senior centres (centres) .. 400
Care houses/ service flats (persons) 1,700 100,000
Health Services Facilities for the Ageda (beds) 47,811 280,000
Sources: Watanabe (1993) and Ministry of Health and Welfare (1997).
Notes: a. Hospitals for the elderly (see section on health care).
Finally, the poor elderly are entitled to cash and services from the
Public Assistance programme. Cash benefits vary regionally according
to the costs of living. The amount is computed for each household as a
function of the age of each family member. Benefits include household
expenses, housing aid, educational aid, medical aid, maternity aid,
occupational aid, funeral aid and work earnings. The standard cash
benefit for a lone elderly household living in a region with a medium
cost of living was Y68,136 per month in 1996 (£401).91 It is important to
note, however, that Japanese civil law extends the responsibility to
support financially one’s family members vertically to three generations
and horizontally to the spouse and siblings. This means that the public
assistance test of means includes parents, children, spouse and siblings
of the person in need.
Disability92
Permanent disability is covered by the same institutions as the old age
pensions, which are explained above. There are two classes of disability:
Class I are the totally disabled requiring constant attendance. Class II are
the severely disabled with restricted ability in daily living. Under the
National Pension, class I disabled are entitled to Y981,000 per year and
Class II 785,000 (resp. £5,774 and £4,621), plus dependants
supplements93, provided they have contributed for at least two third of
the period between age 20 and their accident. People whose disability
originated in childhood or before birth are entitled to NP benefits
without having ever contributed. As to EPI, Class I disabled get 125% of
their old-age pension plus dependants supplements. Class II receive
100% and there is an additional category for less severe disability, Class
                                        
91 Health and Welfare Statistics Association (1997). Additional benefits such as a
housing allowance increase total benefits to Y97,586.
92 This section is based on Social Security Administration (1997), figures of the
beginning of 1997.
93 See footnote 87, but only for the children.
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III, who gets 100% as well but nothing for their dependants. There is a
floor for EPI disability benefits set at Y589,000 (£3,467). Moreover, the
EPI-insured disabled are entitled to a lump-sum grant of 200% of his
old-age pension (minimum Y1,170,000, £6,887).
Poor disabled people are also entitled to the Public Assistance
Programme (see section on the elderly). The cash benefit is topped up
for the person who cares for the disabled.
Family94
The government runs a child allowance programme for children under
age 3. Families were eligible if they earned less than Y3,772,000 a year
for a family of four (£22,204). Employers must pay 70% of the benefits
under that programme, the central government 20%, prefectures and
municipalities sharing the remaining 10%. For the self-employed and
unemployed, the central government takes 66.6% in charge and local
governments share the rest. The benefit amounted to Y5,000 (£29) per
month for the first two children in 1994, and Y10,000 for each
subsequent child.
An additional programme, the Child Support Allowance, targets
children of lone mothers, up to age 18 (or 20 if the child is disabled). The
benefit’s amount also varies with the child’s rank: Y38,860 (£228) per
month for the first child, Y5,000 for the second and Y2,000 for
subsequent ones. It is subject to a two-stage means-test: lone mothers
whose income is under Y1,929,000 (£11,355) receive the full amount and
those earning more than Y3,820,000 receive nothing, those in between
getting Y12,850 for the first child. 86% of recipients were divorced and
5% never married.
Lone mothers may ask a loan from the government for a variety of
expenses, such as training, children’s education, establishing a business,
moving or even daily living costs. The maximum loan amount depends
upon its purpose (the biggest is establishing a business: Y3,630,000), as
well as the interest (no interest for children’s education, 3% for others).
They must be repaid in 3 to 10 years.
There is also a programme for households with disabled children,
the Special Child Dependant Allowance.  The means test was Y7,121,000
for a family of four (£41,917) and the benefit is Y47,160 per month for a
severely disabled child and Y31,440 for a moderately disabled one (resp.
£278 and £185).
                                        
94 This section is based on Ozawa and Kono (1995). Figures of 1993 unless
otherwise stated.
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Retired, survivors and disabled people with children receive
dependants’ allowance presented in the two previous sections.
As to services, the government launched the Angel Plan in 1994 to
increase the supply of care facilities for children. The state also takes in
charge health care costs not reimbursed by insurance for young children
up to elementary school and their mothers. Regular check-ups are
mandatory.
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Welfare Services for Children in Japan (Angel Plan)
1995
(actual)
1999
(goal)
Total number of places in day-care centres 470,000 600,000
Multi-function day-care 200 1,500
Extended hour day-care 2,530 7,000
Short hour/ temporary care centres 600 3,000
Local child support centres 354 3,000
After school programmes 5,220 9,000
Child rearing support centres for 0-2 years old 40 500
Sources: Peng (1998).
Unemployment95
Employment Insurance is mandatory for all employers except
agricultural, forestry and fishery establishments of less than five
employees. Seamen have their own scheme. Government officers are not
covered by any insurance as they are assumed to be employed for life
and receive fairly generous severance payments. Employees over the age
of 65 are not allowed to participate in Employment Insurance, nor are
seasonal workers working less than four months a year (but daily
labourers do have a special protection scheme). Six months of
contribution in the last year are necessary to qualify for the benefits. The
premium is 0.4% of earnings for the employee and 0.75% for employers.
The government subsidises 25% of benefits and takes administrative
costs in charge. The benefit is equal to 60% of the wage (80% for low
wages) for a period varying between 90 days and 300 days according to
length of insurance, age group and employment prospects. The
minimum benefit is Y3,390 a day and the maximum Y10,660 (£20 and
£63).
The Japanese government also relies on active labour market
measures, subsidising enterprises in restructuring industries or regions
to let them keep their redundant labour force. Those subsidies mainly
benefit to middle-aged and aged employees.
Education
The state provides free education. Attendance at elementary and middle
school (6+3 years) is mandatory and almost all children are indeed
                                        
95 This section is based on Social Security Administration (1997), figures of the
beginning of 1997
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enrolled. 97% of those students attend public schools. The curriculum is
uniform and largely decided by the Ministry of Education.
In 1992, 94.8% of children attended high-school, 12.4% two-year
colleges and 26.4% university. Numerous students also attend afternoon
schools (gakushu juku) in order to prepare for entrance examinations for
high-school and university. Those schools are private, for-profit
institutions. In 1993, about 23.6% of children of grades 1 to 6 attended
such a school, and 59.5% of children of grades 7 to 9.96
Housing97
There are three major public housing programmes in Japan. The first one
is the Government Housing Loan Corporation (GHLC), which provides
long term loans at low interest rates for the purchase of private housing.
There is no test of means to benefit from this programme and the size of
loans and interest rates vary according to region and size of the housing
unit. The government pays for about 1 percentage point of interest on
average. The government uses this programme to promote some forms
of housing, such as those consuming less energy or adapted to 3-
generation households.
Secondly, local governments must provide some cheap public
housing under the Housing Law. They receive a grant from the central
government to cover part of the construction costs and allocate the
available units through a lottery. Applications are subject to a means test
and the lone elderly or handicapped have priority.
The third programme is the Housing and Urban Development
Corporation (HUDC) that provides public housing in densely populated
areas, for rent or for sale. Housing units are also allocated through a
lottery, and applicants must have an income of at least for times the rent
of the flat for which they apply.
Among all housing units built between 1945 and 1990, 60% have
been financed entirely by the private sector, 24% have received some aid
from the GHLC, 6% had been built under the Housing Law, another 3%
had been build by the HUDC and the remaining 7% had received
another form of public aid.
                                        
96 See Ozawa and Kono (1995) for a good discussion of these schools.
97 This section is based on Building Centre of Japan (1992).
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Korea98
Health care
Korea achieved universal coverage under the National Health Insurance
system in 1989. Previously, health insurance was reserved for people
belonging to two occupational groups (and their dependants): civil
servants and private school teachers on the one hand99, and employees
of middle-sized and large private firms on the other hand. The
universalisation was made possible by the creation of the Regional
Medical Insurance system, run by local governments, in order to catch
the self-employed, farmers, the retired and employees of small firms
(less than five employees).
The Civil Servants and Private School Teachers Insurance scheme
is managed by the Korea Medical Insurance Corporation, a quasi-
governmental body. In the Industrial Employee Health Insurance
system, each firm must create its own insurance society or share one
with other firms (there were 420 of them in 1992). Those societies are
managed by representatives of both employers and employees. There
are similar societies for the Regional Medical Insurance scheme. The
National Federation of Medical Insurers has created a Co-Financing
Programme, a financial transfer mechanism to help poorer insurance
carriers. All insurers contribute to this fund according to their financial
resources and the money is redistributed to cover actual costs of specific
services, such as special care for the elderly or high technology
equipment.
The Industrial Employee Health Insurance scheme is financed by
premiums equally shared by employees and employers: from 2% to 3.8%
of basic wage (i.e., without bonus), according to the level of earnings
(with a floor wage of W75,000 per month, £61). Civil servants and
private school teachers pay a premium of 4.6% of their wage, half of it
paid by their employer, the state100. In the Regional Medical Insurance
system, the government is subsidising 50% of health care expenditures,
                                        
98 Unless otherwise stated, the whole section on Korea is based on Soon-Won
Kwon (1993). The book also includes a good chronology of the social security system
in Korea. See also Pae (1992) for an alternative overview of the Korean welfare state.
99 The military receive free health care in their barracks but their dependants are
covered by the Civil Servants and Private School Teachers Health Insurance.
100 0.92% from the state and 1.38% from the schools for private school teachers.
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as well as administrative costs. The insured must pay a premium that is
a function of his or her earnings and assets (on a thirty-grade scale), as
well as the number of dependants to be covered. The average premium
was W166,333 in 1993 (£138).101
Patients are charged high co-insurance fees: 20% of inpatient care
costs and 30% of outpatient care costs when they exceed W10,000 (£7), or
a flat fee of W2,600 for clinics and W3,000 for hospitals for low-cost
visits.102
The three insurance schemes cover a wide range of health care
services, with the usual exceptions (e.g., cosmetic surgery). The exact
benefit package varies slightly across insurance carriers. Many clinical
tests are often excluded. Dental care is limited to simple restorations and
extractions. Maternity care is covered only for the two first children.
Patients must pay for their hospital meals as well as for private rooms.
Civil servants and private school teachers are entitled to a free complete
check-up every two years. More importantly, there is a time limit of six
months for the coverage of health care services related to the same
disease (in principle).
Private health insurance is marginal, as a direct consequence of the
mandatory National Health Insurance.
Health care services are provided by a mix of private and public
facilities (in 1990, 20% of hospital beds and 21% of General Practitioners
belonged to the public sector). Both types of facilities are financed by
insurance societies and patients’ co-payments on a fee-for-service basis,
according to a price schedule drawn by the Ministry of Health and
Social Affairs. There is also a referral system for specialised health care,
which is not working properly according to Soon-Won Kwon (1993).
Besides the three health insurance schemes, the Korean
government has also set up a Medical Aid System (Medicaid) for low-
income families and the indigent. Although people taken in charge by
Medicaid do not pay insurance premiums, most of them (76%) must pay
the high co-payments and uncovered expenses. There is no co-payment
for those earning less than W80,000 (£58) per month and inmates of
                                        
101 Figures of 1995 from the International Social Security Association,
http://www.aiss.org/ (February 1998), except for government officers: Soon-Won
Kwon (1993).
102 All figures are as of 1992 (from Kwon, 1993). Larger hospitals such as teaching
hospitals charge higher co-payments (up to 65%) to discourage concentration
(people believing that health care is better in larger facilities).
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social welfare institutions (Category I). The co-payment is zero for
outpatient care and 20% for inpatient care for those earning between
W80,000 and W100,000 (Category 2), and those figures rise respectively
to 44% and 20% for people earning between W100,000 and W120,000
(Category 3).103
Soon-Won Kwon (1993) identifies and discusses a number of
problems facing the Korean health care system, the most acute of which
are:
· The financial weakness of regional medical insurance schemes,
that cover the most vulnerable groups of the population.
· The lack of health care facilities in rural areas.
· The surge in health care demand and expenditures since 1989.
Invalidity, Maternity and Occupational Injuries
 The health insurance schemes presented above include a maternity grant
(except the one of civil servants and private school teachers).
 There is no invalidity insurance or mandatory sick pay in Korea,
although it is customary for enterprises to pay their sick or injured
employees for some time.
 The Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance has covered
occupational injuries since 1964. It is now mandatory for all workers of
firms with more than five employees. Smaller firms are bound by the
Labour Standards Law to finance by themselves some benefits to injured
workers. A central public fund gathers the contributions of employers
only (ranging from 0.24% to 35.1% of payroll, according to the risk of the
industry, with an average of 1.5% in 1995). The government finances the
administrative costs. Benefits include both health care and invalidity
pay. The latter is equal to 70% of wage for the period of treatment
(subject to a seven-day waiting period and for a maximum of 24
months). Permanently disabled workers may choose either an annuity
equals to between 138 and 329 days of earning or a lump-sum grant
equal to 55 to 1,474 days of earning, according to the degree of disability
(less severe disabled must receive the grant). Finally, in case of death at
work, the worker’s family is entitled to a lump sum of 1,300 days of
wage, plus a pension equal to 47% of earnings for a single person, 52%
                                        
103 There is also an asset means test of W10,000,000 per household (£7,960).
People on Medicaid are entitled to interest-free loans to cover expenses above
W100,000 (£80).
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for two persons, 57% for three, and 62% for four or more persons. There
is also a funeral grant of 120 days of earnings.104
Old Age and Survivor105
 The National Pension Programme (NPP) was created in 1988 and has
progressively been extended to all workers of private firms with more
than five employees, as well as farmers, fishermen and the rural self-
employed, all aged 18 to 60 years old106. Civil servants, private school
teachers and the military each have their own pension programme. The
government is planning to extend the NPP to the urban self-employed
this year. Meanwhile, they may voluntarily join the scheme, like
employees of firms with fewer than five employees and workers under
18.107 In 1996, however, only about a third of the working population
had an old-age insurance.
 The NPP is financed by a premium of 9% of the wage, or 3% from
the employee, 3% from the employer and the rest from retirement funds
previously built up by companies (which are therefore being phased out
by the introduction of the NPP). Farmers, fishermen and the rural self-
employed pay 3% of their earnings, but this rate is scheduled to rise to
9% as well by 2005. Voluntarily insured workers pay 9% of the average
earnings of all other NPP contributors. The government only pays for
the administrative costs and subsidises the premium of low-income
farmers and fishermen. Civil servants, military personnel and private
school teachers pay 5.5% of their wage to their own scheme,
complemented equally by the government.108
 The NPP is a funded scheme with defined benefits. The full
pension described below will be paid only to those having contributed
for at least 20 years (i.e., not before 2007).109 Meanwhile, people who
                                        
 104 Figures of 1995 from the International Social Security Association,
http://www.aiss.org/ (February 1998).
 105 This section is based on Soon-Won Kwon (1993), Huck-Ju Kwon (1998b) and
International Social Security Association, http://www.aiss.org/ (February 1998).
 106 55 years old for miners and seamen.
 107 Voluntary insured workers pay a contribution based on the average earnings
of all other NPP contributors. The state does not foot their bill.
 108 2% by the government and 3.5% by the schools for private school teachers.
 109 In a transitory period, however, people will be entitled to a “reduced
pension” after 15 years of contribution, equal to 72.5 to 92.5% of the full pension.
Similarly, employees will have the choice to continue to work between age 60 and 65
in order to get enough years of contribution, in which case they will get from 50 to
90% of the full pension (this is the “extended pension”). Those who continue
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have contributed to the fund and retire before 2007 receive a lump-sum
refund of their contributions, at an interest rate fixed by the National
Pension Corporation, the quasi-governmental institution that manages
the programme. For those retirees, the NPP is thus equivalent to a
provident fund. By 2007, the National Pension Fund will have
progressively accumulated a reserve, which already amounted to 5.4%
of GDP in 1994110. Indeed, all age cohorts between 20 and 60 are now
contributing to the fund every year, but only one cohort per year is
retiring, taking no more out of the fund than what it put in. From 2007
onwards, however, insured workers will be entitled to an annuity. This
full pension will not depend upon the financial performance of the fund.
It is an entitlement. Hence there is no guarantee that the scheme will be
actuarially fair and will not involve large intergenerational transfers. In
fact, the Korean Development Institute predicts the fund to run deficits
by 2031 and to collapse by 2050111, if contribution rates are left
unchanged. Kwon (1998a) makes a similar projection, based on a
simulation of the contributions and benefits of two representative
workers. Thus he does not even take into account the ageing of the
population. The entitlement just appears to be too generous.
 The full pension is computed by the following formula:
 Monthly pension = 2.4 * (M + 0.75*A) * (1 + 0.05*N) / 12
 where M: mean monthly wage of all insured.
 A: average monthly wage over the working life of the insured.
 N: number of years of contribution minus 20.
 The variables A and N are the “actuarially fair” components of the
formula: they imply that benefits are a function of lifetime contributions.
                                                                                                                              
working until the age of 65 receive the full pension regardless of their number of
years of contribution. Inversely, those who have already contributed for twenty
years will be able to retire before the age of 60 and get the “early retirement
pension”, which is 75 to 95% of the full pension. Finally, people aged 45 to 60 at the
introduction of the scheme (1988) who are unable to get 15 years of contribution
before retirement may get the “special pension” if they contribute for at least 5 years,
which is between 25 and 75% of the full pension.
 110 See Huck-Ju Kwon (1998b). Over half of it has been invested in government
bonds. Since the budget deficit was low or even negative, it was really used to
finance public investments rather than current public expenditures.
 111 In other words, the fund constituted in the initial transitory period will cease
to increase by 2031 and will become a debt by 2050. Quoted in Soon-Won Kwon
(1993).
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On the other hand, the variable M is a built-in mechanism of vertical
redistribution. It is easy to calculate that for a worker who earns the
average wage (A=M), the replacement rate is 61.25% of average lifetime
earnings (A).112 Thanks to the vertical redistribution mechanism, this
rate increases for workers who earn less than the average wage (for
example, it becomes 96.25% if A=0.5*M) and decreases for those who
earn more (43.75% if A=2M). Note that the full pension is topped up for
dependants.
 Until 2007, mandatory severance pay will continue to play a
relevant role. The Labour Standards Law requires all employers with
more than four employees to offer a lump-sum retirement payment
equivalent to at least one month of salary for every year spent in the
company. This can be substituted by a private insurance.
 Survivors are entitled to 40 to 60% of the basic pension, depending
upon the number of years of contribution, plus dependants’
supplements.
 The three pension schemes for government officers and related
professions offer different benefits. Their pensions are calculated on the
basis of the last salary and the number of contribution years only.
Therefore, it does not include any vertical redistribution mechanism.
 The three health insurance schemes presented in the health care
section also include a funeral grant of W300,000 for the insured person
or W200,000 for his or her dependants in 1995 (£246 and £164).
 Finally, the state aids the poor elderly who do not have any family
support with a range of in-kind and cash benefits. First, they are entitled
to Medicaid (see the health care section). Second, men over 65 and
women over 55 may be eligible to the Livelihood Protection Programme
(the Korean public assistance). The test of means holds for the household
in need but also for the person legally responsible to take care of them
(i.e., spouse, children or siblings). The income support for one person
was W78,000 per month in 1995 (£64). Besides the cash allowance,
benefits include subsidised fuel and rent, food, free tuition for kids up to
middle school, free medical care113 and free funerals. Third, they may
join a residential home for the elderly subsidised by the state.
                                        
 112 Replacement rates are usually calculated in terms of the last wage prior to
retirement, which is typically higher than average lifetime earnings, which yields a
lower replacement rate.
 113 The poor elderly (as well as the poor disabled) do not need to pay the usual
user fees under Medicaid.
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Disability
 The old-age pension schemes presented in the previous section include
disability benefits. As to the NPP, one year of contribution prior
disability is required. The benefit is equal to 60 to 100% of the basic
pension, according to the level of disability, plus the dependants’
supplements.
 The poor disabled who do not enjoy family support are entitled to
the same range of benefits as the poor elderly (see the previous section).
 
Family
 There is no family or child allowance in Korea. Orphans under 18
without family support are entitled to the Livelihood Protection
Programme (see the Old Age and Survivor section). They may also join a
welfare institution for children. Lone mothers are also a typical group
targeted by the Livelihood Protection Programme.
 
Unemployment
 The Korean government introduced an Employment Insurance
Programme in 1995. Originally, it was mandatory only for private firms
with more than thirty employees, then 10 employees from January 1998.
The contribution rate is 1.5% of earnings (paid by the employer). The
benefit is equal to 50% of earnings for a period of 30 to 210 days,
increasing with age and the length of contribution. As a response to the
current economic crisis, the government has recently extended the
programme to employees of firms of more than five employees, raised
the minimum benefits to W8,316 per day (£4) and temporarily reduced
the minimum period of contribution to be eligible from one year to six
months. Part-time workers will be covered from July 1999.
 Poor households may also be eligible to the Livelihood Protection
Programme (see the Old Age and Survivor section). Most households
with able-bodied, middle-aged adults don’t receive the full range of
benefits of the Livelihood Protection Programme. Typically, they will
not get the cash allowance and will receive food only in the winter when
seasonal work is more difficult to get. They will generally be required to
join public works (in farms or infrastructure building). They will also
need to take loans for medical care (see the Medicaid programme under
the Health Care section). On the other hand, they will be entitled to
interest-free loans to create or expand a business. Public works, loans for
livelihood, loans for starting a business and training programmes have
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all been expanded as a response to the current economic crisis. A total of
W8 trillion has been appropriated for active and passive labour market
measures in 1998 (£3.9bn or about 1.9% of GDP), although it is unclear
whether this sum is actually going to be disbursed.114
 
Education
 The state provides free education. Attendance at elementary and middle
school (6+3 years) is mandatory and almost all children are indeed
enrolled. Both private and public schools are financed by the state, but
private schools may charge fees for extra-curricular activities. The
curriculum is uniform and largely decided by the Ministry of Education.
However, a large number of private institutions organise afternoon
classes for the preparation of college entrance examination. In 1992, 84%
of students attended high-school, and 50.8% higher education
 There is a small budget for public scholarship for indigent people
(including the elderly and the disabled), amounting to W79.4bn in 1992
(£58m). The benefits of the Livelihood Protection Programme include
tuition subsidies for children up to middle school (see the Old Age and
Survivor section).
 
Housing
 The Korean housing policy emphasises housing construction for sale
and is thus primarily directed to the middle class rather than the poor.
The Korea National Housing Corporation (KNHC) built about half a
million dwellings between 1962 and 1989. Most of them were sold either
immediately or after short term renting contracts, with only 6.5% being
rented under permanent or long term contracts. Housing finance is the
responsibility of the Korea Housing Bank (KHB). Applicants for
purchase of KNHC housing must make a deposit to the KHB for a
certain period of time, the balance of which is used as a full or partial
payment of the dwelling once the sale is agreed upon. The KHB may
cover the difference with a loan.115
 The KHB is also a mandatory channel to purchase a large
proportion of privately built housing, particularly in large cities. Most
newly built houses and flats must be sold through the KHB lotteries and
                                        
 114 The information on the recent developments of the Employment Insurance
Programme and the labour market policies are from International Labour
Organisation (1998).
 115 See Ha (1994).
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waiting lists. Purchasers may not sold them on the secondary market
before a certain number of years. This secondary market (i.e., dwellings
built some years ago) is governed by the law of supply and demand and
prices are much higher. In other words, the government plays a major
role in allocating housing and keeping down the price of new housing
through a system of waiting list. The KHB is also a way for the
government to mobilise private savings, which are in fact blocked for
many years.
 The 1988-92 five-year plan put more importance on housing for
low-income groups. 250,000 housing units were planned to be built for
rental to low-income people, with a direct subsidy from the government
amounting to W500.5bn in 1992 (£363m).116 They targeted households in
the lowest 10% income bracket, who were estimated to be about one
million. Yet only 190,000 housing units had been built by 1992. 117
 
 Taiwan
Health care
 The National Health Insurance (NHI) is Taiwan’s main social security
programme. It is aiming at universal coverage, the military being the
only remaining occupational group that has its own health care scheme.
The NHI is run by a single government agency, the Bureau of National
Health Insurance.118 However, the government has been seriously
considering to privatise it, which, if enacted, would completely change
Taiwan’s health care system. Workers and their dependants join the NHI
through employment, while about 10% of the insured are brought into it
by local governments (so-called community-based insured persons). As
to health care providers, there are both public and private facilities, the
former accounting for about a third of hospital beds.
 The NHI is financed by a direct government subsidy and by
premiums paid by the government, employers and employees. The
premium is now set at 4.25% of the wage. The share taken by the
government varies across occupational groups, from zero for the self-
                                        
 116 Budget figure from Soon-Won Kwon (1993).
 117 See Ha (1994).
 118 This administration maintains an outstanding web-site including all the
information of this section and much more: Bureau of National Health Insurance,
http://www.nhi.gov.tw (December 1997). Figures of 1997.
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employed other than farmers to 100% for low-income families and
veterans. It is 10% for normal private sector employees. The share taken
by the employer is usually 30%.
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 The contribution formula is the following:
 Contribution = Wage x 4.25% x Occupation’s contribution share x (the
insured + number of dependants up to five)
 There is also a floor and ceiling wage to compute the contribution: the
minimum wage and 3.6 times the minimum wage (£380 per month in
1994). The contributions of community-based insured people are
computed with a flat, notional wage equal to the average of the insured
from the occupational groups.
 The NHI covers virtually all health care services and supplies,
with the usual exceptions such as eyeglasses or non-medically required
cosmetic surgery. Co-payments apply to most patients and treatments,
subject to ceilings for hospitalisations. They account for 6% of health
facilities’ revenues. There are also other user fees for meals, not-covered
services etc.
 Health facilities bill the BNHI on a fees-for-service basis, except for
a very few standard treatments for which flat rates apply.
 As elsewhere, health care expenditures in Taiwan are growing
faster than its GDP, although the gap has been contained in recent years.
The government is committed to keep the NHI’s budget balanced by:
· Increasing user fees for outpatient care;
· Increasing the basic premium rate;
· Extending the scope of the case payment system;
· Progressively shifting from the fee-for-service to the global budget
system to finance health facilities according to their population
mix, treatment mix, heavy equipment and so on.
Invalidity, Maternity and Occupational Injuries119
 Labour Insurance, Government Employees Insurance and Farmers
Insurance protect eligible workers against loss of income due to health-
related work interruption.
 As far as Labour Insurance is concerned, the contribution is set at
6.5% of earnings (with a wage ceiling of NT$36,300 per month, or £845).
It is taken in charge by the employee (70%), the employer (20%) and the
                                        
 
 119 See Social Security Administration (1997), Bureau of Labour Insurance (1998),
Central Trust of China (1997) and information provided by the courtesy of the
Farmers Insurance Bureau. Figures of 1997.
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state (10%).120 This, however, covers not only invalidity and maternity,
but also the retirement and disability grants (see next two sections). The
invalidity pay is equal to 50% of earnings for a period of up to one year
(6 months if less than a year of contribution). The maternity benefit is a
lump sum equal to one month of earnings.
 The occupational injury component of the Labour Insurance is as
follows. Injured workers receive 70% of their monthly pay for the first
year after the accident, and 50% for the second year. In case of
permanent disability, they receive a lump sum equal to 60 months of
earnings, or between 1.5 and 50 months if the disability is partial. The
survivors of workers dying at work are entitled to 45 months of earnings
plus 5 months as a funeral grant. The Labour Insurance also covers the
entire medical cost of occupational injuries. The contribution is paid
entirely by the employer and depends upon the type of business (there
are 52 categories), ranging from 0.09 to 3% of the wage and averaging
0.37% in 1997. This contribution comes on top of the 6.5% for the other
benefits (see above).
 Government employees pay a premium of 4.75%. The government
pays 65% as an employer, the employee paying the remaining 35%.
However, this premium is entirely devoted to old age and disability
benefits (see next two sections). In case of maternity, invalidity and
occupational injuries, government employees just continue to receive
their normal wage.
 The Farmers Insurance’s premium is 2.55% of a notional salary,
which was NT$10,200 per month in 1997 (£237). The government pays
30% of it, farmers pay the rest. Farmers get only maternity benefits, as
well as disability and death grants (see next section).
 
Old Age and Survivor121
 The government has announced the creation of a universal old age
pension programme by the year 2000. According to the government’s
plan, all employees will have to join the scheme, which will also be
mandatory for the self-employed above 25 years old. The age of
                                        
 120  Fishermen, seamen and temporary craft workers have special arrangements,
with a higher state contribution (see Bureau of Labour Insurance, 1998). For the self-
employed who may also opt for the Labour Insurance, the contribution rate is 3.9%,
topped up by the government by 2.6%.
 121 This section is based on Bureau of Labour Insurance (1998) and Social Security
Administration (1997).
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retirement is set at 65 years old. The benefits will consist of flat old age,
survivor and disability annuities. A minimum of ten years of
contribution will be required to claim a pension, but the full pension will
be paid to workers who have contributed at least 40 years. The full
pension will be equal to about 50 to 70% of average per capita
expenditures in the two previous years. Retiring people who have
contributed less than 40 years will be entitled to that full pension minus
2.5% per year of non-contribution. Transitory benefits will be available
too.122 Contributions will be shared by employers and employees, the
self-employed paying them entirely on their own. Some subsidies for
low-income households will be available. The state will manage the
system at its inception but it might be privatised later. It will be partially
funded, without state guarantee.123
 As of today, only workers who are insured by the Labour
Insurance or the Government Employees Insurance benefit from a
retirement insurance at age 60. 124 The former receive a lump-sum grant
at the time they retire. It is equal to one month of earnings by year of
contribution (and 2 months of earnings for each year over the 15th, with
a maximum of 45 months). The basis is the average monthly wage in the
six months prior to retirement. Workers wishing to continue to work
until 65 years old can claim a supplement equal to one month salary for
each additional year. Government employees may choose either a lump-
sum payment or an annuity. The Labour Insurance’s survivor benefit is
equal to 15 to 35 months of earnings125. There is also a funeral grant
amounting to five months of earnings.
                                        
 122 The necessary length of contribution to be entitled to benefits will be
decreased to 25 for workers who are over the age of 25 at the programme’s
inception. People over the age of 65 will be entitled to a monthly allowance of
NT$2,000 (£47). However, if they have already received a lump-sum pension, this
entitlement will be postponed until their lump-sum grant has been spent out on the
basis of a consumption worth NT$2,000 per month. See Ku (forthcoming).
 123 See Council for Economic Planning and Development (1995).
 124 See Social Security Administration (1997). Figures of 1997. Same source for the
rest of this paragraph. The civil servants’ premium is 9% of earnings and the
farmers’ one ranges from 6 to 8% (subsidised by the state at 70%), based on flat
earnings of NT$10,200.
 125 20 months if less than two years of contribution and 10 months if less than a
year. The insured is also entitled to a grant in the event of the death of one of his
family members, which is equal to 1.5 to 3 months’ salary.
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 Government employees receive an old age pension, a death grant,
as well as a death grant for their dependants. The old age lump sum is
equal to one month of earnings for each year of contribution. The 11th to
15th years of contribution count double and the 15th to 20th years triple
(with a maximum of 36 months of earnings). The survivor benefit is
equal to 30 months of earnings (or 36 months if the employee dies at
work).
 Farmers’ families receive substantial death grants under the
Farmers Insurance. The government has also recently introduced an old-
age allowance for farmers over 65 years old, amounting to NT$3,000 per
month (£70).
 Both the Labour Insurance and the Government Employees
Insurance have built up funds to meet their obligations under their old
age component. Yet the latter fund has been progressively depleted and
the GEI is now running important deficits every year. The Labour
Insurance has been managed more conservatively such that its reserve is
almost sufficient to meet its actuarially due benefits.
 Since 1993, the government has began providing a monthly
allowance to elderly people belonging to low-income families126. All
citizens over the age of 65 whose average family income is less than or
equal to 1.5 times the minimum monthly expenses are entitled to receive
a monthly subsidy of £142. If it is between 1.5 and 2.5 times the
minimum expenses, they receive £71.127
 Under the Elderly Welfare Law, the government provides or
subsidises a variety of services to the elderly, including elderly care
institutions, apartments designed for old people, cultural and
recreational activities and organisations, free transportation and tax
breaks or subsidised housing to assist households with senior citizens.
                                        
 126 Those are families whose income is inferior to the minimum vital expenses
computed by the government on the basis of the consumer price indexes of each
locality or region. That minimum was, for instance, US$249 for one person in Taipei
City in 1997. Several authors agree that this is an extremely low level (see inter alia
MacPherson, 1992 and Hill and Lee, 1992). About 114,700 people or 48,500
households were considered members of low-income families in 1995. (See
Government Information Office, http://www.gio.gov.tw/ info/yearbook/
content.htm, December 1997).
 127 See Government Information Office, http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/
yearbook/content.htm, (December 1997).
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Still, the government itself recognises that there is a shortage of elderly
homes to welcome needy elderly.128
Disability
 The Labour Insurance, Government Employees Insurance and Farmers
Insurance all include disability benefits. As to the former, if a worker
becomes permanently disabled, he receives a lump-sum amount equal to
a maximum of 40 times his monthly wage (or one to 33.3 months if the
disability is partial).129
 The government also subsidises private care institutions for the
disabled.
 Taiwan has a law that stipulates that private enterprises with more
than 100 employees must hire disabled persons such that their
proportion in their labour force reaches at least one percent.
Government offices, public schools and public enterprises with 50 or
more employees are held to a doubly stringent standard. If each
employer were to meet the quota exactly, nearly 29,000 disabled people
would be employed. Such is not the case, however. Only about 22,000
disabled people had been hired as of March 1996.130
 People with severe disabilities pay no premium and receive free
treatment for serious injuries under the National Health Insurance.
People whose disabilities are not so severe pay discounted premium and
user-fees.131
 
Family
 There is no family allowance in Taiwan, except for the low-income
families (see definition in the section on old age and survivor). Children
of families whose average monthly income does not exceed the
minimum expenses are entitled to a monthly allowance that varies
according to location (it was £38 per child in Taipei County in 1997), for
                                        
 128 See Government Information Office, http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/
yearbook/content.htm, (December 1997).
 129 See Social Security Administration (1997).
 130 See Government Information Office, http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/
yearbook/content.htm, (December 1997).
 131 See Government Information Office, http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/
yearbook/content.htm, (December 1997).
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a maximum of two children per household. Two-third of this allowance
is borne by local governments that are allowed to top it up.132
 Cities and counties must also provide child care centres.
 
Unemployment
 There is no unemployment insurance in Taiwan yet, but the government
is going to introduce one by the end of 1998 under the Labour Insurance.
For the time being, there is an Unemployment Assistance Programme
that was set up in 1994 and entitles fired workers to £362 per month for
up to four months. There is also a small fund to pay workers’ wage
arrears when companies fail. It is financed by employers’ contributions
of 0.05% of wages.133
 Low-income families are entitled to the public assistance to
increase their income up to the government-defined minimum vital
expenditures (see definition and number in the old age and survivor
section). The test of means for this allowance rests upon the extended
family and that the main wage-earner must be unable to work due to
permanent illness, accidental injury or because of death. The benefit
averaged NT$3,863 per month household in 1996 (£90).134
 MacPherson (1992) also emphasises that the government
distributes gifts to indigent families on holidays and special occasion (a
Chinese tradition). This budget is not insignificant compared to the
public assistance programme: 36,000 donations at an average of £97
were made in 1989.
 
Education
 The state provides free education. Attendance to elementary and middle
school (6+3 years) is mandatory and 98% of children are indeed
enrolled. Almost all primary schools are public, as well as a third of
middle schools. The curriculum is uniform and largely decided by the
Ministry of Education.
 About 90% of students finishing middle schools go to either high-
school to prepare for college, vocational schools or “junior colleges”.
Again, about a third of schools are public but they are all financed at
                                        
 132 See Government Information Office, http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/
yearbook/content.htm, (December 1997).
 133 See Government Information Office, http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/
yearbook/content.htm, (December 1997).
 134 See Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (1997).
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least partially by the government. A variety of higher education
institutions receive public subsidies as well, attended by 29% of the 18-
21 year-old population.
Housing135
 The government’s intervention in the housing market has never been
very important in Taiwan, where about 80% of the population live in
their own house or flat.
 The most ambitious programme was initiated in the late 1970s and
early 1980s, when the government planned to build about 25,000 units
every year. The world-wide recession of the early 1980s led to a sharp
decline of the demand and numerous dwellings were left unoccupied,
such that the eligibility standards were assigned to middle or even high
income households. As a result, the housing stock built by the
government accounts for about only 5% of the total.
 Since then, the housing policy has focused on loans to help
individuals to build or purchase their own housing. It is thus targeted at
the middle class rather than the very poor who cannot save or borrow
enough money. Yet, the government has set up a number of small
programmes to help the poor as well (see a summary in Chen, 1994).
 
 Hong-Kong
Health care136
 Hong Kong’s health care system is very heterogeneous. On the one
hand, anyone may go to public facilities run by the Hospital Authority, a
quasi-public body, or the General Outpatient Department’s clinics. They
provide most kinds of health care at very low cost. For instance, a day in
a public hospital was charged at HK$29 in 1989 (£2), about 5% of its cost.
However, the service quality is poor and some kinds of medical services
are lacking. More importantly, the waiting lists are huge and queuing is
so time-consuming and exhausting that about 65% of patients use
private doctors, bearing the whole cost themselves. The proportion of
admissions in hospitals was 54% at government hospitals, 28% at
                                        
 135 This section is based on Chen (1994).
 
 136 This section is based on Hay (1992).
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subvented hospitals and 18% at private hospitals in 1988.137 “Rather than
allocating scarce medical manpower on the basis of medical need, the
Hong Kong government system allocates it to consumers with the
greatest tolerance for waiting” (Hay, 1992, p.xxiv). Another serious
systemic problem is the lack of co-ordination between outpatient and
inpatient care providers. Tackling that issue, improving the system’s
overall management and increasing user charges are the major points on
the government’s health care agenda.
 Hay (1992) notes that little is known about Hong Kong’s private
health care sector. He reckons that service quality and fees vary widely.
It is possible to find the very best (and also most expensive) health care
by any international standard. On the other hand, some doctors charge
excessive fees, discriminate their bills according to their patients’ wealth
and provide unnecessary services, sometimes outside of their area of
competency. Hay (1992) deplores the lack of regulation of the private
health care sector, the government being too much focused on the
Hospital Authority.
 As to private health insurance, only about 14% of the population
would be covered, many of whom through insurance packages
proposed by their employers. The characteristics of the insured (mostly
young, male and wealthy people) suggest a strong adverse selection
effect. According to Hay (1992), the modal reported monthly premium
was HK$200-500 (£20-36). The coverage available at this price was
limited however, any catastrophic medical event putting the insured
back on the public hospital’s waiting lists.
 
Invalidity, Maternity and Occupational Injuries138
 Employers must pay their employees who are temporarily unable to
work because of invalidity for up to 120 days, depending upon seniority.
The sick pay is 80% of normal wage.
 In case of maternity, employers must also pay 80% of the wage for
a total of 10 weeks (for the first three children only).
 Employers must also compensate workers for occupational
injuries. If the employee is temporarily unable to work, her employer
will give her 80% of the difference between her earnings before and after
the occupational accident, for a period up to 36 months. If she becomes
                                        
 137 The Ministry of Health used to subsidise privately run hospitals. They were
merged with the Hospital Authority in 1992.
 138 This section is based on Social Security Administration (1997).
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permanently unable to work, she is entitled to a lump sum of 48 to 96
times her monthly wage, depending upon her age and subject to a floor
and ceiling (HK$262,000-1,512,000 or £21,692-125184). A supplement
applies if she needs permanent attendance. If the disability is partial,
only a fraction of that amount will be paid. The employer must also pay
her medical care fees, subject to a daily maximum of HK$160 (£13).
Finally, if an employee dies at work, her employer will have to pay her
survivor a lump sum of 36 to 84 months of earnings, according to the
age of the diseased, subject to a ceiling and floor, as well as a funeral
grant of HK$14,000 (£1,160). Unlike for the other legal benefits,
employers must purchase a private insurance for the risk of
occupational injury.
 Employees unable to work for a longer period and who don’t have
any other means of support fall into the CSSA programme.
 Finally, the Department of Social Welfare runs two small programmes
compensating victims of traffic accidents and criminal injuries.
 
Old Age and Survivor
 Every elderly person over 70 is entitled to the Higher Old Age
Allowance (part of the SSA scheme), amounting to HK$635 per month
(£52). People between 65 and 70 years old may apply for the Normal Old
Age Allowance, which is HK$560 (£46). Unlike the other allowances, the
latter is means-tested. The income ceiling is HK$1,500 per month for a
single person and HK$2,500 for a couple (resp. £124 and £207). 139
 The poor elderly are taken in charge by the CSSA instead of the
SSA and receive their Old Age Allowance on top of the normal CSSA
flat benefit. As to survivor benefits, recipients of CSSA are entitled to a
funeral grant of HK$10,700 (£886).140
 Firms must pay mandatory severance pay for their retiring
workers who have worked for them at least five years (called Long
Service Payment). It is equal to two third of basic monthly salary times
the number of years of service. Each additional year of service beyond 31
counts for half only. The maximum severance pay is HK$270,000
(£22,354). If employees are enlisted in a retirement plan by their
employers, their pension may be deducted from the legal severance
pay.141
                                        
 139 See MacPherson (1992).
 140 See Social Security Administration (1997).
 141 See http://www.info.gov.hk.
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 In 1995, the government agreed to introduce a provident fund to
protect the fast ageing population against old age poverty. This scheme
will substantially change Hong Kong’ social security system, although it
will take a long time to mature before delivering its full benefits.142
 The Government also sponsors a number of homes for the elderly.
Disability
 Every registered disabled person is entitled to the Disability Allowance
(part of the SSA programme), amounting to HK$1,125 per month in 1995
(£93). Severely disabled people requiring constant attendance and who
are not residing in public institutions receive the Higher Disability
Allowance, which is twice as high. Doctors and social workers assess
eligibility, respectively.
 Disabled people who are also poor are taken in charge by the
CSSA instead. They receive the Disability Allowance on top of the
normal assistance benefits.
 Both the government and charities manage institutions for the
disabled.
 
Family
 There is no family allowance in Hong Kong. However, the Social
Welfare Department runs a programme to reimburse part of the fees of
child care centres for poor parents.143
 Lone parents in need are also entitled to the CSSA (see table 5 in
section I.4).
 The Department of Social Welfare and charities are running child
care centres and “family services centres”.144
 
Unemployment
 There is no unemployment insurance in Hong Kong. However, firms
must give one month notice to dismissed employees who are also
entitled to a severance payment if they have worked for that employer
for at least two years. The amount is the same as the Long Service
Payment (see Old Age and Survivor section).
 Indigent unemployed are eligible to CSSA aid (see table 5 in
section I.4). Small amounts of earned income are even disregarded to
encourage them to work, especially for aged workers.145
                                        
 142 See Chow (1998).
 143 See Department of Census and Statistics (1997c).
 144 For more information, see http://www.info.gov.hk.
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Education
 The state provides very cheap education at the primary and secondary
level (12 years). Attendance to elementary and middle school (9 years) is
mandatory and 99% of children are indeed enrolled. 84% of schools are
public or subvented by the government, the rest being private and
charging fees. The curriculum is uniform and largely decided by the
Ministry of Education.
 About 83.8% of students finishing middle schools go to high-
school, financed by the government. 19.6% of the relevant population is
enrolled in higher education institutions, most of which are private but
subvented as well.
 
Housing146
 Hong Kong, as a crowded city-state facing large immigration flows, has
run an ambitious housing policy since the 1950s. 35% of households live
in a flat rented from the Housing Authority (HA) and another 11% have
purchased their flats under the Home Purchase Loan Scheme.147 This
programme is opened to applicants to rental HA housing, as well as to
HA tenants, to encourage them to move to the private sector. It consists
of an interest-free loan of up to HK$400,000 or HK$600,000 for private
tenants (resp. £33,117 and £49,676), recoverable in 20 years. There is also
a mechanism that induces wealthier HA tenants to move out of public
housing. HA flats are small, standard and cheap accommodations rented
at fairly cheap rates (the norm being 15% of tenants’ median income,
18.5% for those selecting larger flats). According to data published by
the government, the rents per square meter are significantly lower than
the average of the private sector, although it is hard to make a rigorous
comparison as they differ in quality and location.148 Flats are allocated
on an administrative basis to applicants whose incomes do not exceed a
certain limit. HA provides limited assistance for some households who
cannot pay their rent. The HA is currently running a large surplus. Its
expenditures, including interests and dividends, amounted to only
                                                                                                                              
 145 See MacPherson (1992).
 146 This section is based on Chan (1996).
 147 See Department of Census and Statistics (1997b).
 148 See Department of Census and Statistics (1997c and 1997d).
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about half of the rental fees and loan reimbursements paid by tenants
and purchasers.149
 Singapore
Health care150
 Health care is provided by a mix of public and private facilities in
Singapore. They all charge user fees but some of them are subsidised by
the Ministry of Health.
 The government has set up three programmes to help patients
meet the user charges: (i) Medisave, the CPF’s health care branch, (ii)
MediShield, a catastrophic insurance scheme covering very large
medical bills and (iii) Medifund, a health endowment fund which
provides a safety net for the poor.
 From the 40% of workers’ wages put into CPF, 6 percentage points
are channelled to their Medisave Accounts.151 Self-employed must also
contribute 6% of their earnings. Workers may use their Medisave
savings to pay for hospitalisation expenses, a few outpatient treatments
incurred by themselves or their dependants, as well as a limited number
of private insurance premium. By the end of 1995, the average balance in
Medisave accounts was S$5,400 (£2,452).
 MediShield and MediShield Plus are voluntary insurance schemes
opened to all CPF members to complement Medisave. They provide
extra coverage for “major and prolonged” illness for those under 75
years old. They are distinct in their level of deductible, co-payment and
cap, as well as contribution rate. MediShield Plus is more expensive but
covers better quality treatment (e.g., private hospitals or single rooms in
public hospitals). 85% of eligible members have chosen to join the
scheme.
 Started in 1993, Medifund is an endowment fund set up especially
to help the poor pay for their health care. The Government has injected
S$500 million in it by 1997 (£227m). Only the interest income from the
fund is used to pay hospital bills of the poor. That income is distributed
                                        
 149 See Department of Census and Statistics (1996).
 150 All this section is based on the Ministry of Health,
http://www.gov.sg/moh/mohiss/hlthfin.htm (December 1997), the Central
Provident Fund, http://www.cpf.gov.sg (December 1997), and information
provided by the courtesy of the Ministry of Health.
 151 This percentage increases to 7% after 35 years of age, and to 8% after 45.
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to public sector hospitals, a committee of which consider applications
from needy patients and allocate the funds.
 Like in other countries, health care expenditures in Singapore tend to
rise as a proportion of GDP. The government’s strategy to cope with this
evolution is based on the following points:
· Progressively increase the Medisave contribution rate up to 10%.
· Encourage employers to top-up their employees’ Medisave
accounts as part of the total compensation package.
· Diversify MediShield and allow people to buy approved private
insurance with their Medisave account.
Invalidity, Maternity and Occupational Injuries152
Employees are entitled to 14 days of paid sick leave per year, or up to 60
days if he has been hospitalised.
In case of maternity, employers must pay 100% of the wage for a
total of 8 weeks (for the first two children only).
For occupational injuries, employers must also bear the whole cost
and are encouraged to buy a private insurance, which is mandatory for
some industries. Employees are entitled to their entire wage for 14 days
(60 if hospitalised) and two third of it thereafter, for a period of
maximum one year. This amount is subject to a floor of S$49,000 and a
ceiling of S$147,000 (£22,252 and £66,757). If the incapacity to work is
permanent, he receives a lump-sum corresponding to 6 to 12 years of
earnings (depending upon age). If the incapacity is partial, he will
receive only a fraction of that amount. If the injured employee needs
constant attendance, the lump-sum is topped up by 25%. Finally, if an
employee dies at work, his employer owes his survivor a lump sum of
four to nine years of earnings according to the age of the diseased, with
a maximum of S$111,000 and a minimum of S$37,000 (£50,408 and
16,802).
Old Age and Survivor153
From the 40% of workers’ wages put into CPF, 4 percentage points are
channelled to their Special Account that earns more interest than the
Ordinary account. CPF members may withdraw the balance of both
accounts plus interests when they reach the age of 55. The median
                                        
152 This section is based on Social Security Administration (1997). Figures of 1997.
153 See Central Provident Fund Board (1997) and Central Provident Fund,
http://www.cpf.gov.sg (December 1997). Figures of 1997.
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balance was S$98,296 in 1996 (£44639). They must however keep a
Minimum Sum of S$50,000 (£22,706) in the Retirement Account until age
60. Alternatively, they may pledge to keep their property, or use this
amount to buy an approved life annuity or leave it in a bank. This
minimum sum will be raised progressively by S$5,000 a year to reach
S$80,000 by 2003. They must also leave a minimum amount in their
Medisave Account, currently set at S$15,000 (£6,811). Only about half of
retiring employees have a sufficient balance to meet that requirement
however. Any CPF member may also top up his parents’ Retirement
Account, using either cash or their own Ordinary Account.
Government employees have a pension scheme of their own.
When CPF members die, the balances of their accounts are paid as
a lump sum to their nominated survivors or to her legal heirs.
As additional survivor benefit, the CPF offers a life insurance, the
Dependants Protection Scheme. It is administered by for-profit private
companies and provides a fixed amount of S$30,000 (£13,624) to families
whose main wage-earner has died or becomes permanently
incapacitated. The annual premium ranges from S$36 to S$360 (£16 to
£163) and may be paid out of a CPF account. 80% of eligible members
were effectively covered.
Needy Singapore citizens who are unable to work, have no savings
and no one to depend upon may seek financial aid under the Public
Assistance Scheme. The monthly allowance ranges from S$200 a month
for a single-person household, to a maximum of S$570 for four-person
household (resp. £90 and £570). It corresponds to 69% of the minimum
household expenditure calculated by the government.154 They are also
entitled to free medical care in government facilities, waived school fees
and scholarships.
As to services, the Ministry of Community Development sponsors
elderly homes and co-ordinates a network of community-based support
services and programmes to enable the elderly to remain physically,
mentally and socially active and to assist families in caring for their
elderly members. These include Senior Citizens' Clubs, the Befriender
Service, meal services, hotlines and counselling, mutual schemes and
day care facilities.
                                        
154 See Ramesh (1995).
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Disability
People becoming permanently incapacitated may withdraw their
savings from the CPF. They may also benefit from the Dependants
Protection Scheme (see above).
Poor disabled people may also be helped by the Public Assistance
programme (see previous section).
The Ministry of Community Development and other departments
sponsor disabled residences and provide a certain number of services to
the disabled, including special education, vocational training, day care,
residential care and employment services.
Family
The closest programme Singapore has to a family allowance is the Small
Families Improvement Scheme is a means-tested bursary and housing
support for small “intact” families whose budget does not exceed S$1
million.
Widows, orphans and lone mothers with dependant children are
entitled to the Public Assistance Scheme, although there were only 78
recipient households in 1997.
The government also subsidises some child care centres.
Unemployment
There is no unemployment insurance or allowance in Singapore.
Enterprises must compensate laid-off employees but the law does not
specify the amount of the severance payment, which is subject to
negotiations between employers and employees.
Categories of recipients of the Public Assistance Scheme do not
even include the unemployed.
Education
Attendance to primary and secondary school (6+4 years) is mandatory.
Primary school is free but secondary school is only partially subsidised.
87.4% of children are enrolled in secondary schools, of which 75% attend
public schools, 25% private subvented schools, a small minority
choosing independent schools, providing elite education for a fee. The
curriculum is set up by the Ministry of Education for government-
subvented schools, the independent schools having some freedom.
Every school and the Ministry of Education offer a certain number of
bursaries, scholarships and loans.
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Housing155
The government of Singapore has an ambitious aim for its housing
policy: all Singaporeans should become home owners. This policy has
two dimensions. First, the Housing and Development Board (HDB) has
been building and renting flats to hundred of thousands of families since
the 1950s. This was a response to the serious housing shortages and
appalling living conditions in many areas of Singapore. Second, the
government is using the CPF to promote home ownership, as members
can withdraw the bulk of their mandatory savings to purchase either
HDB or private accommodation.156 As a result, about 87% of the
population live in housing built by the HDB and 81% of Singaporeans
now own their flat.
The HDB offers a range of financing plans. Some discounted flats
are available for purchase by low-income families.157
The HDB is financed by loans from the government (most of
which indirectly comes from CPF members’ savings), but it also receives
an annual grant.
                                        
155 This section is based on Housing & Development Board,
http://www.hdb.gov.sg (December 1997).
156 There also exists a small Home Protection Scheme, a compulsory mortgage-
reducing insurance scheme.
157 See Housing & Development Board, http://www.hdb.gov.sg for more
details.
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Annex 2: Macroeconomic Data
Japan
bio.Y 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
GDP 430,040 458,299 471,064 475,381 479,260 482,930 500,356
Government
Expenditures
136,166 144,695 155,419 163,872 168,043 177,356 ..
Consumer Prices 100.00 103.30 105.10 106.40 107.10 107.00 107.20
Exchange Rate (=1
US$)
144.79 134.71 126.65 111.20 102.21 94.06 108.78
Source:  IMF (1997), except for government expenditures:  OECD (1997).
Note:  Figures in italic indicate a break in the time series
Korea
bio.W 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
GDP 179,539 215,734 240,392 267,146 305,970 351,295 389,979
Government
Expenditures
32,689 41,783 50,485 55,762 63,758 72,426 ..
Consumer Prices 100.00 109.30 116.10 121.70 129.30 135.10 141.80
Exchange Rate (=1
US$)
707.76 733.35 780.65 802.67 803.45 771.27 804.45
Source:  IMF (19971), except for government expenditures:  OECD (1997).
Note:  Figures in italic indicate a break in the time series.
Taiwan
bio.NT$ 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
GDP 4,307.043 4,810.705 5,337.693 5,874.513 6,376.498 6,892.046 7,477.540
Government
Expenditures
1,166.747 1,416.625 1,696.117 1,859.294 1,913.742 2,074.929 2,005.897
Consumer Prices 100.00 103.63 108.26 111.44 116.00 120.27 123.96
Exchange Rate
(=1 US$)
27.108 25.748 25.403 26.626 26.240 27.265 27.491
Source:  Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (1997).
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Hong Kong
bio.HK$ 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
GDP 582.500 668.500 779.300 897.500 1,010.900 1,084.200 1,199.000
Government
Expenditures
.. 92.191 113.332 147.438 164.155 183.158 ..
Consumer Prices 100 112 122.53 132.95 143.72 156.22 165.59
Exchange Rate
(=1 US$)
7.789 7.771 7.741 7.736 7.728 7.736 7.734
Sources:  Monetary Authority of Hong Kong (1997).  Except government expenditures:
Department of Census and Statistics (1996).
Note:  Government expenditures include the General Account only.
Singapore
bio.S$ 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
GDP 67.879 75.266 80.940 94.223 108.505 121.081 132.629
Government
Expenditures
14.223 15.966 15.858 16.354 15.059 19.233 ..
Consumer Prices 100 103.4 105.8 108.2 111.5 113.5 115
Exchange Rate
(=1 US$)
1.813 1.728 1.629 1.616 1.527 1.417 1.410
Source:  International Monetary Fund (1997).
Note:  The government expenditures include the central government only.
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Annex 3: Demographic Data
Japan
1995 ('000 and % active
population)
Men Women Total Men Women Total
Population 61,341 64,227 125,568 100.0 100.0 100.0
Population under 15 ('000, % pop.) 10,261 10,207 19,957 16.7 15.9 15.9
Population over 64 ('000, % pop.) 7,749 10,848 18,597 12.6 16.9 14.8
Active elderly 2,780 1,670 4,450 6.0 3.7 4.9
Active population 46,111 44,842 91,464 75.2 69.8 72.8
Students 4,890 4,240 9,130 10.6 9.5 10.0
House keepers 220 16,370 16,590 0.5 36.5 18.1
Inmates of social institutions 599 0.7
Inmates of prisons 46 0.1
Labour force 39,660 27,010 66,660 86.0 60.2 72.9
Unemployed 1,230 870 2,100 2.7 1.9 2.3
ILO unemployment rate - - - 3.1 3.2 3.2
Agricultural workers 1,780 1,620 3,400 3.9 3.6 3.7
Informal sector 1,220 3,950 5,170 2.6 8.8 5.7
Active in formal urban sector 35,430 20,570 55,990 76.8 45.9 61.2
Civil servants 3,420 1,960 5,380 7.4 4.4 5.9
Self-employed 5,500 2,340 7,840 11.9 5.2 8.6
Private sector employees 28,210 17,840 46,050 61.2 39.8 50.3
Source:  Statistics Bureau (1997)
Notes:  Informal sector = family workers + daily labourers.  Agricultural workers are
double-counted in occupational
1980 1995
Population ('000) 117,060 125,569
People living in institutions (%pop) 1.31% 1.64%
Number of households ('000) 35,824 43,447
Average household size 3.27 2.89
Household Composition
Non-family households 0.17% 0.31%
One-person households 19.83% 24.78%
couple only 12.45% 17.53%
couple + children 42.10% 34.36%
lone parents 5.73% 7.23%
couple w/ parents 1.70% 1.97%
couple w/ parents & children 12.20% 9.42%
others 5.82% 4.40%
Source: Statistics Bureau (1997).
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Korea
1996 ('000 and % active
population)
Men Women Total Men Women Total
Population 22,939 22,606 45,545 100.0 100.0 100.0
Population under 15 ('000, %pop.) 5,484 4,927 10,411 23.9 21.8 22.9
Population over 64 ('000, %pop.) 1,034 1,743 2,777 4.5 7.7 6.1
Active elderly (over 59) 1,032 804 1,836 4.5 3.6 4.0
Active population 16,734 15,887 34,193 72.9 70.3 75.1
Students 2,343 1,981 4,324 14.0 12.5 12.6
House keepers 516 6,148 6,664 3.1 38.7 19.5
Labour force 12,620 8,568 21,188 75.4 53.9 62.0
Unemployed 290 134 424 1.7 0.8 1.2
ILO unemployment rate - - - 2.3 1.7 2.0
Agricultural workers 1,264 1,141 2,405 7.6 7.2 7.0
Informal sector 1,182 2,538 3,720 7.1 16.0 10.9
Active in formal urban sector 9,884 4,755 14,639 59.1 29.9 42.8
Civil servants 495 143 638 3.0 0.9 1.9
Self-employed 4,122 1,677 5,799 24.6 10.6 17.0
Private sector employees 6,532 4,076 10,608 39.0 25.7 31.0
Source:  National Statistics Office (1997).
Notes:  Active population = people aged 15-59 plus active aged 60 and over.  Informal
sector = family workers and daily workers.  Agricultural workers are double-counted in
informal sector, self-employed and private sector employees categories.
1995
Population ('000) 44,609
People living in institutions (%pop) 1.18%
Number of households ('000) 12,958
Average household size 3.44
Household Composition
Non-family households 1.41%
One-person households 12.67%
couple only 12.66%
couple + children 50.38%
lone parents 7.41%
couple w/ parents 0.93%
other 2-generation households 4.56%
3 and more-generation households 9.97%
Earners per household 1.45
Source: National Statistics Office (1997).
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Taiwan
1996 ('000 and % active
population)
Men Women Total Men Women Total
Population 11,037 10,434 21,471 100.0 100.0 100.0
Population under 15 ('000, %pop.) 2,581 2,436 5,017 23.4 23.3 23.4
Population over 64 ('000, %pop.) 920 765 1,686 8.3 7.3 7.9
Active elderly 149 1.0
Active population 7,536 7,233 14,918 68.3 69.3 69.5
Students 2,003 13.4
House keepers 2,595 17.4
Labour force 5,662 3,648 9,310 75.1 50.4 62.4
Unemployed 154 88 242 2.0 1.2 1.6
ILO unemployment rate - - - .. .. ..
Agricultural workers 918 6.2
Informal sector 758 5.1
Active in formal urban sector 7,392 49.6
Civil servants 1,027 6.9
Self-employed 2,023 13.6
Private sector employees 5,259 35.3
Source:  Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (1997).
Notes:  Informal sector = family workers.  Agricultural workers are double-counted in the
self-employed, employees and family workers categories.
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Hong Kong
1996 ('000 and % active
population)
Men Women Total Men Women Total
Population 3,108 3,109 6,218 100.0 100.0 100.0
Population under 15 ('000, %pop.) 596 555 1,151 19.2 17.8 18.5
Population over 64 ('000, %pop.) 283 347 630 9.1 11.2 10.1
Active elderly 48 13 61 2.1 0.6 1.4
Active population 2,277 2,221 4,498 73.3 71.4 72.3
Students 693 659 1,352 30.4 29.7 30.0
House keepers 8 709 717 0.3 31.9 15.9
Labour force 1,925 1,257 3,182 84.5 56.6 70.7
Unemployed 92 47 139 4.0 2.1 3.1
ILO unemployment rate - - - .. .. ..
Agricultural workers 0 0 0 0.0
Informal sector 27 0.6
Active in formal urban sector 1,833 1,210 3,016 80.5 54.5 67.1
Civil servants 182 4.0
Self-employed 332 7.4
Private sector employees 2,503 55.6
Source:  Department of Census and Statistics (1996, 1997a and 1997b).
1981 1996
Population ('000) 4,987 6,218
People living in institutions (%pop) .. ..
Number of households ('000) 1,245 1,856
Average household size 4.01 3.35
Household Composition
Non-family households 2.22% 2.19%
One-person households 15.19% 14.92%
Unextended nuclear families 54.40% 63.57%
Horizontally extended nuclear
families
14.64% 9.41%
Vertically extended nuclear families 13.55% 9.91%
Source:  Department of Census and Statistics (1997a).
Note:  Horizontally extended families include “related
persons who do not form a nuclear family” and “two
or more nuclear families”.
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Singapore
1996 ('000 and % active
population)
Men Women Total Men Women Total
Population 1,531 1,513 3,044 100.0 100.0 100.0
Population under 15 ('000, %pop.) 359 335 695 23.5 22.1 22.8
Population over 64 ('000, %pop.) 95 115 210 6.2 7.6 6.9
Active elderly 20 6 26 1.8 0.5 1.2
Active population 1,097 1,069 2,166 71.7 70.6 71.2
Students 124 109 232 11.3 10.2 10.7
House keepers 2 454 456 0.2 42.5 21.1
Labour force 1,055 747 1,802 96.1 69.9 83.2
Unemployed 31 23 54 2.8 2.1 2.5
ILO unemployment rate - - - 2.7 2.8 2.7
Agricultural workers 4 0.2
Informal sector 21 1.0
Active in formal urban sector 1,724 0.0 0.0 79.6
Civil servants 62 2.9
Self-employed 236 10.9
Private sector employees 1,429 66.0
Source:  Department of Statistics Singapore (1997 and 1996).
Notes:  Informal sector = family workers.  Agricultural workers are double-counted in the
self-employed, employees and family workers categories.  House keepers and students:
data of 1995.
